Trenton Banking Co. v. Rittenhouse

• Citation: 115 A. 443
• Decision Date: 14 November 1921
• Docket Number: No. 15.,15.
• Parties: TRENTON BANKING CO. v. RITTENHOUSE.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

115 A. 443

TRENTON BANKING CO.

v. RITTENHOUSE.

No. 15.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 14, 1921.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by the Trenton Banking Company, as administrator, against John C. Rittenhouse. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Wall, Haight, Carey & Hartpence, of Jersey City, and Hervey S. Moore, of Trenton, for appellant.

William E. Blackman, of Trenton, for respondent.

WALKER, Ch. This is a suit in the New Jersey Supreme Court on a book account for groceries sold by the plaintiff's decedent to the defendant, to which the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. The case was tried at circuit before Lloyd, J., without a jury, on an agreed state of facts which sufficiently appear in his opinion, which is as follows:

"This case was heard upon stipulation of facts and presents the single question of their sufficiency to remove the bar of the statute of limitations pleaded by the defendant. The stipulation is 'that in 1895 there was due [the plaintiff] on a grocery account the sum of $747.79, and there was paid on that account, March 22, 1907, $10; October 1, 1913, $25; June 4, 1915, $5; April 14, 1916, $5.'

"The proofs consist of letters accompanying the payments in which the defendant uniformly promised further payments on account. In 1917 he wrote plaintiff's counsel, in reply to a communication, 'Inclosed find check to apply on account of Charles W. Reed.' The tenth section of the statute of limitations provides that no acknowledgment or promise by words only shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, unless in writing, coupled, however, with the proviso that nothing therein should alter or take away or lessen the effect of any payment of any principal or interest.

"Whether the writings, standing alone, are sufficient to revive the debt, it is not necessary to decide. Taken in connection with the payments, I have no doubt of such sufficiency. It was well settled before the passage of the act that payments on account had the effect of creating a new obligation, provided the debt be identified as one larger in amount than the payments involved, and that same rule of law exists since the passage of the act. Vaughn v. Hankinson, 35 N. J. Law, 79; Roniaine v. Corlies, 47 N. J. Law, 108. In the former of the two cases cited Chief Justice Beasley denied the sufficiency of payments of money, standing alone, to revive an entire book account, but uses this language: 'Upon turning to the decisions, it will be found that the part payment, which will operate to remove the bar of the statute, must be in part satisfaction of a larger debt known to the party.' In the latter case Justice Van Syckel held that payments with knowledge were sufficient to revive the claim of a book account, the Justice saying: 'It must appear that the payment is made only as part of a larger debt, for in the absence of such evidence it will be deemed an admission of no more indebtedness than it pays. While, therefore, the parol promise to pay the balance of the debt is not effective, as a new promise, to take the claim out of the statute, it is competent to show that the debtor intended to apply the payment as in part satisfaction only of a larger claim then recognized * * * as subsisting and unpaid.'

"In the case before me the debt is established by the stipulation. It was a grocery account, recognized in all its integrity when the defendant agreed to the stipulation. On it he paid various sums of money down to within two years of bringing suit. Both the stipulation and the letters show the payments to be in recognition of a larger debt. That the exact figures of the claim were all along known to the defendant is a fair inference from the admissions in the stipulation and the nature of the charges. The latter were no doubt for necessaries furnished him upon his order, of which he would justly be presumed to be fully cognizant as to the articles and prices. The stipulation as to the exact figures leads to no other conclusion. If he knows them now, he must have known them when he contracted the debt, for no other source of information is disclosed in the case.

"While the statute is one of repose, intended to protect honest debtors from the payment of stale claims, where the evidence to refute them may be supposed to be lost or destroyed, it is not to be used to defeat an admittedly honest claim, where the debtor, knowing of its existence, admits the claim to be correct, pays sums of money on account and repeatedly promises in writing to make additional payments thereon."

The judgment under review will be affirmed, for the reasons stated by the judge at circuit. There is, however, a matter of practice apparent upon the face of this record which should be noticed. It concerns the grounds of appeal filed by the defendant appellant.

In this case the Supreme Court was the court of first instance, the suit having been commenced there, and was tried at circuit, with Judgment entered in the Supreme Court on the postea; therefore the...