Tressler v. Summit Twp., Case No. 3:17-cv-32
| Decision Date | 29 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-32 |
| Parties | GRANT TRESSLER, Plaintiff, v. SUMMIT TOWNSHIP, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court are Defendant Summit Township's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 66) and Motion to Strike Response in Opposition, Exhibit 4. (ECF No. 77.) These Motions are fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. (See ECF Nos. 67-71, 73, 77-78.) For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 66) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and Defendant's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 77) is DENIED AS MOOT.
Plaintiff filed a three-count Complaint against the Township on March 1, 2017. (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff's Complaint alleged: (1) a violation of the Clean Water Act and Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Law (id. ¶¶ 55-59); (2) continuing trespass (id. ¶¶ 60-67); and (3) continuing nuisance. (Id. ¶¶ 68-76.)
On November 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") as a defendant. (See ECF No. 26.) The Amended Complaint contained the same three counts—for violation of the Clean Water Act and Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Law, continuing trespass, and continuing nuisance. (Id.)
On December 29, 2017, PennDOT filed a Motion to Dismiss. (See ECF Nos. 34-36.) In a Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court granted PennDOT's Motion to Dismiss on sovereign-immunity grounds. (ECF No. 37 at 6-7.) The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. (Id. at 7-8.)
Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint on March 2, 2018. (ECF No. 38.) His Second Amended Complaint named Leslie S. Richards, in her official capacity as Secretary of PennDOT, as a defendant. (Id. ¶ 1.) On September 28, 2018, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against Secretary Richards because Plaintiff and Secretary Richards reached a settlement agreement. (ECF No. 64.)
From late 2017 until September of 2018, the parties engaged in discovery. (See ECF Nos. 18, 46, 62.) On January 12, 2019, the Township—the only remaining defendant in the case—filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 66.)
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. The Court includes additional material facts in Section IV where necessary.
Plaintiff Grant Tressler owns property at 7974 Mt. Davis Road in Meyersdale, Summit Township (the "Township"), Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 68 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff's property is bordered and surrounding as follows:
(Id. ¶ 2.)
There are four or five private residences on the west side of Mt. Davis Road, across from and upgradient of Plaintiff's property. (Id. ¶ 6.) There is a "ditch and culvert" drainage system on the west side of Mt. Davis Road. (Id. ¶ 3.) Water enters the ditch-and-culvert system and then flows through pipes underneath Mt. Davis Road and onto Plaintiff's property. (Id. ¶ 4.) This case arises from wastewater running from the west side of Mt. Davis Road, through the ditch-and-culvert system, onto Plaintiff's property, and then into the Casselman River.
Plaintiff purchased his property in 2009. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff claims that a test of his well water in March of 2010 revealed a detectable amount of sewage in that water. (Id.) The alleged sewage originates from the homes on the west side of Mt. Davis Road discharging their wastewater into the ditch-and-culvert system, thereby polluting the water on Plaintiff's property. (Id. ¶ 8.)
Mt. Davis Road is a state highway owned and maintained by PennDOT. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 14.) PennDOT is responsible for maintenance and decision-making related to state highways, including the utilization of ditches and drainage facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) PennDOT constructed the ditch-and-culvert drainage system on the west side of Plaintiff's property. (Id. ¶ 20.) The ditch-and-culvert drainage system is located either within a PennDOT right-of-way along Mt. Davis Road or on private property to the north of Plaintiff's property. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.)
In August of 2015, PennDOT attempted to stop the flow of wastewater onto Plaintiff's property by replacing two cross pipes under Mt. Davis Road. (Id. ¶ 22.) During that replacement, PennDOT crushed a separate pipe on Plaintiff's property leaving a "big, open septic tank" in his front yard. (Id. ¶ 25.)
On September 25, 2015, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ("PADEP") inspected Plaintiff's property. (ECF No. 70-1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 71 ¶ 4.) PADEP inspection reports note that discharge that appeared to be raw sewage that flowed from ditch-and-culvert drainage system on Mt. Davis Road into the Casselman River. (ECF No. 70-1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 71 ¶ 4.) Those reports listed Summit Township as the "Responsible Party." (ECF No. 70-1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 71 ¶ 4.)
PADEP devised a short-term solution to the wastewater problem on Plaintiff's property. (Id. ¶ 25.) PADEP directed the Township and PennDOT to add pipe to the ditch system on Mt. Davis Road. (Id.) This project was designed to reroute the flow of wastewater until a permanent sewer system was installed. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) PennDOT and the Township agreed to collaborate on that project. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.)
In October of 2015, PennDOT and the Township attempted to reroute the wastewater away from Plaintiff's property. (Id. ¶ 29.) The Township installed 400 feet of pipe across from Plaintiff's property and attempted to seal pipes below Mt. Davis Road using cement. (Id.) However, Plaintiff claims that wastewater still enters his property through one of the pipes below Mt. Davis Road. (Id. ¶ 31; ECF No. 70-1 ¶ 1; ECF No. 71 ¶ 1.)
In October of 2018, PennDOT plugged one of the pipes underneath Mt. Davis Road as a term of the settlement agreement between Plaintiff and PennDOT's Secretary Richards.2 (ECF No. 70-1 ¶ 6.)
The Court has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff's claim arises under the laws of the United States. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Venue in this district is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial portion of the events underlying this case occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only where . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Melrose, Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Issues of fact are genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Material facts are those that will affect the outcome of the trial under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The court's role is "not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovingparty." Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009). "In making this determination, 'a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor.'" Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets this burden, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials" of the pleading, but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 n.11, (1986)). "For an issue to be genuine, the nonmovant needs to supply more than a scintilla of evidence in support of its position—there must be sufficient evidence (not mere allegations) for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant." Coolspring Stone Supply v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) () (internal quotation marks omitted).
For the following reasons, the Township is entitled to summary judgment on part of Plaintiff's first claim for unlawful discharge in violation of the federal Clean Water Act and Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Law. The Township is also entitled to summary judgment onPlaintiff's state-law tort claims for nuisance and trespass. The Court will separately address these claims.
1. The Township is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claim Under the Clean Water Act and Section 201 Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law; But is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claim Under Section 401 of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law (Count I)
Count I of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint asserts that the Township violated the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) and...
To continue reading
Request your trial