Tres Lotes LLC v. BNSF Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14–CV–566–MV–WPL.,14–CV–566–MV–WPL.
• Parties: TRES LOTES LLC, a New Mexico Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, and Mark Bryant, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

61 F.Supp.3d 1213

TRES LOTES LLC, a New Mexico Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff

v.BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, and Mark Bryant, Defendants.

No. 14–CV–566–MV–WPL.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Signed Nov. 21, 2014.

Floyd D. Wilson, Myers, Oliver & Price, P.C., Cedar Crest, NM, Tye Christopher Harmon, Harmon Law Office, Clovis, NM, for Plaintiff.

Stanley N. Harris, Modrall Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk PA, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARTHA VÁZQUEZ, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Tres Lotes LLC's Motion to Remand and Supporting Memorandum [Doc. 11]. The Court, having considered the motions, briefs, relevant law, and being otherwise fully informed, finds that the motion is well-taken and will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Despite the extensive procedural maneuvering by the parties and the disagreement regarding the timeline of events, the facts relevant to Plaintiff's Motion are easily summarized.

I. The Property Dispute

In the winter of 2011, Plaintiff Tres Lotes LLC (“Tres Lotes”) began “looking into the purchase of” a building for use as a law office, including the “Subject Property” at issue here. Doc. 8–1 ¶ 8. While generally suitable to the Plaintiff, the south wall of the Subject Property immediately abuts the BNSF Railway Company's (“BNSF”) rail terminal, such that it “is not physically possible to obtain access, ingress or egress” to a portion of the Subject Property without traversing BNSF's land. Id. ¶ 7. Tres Lotes alleges that, upon learning of the property's idiosyncratic limitations, its members met with Mark Bryant, a representative of BNSF, to discuss “their desire and intent to access, for ingress and egress purposes” a portion of BNSF's property immediately adjacent to the Subject Property. Id. ¶ 13. According to the Plaintiff, Bryant, after speaking with “unknown individuals at BNSF,” advised the Plaintiff's members that BNSF agreed with the proposed access agreement. Id. ¶¶ 17–21.

Months later, after renovations had begun on the Subject Property, another BNSF employee, Mr. Harry Lara, approached workers at the building and accused them of trespassing on BNSF property; Plaintiff states that Lara later explained that BNSF had changed its mind and that Tres Lotes no longer had permission to traverse BNSF property. Id. ¶¶ 56, 60–63. Doc. 8–4 ¶¶ 14–15. As a result of its reliance on Bryant's initial representations, Tres Lotes claims that it has “expended or committed to expend in excess of $221,000.00,” including the purchase of the Subject Property and subsequent renovations. Doc. 8–1 ¶ 68. Shortly after BNSF allegedly revoked its permission, Plaintiff filed suit in New Mexico state court.

II. Procedural History

This is the parties' second trip to federal court on this dispute. On January 29, 2014, Tres Lotes filed its first Verified Complaint in a New Mexico district court against BNSF; BNSF promptly removed the action to federal court. See Doc. 1 at 3. Evidently perceiving a weakness in its argument against federal diversity jurisdiction, Tres Lotes dismissed the first Verified Complaint in favor of a second Verified Complaint, which purports to join as a defendant to the action Mark Bryant, a New Mexico citizen. See Doc. 8–1 ¶ 2; Doc. 1 at 3–4. Shortly after the instant case was filed, BNSF again complied with the procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446 and again removed the action to this Court. See Doc. 1 at 5.

Tres Lotes seeks injunctive relief recognizing an easement, either by implication, necessity, estoppel, or prescription, across a portion of Defendant's property, including a “strip of BNSF's existing paved surface” about twenty-five feet wide. See Doc. 8–1 ¶¶ 113–15, 117, 123, 131. It appears that this injunction would, in effect, enforce the terms of the purported access agreement with BNSF. The area included in this twenty-five foot strip, however, is immediately adjacent to Track 504, an active spur of BNSF's railroad, which is currently “subject to an industry track agreement” with a third party, who “uses the track for loading and storage of cars used to transport grain.” Doc. 1–3 ¶ 7.

In the alternative, the Plaintiff requests monetary damages not to exceed $74,000.

DISCUSSION

A state court defendant is generally entitled to remove “a civil action over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction” to an appropriate federal court. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ). However, in our constitutional system, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Sunshine Haven Nursing Operations, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 742 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result of this limitation, “there is a presumption against removal jurisdiction, which the defendant seeking removal must overcome.” Williams v. Board of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 990 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1133–34 (D.N.M.2014). See also Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1094–95 (10th Cir.2005) (“It is well-established that statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts, and particularly removal statutes, are to be narrowly construed in light of our constitutional role as limited tribunals.”). Here, BNSF argues that removal is proper because this Court has both federal question and diversity jurisdiction over this case. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. The Court disagrees. For the reasons explained below, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action and therefore must remand the case to the Ninth Judicial District Court for the State of New Mexico, County of Curry.

I. Federal Question Jurisdiction

BNSF contends that removal is proper because Tres Lotes's claims are completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”). Doc. 15 at 1. See also 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. “Ordinarily,” the Supreme Court has explained, “federal preemption is raised as a defense to the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint.”Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). See also Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (noting that a defense based on “the pre-emptive effect of a federal statute” generally does not constitute grounds for removal). “However the Supreme Court has recognized an exception or ‘independent corollary’ ” to this general rule “known as the ‘complete pre-emption’ doctrine.” Felix v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1154 (10th Cir.2004) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425 ). Any cause of action that is “completely” preempted is “considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law” for jurisdictional purposes. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425. See also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207–08, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004). Stated differently, complete preemption is a “specific situation in which a federal law not only preempts a state law to some degree but also substitutes a federal cause of action for the state cause of action, thereby manifesting Congress's intent to permit removal.” Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir.1996). Hence, if the ICCTA “completely” preempts Tres Lotes's nominally state law claims, this Court has federal question jurisdiction over those claims.

To begin, the ICCTA provides that “the jurisdiction of the [Surface Transportation Board] over:

(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and

(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State,

is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.

49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). “Transportation,” in turn, is defined as:

(A) a locomotive, car, vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use; and

(B) services related to that movement, including receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, and interchange of passengers and property

49 U.S.C. § 10102(9).

Despite this express preemption in the statute, however, the question remains whether Congress intended for the ICCTA to exert complete preemption in the context presented in the instant case. See Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir.2011) (“In determining the nature and reach of federal preemption, Congress's intent is the ‘ultimate touchstone.’ ”) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) ). A careful reading of the statute reveals that its preemptive effect is confined to the regulation of rail transportation and that, “[w]hile certainly expansive, [the] definition of ‘transportation’ does not encompass everything touching on railroads.” Emerson v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 503 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir.2007). See also St. Charles Inv. Co. v. C.I.R., 232 F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir.2000) (“we will assume that Congress's intent is expressed correctly in the ordinary meaning of the words it employs.”).

The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, which explained that the...