Trent v. Dial Medical of Florida, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-2047,92-2047
• Parties: Earl TRENT, and all those similarly situated; Edwin Snead, Executor of the Estate of Elaine Snead Intervenor-Plaintiff in D.C.; Edwin Snead, in His Own Right Intervenor-Plaintiff in D.C. v. DIAL MEDICAL OF FLORIDA, INC.; Community Dialysis Centers; v. W.W. GRAINGER, INC.; American Machine and Tool Co. Inc. of Pennsylvania, a/k/a American Machine and Tool Co., Inc.; Baxter Healthcare Corporation; Earl Trent, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 217

33 F.3d 217

Earl TRENT, and all those similarly situated; Edwin Snead,

Executor of the Estate of Elaine Snead

Intervenor-Plaintiff in D.C.; Edwin

Snead, in His Own Right Intervenor-Plaintiff in D.C. v. DIAL MEDICAL OF FLORIDA, INC.; Community Dialysis Centers; v. W.W. GRAINGER, INC.; American Machine and Tool Co. Inc. of

Pennsylvania, a/k/a American Machine and Tool Co.,

Inc.; Baxter Healthcare Corporation;

Earl Trent, Appellant.

No. 92-2047.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued July 26, 1993.

Decided Aug. 12, 1994.

Ronald V. Cole (argued), Philadelphia, PA, for appellant.

Paul C. Quinn (argued), Steven G. Wigrizer, Wapner, Newman & Associates, Philadelphia, PA, for appellee, Edwin Snead, Executor of Estate of Elaine Snead and in his own right.

Joseph Frontino, Richard W. Yost, L'Abbate & Balkan, Philadelphia, PA, for appellee, Dial Medical of Florida, Inc.

Andrew A. Chirls (argued), Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, Philadelphia, PA, for appellee, Community Dialysis Centers.

Charles T. Roessing, White & Williams, Paoli, PA, for appellee, W.W. Grainger, Inc. and American Machine and Tool Co., Inc. of Pennsylvania a/k/a American Machine and Tool Co., Inc.

Before: MANSMANN, GREENBERG and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

LEWIS, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Earl Trent challenges a district court's decision to abstain from hearing his case until a similar state court case is resolved. We will affirm.

I.

Trent receives dialysis treatment at defendant Community Dialysis Center ("CDC") in Lansdowne, Pennsylvania. Defendant Dial Medical of Florida, Inc. ("Dial Medical") sells acid concentrate to CDC for use in dialysis treatment. Between late 1988 and early 1992, several CDC patients, including Trent, were found to have high serum aluminum levels, which could result in aluminum poisoning.

In July, 1992, Trent filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging negligence against CDC and Dial Medical. ¹ Specifically, Trent alleged that the elevated aluminum levels in CDC patients resulted from CDC's use of aluminum pumps to pump acid concentrate through patients as part of their dialysis treatment. In September, 1992, he filed a "motion for class maintenance," seeking certification of the class described in his amended complaint--fifty-three CDC patients who have tested positive for serum aluminum levels of greater than 100 micrograms per liter (mcg/l) since January, 1990.

Shortly thereafter, Edwin Snead, who had earlier filed a similar class action complaint against CDC and its two medical directors in state court, moved to intervene in Trent's lawsuit. Snead, whose wife had died of aluminum poisoning after receiving dialysis treatment at CDC, sought in his case to represent a class comprised of all CDC patients injured by CDC's allegedly defective dialysis equipment and methods. Snead's complaint alleged negligence and outrageous conduct and included counts for wrongful death and survival.

In November 1992, the district court granted Snead's motion to intervene, denied Trent's motion for class certification and sua sponte decided to abstain from hearing the Trent case in light of the pendency of the Snead case in state court. The following order issued:

The motion of Edwin Snead ... to intervene as a party plaintiff is GRANTED.

The motion of plaintiff Earl Trent for class certification is DENIED without prejudice.

This suit is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This case is to remain in status quo and the Statute of Limitations is tolled.

It is further understood that all discovery and settlement discussions will continue in coordination with the action currently pending in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas styled Snead v. Community Dialysis Center, Inc..... If intervention by the court is needed or desired, the parties may ask for assistance by either filing the appropriate motions, writing to the court or setting a telephone conference.

The parties shall keep the court advised of the status of this case and the state court action. When they are ready for trial or wish a settlement conference all that is necessary is to write directly to the court or set a telephone conference.

App. at 185-86.

Since this appeal was argued, a class has been certified in the Snead case as to duty and breach of duty. Although the time period for opting out of that class has expired, Trent has chosen not to opt out. Trent appeals the district court's decision to abstain from hearing his case.

II.

Initially we must determine whether federal appellate jurisdiction exists. The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(a)(1). ² The inquiry into our jurisdiction, which we would undertake in any event but which is also the subject of a pending motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, is more complex due to conflicting statements in the district court's order.

That order indicates that Trent's case was dismissed without prejudice. An order dismissing a case is, of course, final and appealable. Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Callison, 844 F.2d 133, 134-35 & n. 1 (3d Cir.1988). Even dismissals without prejudice have been held to be final and appealable if they "end[ ] [the] suit so far as the District Court was concerned," United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n. 1, 69 S.Ct. 824, 825 n. 1, 93 L.Ed. 1042 (1949), although we have indicated that such dismissals may not constitute final orders until the party seeking relief renounces any intention to reinstate litigation. See Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 (3d Cir.1991).

The court's order is not clearly a dismissal, however, for it states that the case is "to remain in status quo," "discovery and settlement discussions will continue in coordination with" the Snead case, the parties may contact the court if they desire judicial intervention, and the parties need only "write directly to the court or set a telephone conference" when they "are ready for trial or wish a settlement conference." App. at 185-86. The order thus appears to remove the case from the district court's docket of pending cases but to anticipate reactivation. See Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237 (3d Cir.1977). Therefore, the proper jurisdictional inquiry focusses on an interpretation of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), and other cases addressing the issue of whether a stay order is final for purposes of appeal. See Rolo v. General Development Corp., 949 F.2d 695, 700-02 (3d Cir.1991); Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 104-05 (3d Cir.1989); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Underwriters, Inc., 846 F.2d 196, 198 (3d Cir.1988); Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732 (3d Cir.1983).

In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court held that a stay grounded in the pendency of similar litigation in state court is appealable if it "effectively deprive[s] the plaintiff of its right to a federal forum because once the state court adjudicate[s] the issues in the case, a federal court would be bound to honor those determinations as res judicata." Schall, 885 F.2d at 104. Under Moses H. Cone, even if a stay order is entered with the expectation that the federal litigation will resume if the plaintiff does not obtain relief in state court, the stay decision may be appealed if "the object of the stay is to require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state forum." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. at 934 n. 11.

That is precisely the effect the district court's order will have here. It is clear that the district court judge expected that Snead would resolve this case, at least in large part. A decision in Snead will constitute res judicata as to at least the two major issues (duty and breach) in Trent. ³ Effectively requiring Trent either to wait until Snead is resolved or to remain in the Snead class deprives him of the opportunity to pursue remedies in federal court, thus constituting a requirement that "all or an essential part of the federal suit ... be litigated in a state forum." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. at 934 n. 11. Since issuing the order in question, in fact, the district court has denied as moot a motion to file a second amended complaint, thus implying that it believes it has effectively disposed of the case.

In Moses H. Cone, "[t]he Court distinguished between stay orders that 'merely ... have the practical effect of allowing a state court to be the first to rule on a common issue' (such as an 'ordinary delay in the interest of docket control') and stay orders whose 'sole purpose and effect ... are precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.' ... Only the latter type of stay order is immediately appealable." Schall, 885 F.2d at 104, quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. at 934 n. 11. CDC attempts to categorize this case as one in which the district court has issued a stay merely to afford the state court an opportunity to rule first on a common issue. It sees this order as an attempt at docket control rather than an action which effectively dismisses Trent's case. Thus, it argues that we lack jurisdiction.

Indeed, portions of the order point in the direction CDC indicates. The order provides that "the case is to remain in the status quo" and that "all discovery and settlement discussion will continue in coordination with the action currently pending in ... Snead." App. at 185. It also instructs the parties that the judge will be amenable to intervening if the parties ask him to do so, and that they should keep him "advised of the status of this case and the state court action." Id. In the same vein, it provides that "[w]hen [the parties] are ready for trial or wish a settlement conference all that is necessary is to write directly to the court or set a...