Trest v. Cain

• Citation: 522 U.S. 87,118 S.Ct. 478,139 L.Ed.2d 444
• Decision Date: 09 December 1997
• Docket Number: 967901
• Parties: Richard F. TREST, Petitioner, v. Burl CAIN, Warden
• Court: United States Supreme Court

522 U.S. 87

118 S.Ct. 478

139 L.Ed.2d 444

Richard F. TREST, Petitioner,

v Burl CAIN, Warden.

No. 96-7901.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 10, 1997.

Decided Dec. 9, 1997.

Syllabus^*

In upholding the District Court's refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus vacating petitioner Trest's Louisiana prison sentence, the Fifth Circuit stated its belief that a state court would refuse to consider Trest's federal claims as untimely, and that this "procedural default'' was an adequate and independent state ground for denying him relief. In his petition for certiorari, Trest pointed out that the Fifth Circuit had raised and decided the "procedural default'' question sua sponte, and that language in the court's opinion suggested that it had thought that, once it had noticed the possibility of a procedural default, it was required to raise the matter on its own.

Held: A court of appeals is not "required'' to raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte. Pp. ___-___.

(a) In the habeas context, procedural default is normally a "defense'' that the State is "obligated to raise'' and "preserv[e]'' if it is not to "lose the right to assert the defense thereafter.'' Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, ----, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 2082, 135 L.Ed.2d 457. This Court is unaware of any precedent stating that a habeas court must raise such a matter where the State itself does not do so. P. ___.

(b) This is not an appropriate case in which to examine whether the law nonetheless permitted the Fifth Circuit to raise the procedural default sua sponte. First, its opinion contains language suggesting it believed that, despite Louisiana's failure to raise the matter, Circuit precedent required, not simply permitted, it to consider a potential procedural default. Second, Trest made clear in his certiorari petition that he intended to limit the question to mandatory consideration, and Louisiana in its response did not object, suggest alternate wording, or ask this Court to consider the question in any broader context. Third, the broader question cannot be easily answered in the context of this case, for this Court is uncertain about matters which arguably are relevant to the question of whether the law permitted the Fifth Circuit to raise a procedural default sua sponte: questions about the exhaustion of Trest's federal claims in state court and about the relevant procedural rules to be applied. The parties might have considered these questions, and the Fifth Circuit might have determined their relevance or their answers, had that court not decided the procedural default question without giving the parties an opportunity for argument. Pp. ___-___.

94 F.3d 1005, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Rebecca L. Hudsmith, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Kathleen E. Petersen, for respondent.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner in this case, Richard Trest, seeks a writ of habeas corpus, which would vacate a long sentence that he is serving in a Louisiana prison for armed robbery. The District Court refused to issue the writ. Trest appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which ruled against him on the ground of "procedural default.'' Trest v. Whitley, 94 F.3d 1005, 1007 (1996). The Fifth Circuit believed that Trest had failed to raise his federal claims on time in state court, that a state court would now refuse to consider his claims for that reason, and that this state procedural reason amounted to an adequate and independent state ground for denying Trest relief. Hence, in the absence of special circumstances, a federal habeas court could not reach the merits of Trest's federal claims. Id., at 1007-1009; see generally Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982).

In his petition for certiorari to this Court, Trest pointed out that the Court of Appeals had raised and decided the question of "procedural default'' sua sponte. The parties themselves had neither raised nor argued the matter. And language in the Court of Appeals' opinion suggested that the court had thought that, once it had noticed the possibility of a procedural default, it was required to raise the matter on its own. Trest consequently asked us to decide whether a court of appeals, reviewing a district court's habeas corpus decision, "is required to raise . . . sua sponte'' a petitioner's potential procedural default. Pet. for Cert i (emphasis added). We agreed to do so.

Precedent makes clear that the answer to the question presented is "no.'' A court of appeals is not "required'' to raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte. It is not as if the presence of a procedural default deprived the federal court of jurisdiction, for this Court has made clear that in the habeas context, a procedural default, that is, a critical failure to comply with state procedural law, is not a jurisdictional matter. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. ----, ----, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 1522, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997); Coleman, supra, at 730-731, 111 S.Ct., at 2554-2555. Rather, " [i]n the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine,'' of which a procedural default is typically an instance, "is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism.'' Coleman, supra, at 730, 111 S.Ct., at 2554 (contrasting habeas proceeding with this Court's direct review of a state court judgment). Thus, procedural default is normally a "defense'' that the State is "obligated to raise'' and "preserv[e]'' if it is not to "lose the right to assert the defense thereafter.'' Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, ----, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 2082, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996); see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234, n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2127, n. 1, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). We are not aware of any precedent stating that a habeas court must raise such a matter where the State itself does not do so. And Louisiana concedes as much, for it says in its brief that "the Fifth Circuit clearly was not "required' to sua sponte invoke procedural default.'' Brief for Respondent 16-17.

Louisiana, however, would like us to go beyond the question presented and hold that the law permitted (though it did not require) the Fifth Circuit to raise the procedural default sua sponte. Cf. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-134, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 1674-1675, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (appellate court may raise sua sponte petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies). We recognize some uncertainty in the lower courts as to whether, or just when, a habeas court may consider a procedural default that the State at some point has waived, or failed to raise. Compare Esslinger v. Davis, 44 F.3d 1515, 1525-1528 (C.A.11 1995) (sua sponte invocation of procedural default serves no important federal interest) with Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502-505 (C.A.10 1992) (comity and scarce judicial resources may justify court raising state procedural default sua sponte); see...