Treverrow v. State, No. 35311
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
| Writing for the Court | SACK; THORNAL; THOMAS |
| Citation | 194 So.2d 250 |
| Parties | Iames A. TREVERROW, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 25 January 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 35311 |
Page 250
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Page 251
A. K. Black, Lake City, for petitioner.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Thomas E. Boyle, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
SACK, Circuit Judge.
We granted certiorari on an alleged conflict between the decision below of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Treverrow v. State of Florida, Fla., 184 So.2d 473, and our opinions in Cooper v. State, Fla., 143 So. 217, and Chacon v. State, 102 So.2d 578, and Harrington v. State, 110 So.2d 495.
At issue are the questions of the sufficiency of the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued and the right of the defendant-petitioner to have disclosed to him the name of the informer. The Beverage officer's affidavit contained the following material language:
'On Wednesday, January 6, 1965, a reliable confidential informer told me that about two days prior to this date, he saw two metal drums containing fermented mash inside the above described premises.'
It will be seen that the agent here affirmed under oath: (a) that the information given him was by one whom he considered reliable, and (b) that the information consisted of a direct observation by the informer of the presence of the mash inside the premises in question.
In the Cooper case, supra, the affidavit only said:
'That the aforesaid belief of affiant is based upon the following facts; upon information furnished affiant by parties who have knowledge of such sale and possession and whom affiant believes to be truthful and reliable.'
This affidavit stated no factual basis for the alleged knowledge of the informer. Such knowledge could have been based on hearsay or hearsay on hearsay. It contained no statement that the informer had seen or participated in the sale or the possession of the liquor. As we pointed out in our opinion:
'It will be observed that this language does not state any fact on which such
Page 252
reason or belief is based, but is equivalent only to an allegation 'that affiant has reason to believe and does believe, on information and belief.''While the information given to the officer in the case sub judice came from a third person and would not be admissible at the trial of the cause, yet in Chacon, supra, we announced that the information forming the basis for a search warrant is not to be measured by its admissibility as evidence in the trial of the...
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State v. Zamora, 86-3079
...to withhold the identity of a confidential informer...." State v. Hassberger, 350 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.1977); see Treverrow v. State, 194 So.2d 250, 252 (Fla.1967); Spataro v. State, 179 So.2d 873, 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); State v. Hardy, 114 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959); Harrington v. State, 11......
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State v. Hassberger, s. 48444 and 48445
...limited privilege to withhold the identity of a confidential informer is well established under Florida law. Treverrow v. State, 194 So.2d 250 (Fla.1967); Harrington v. State, 110 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959); Spataro v. State, 179 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Even where the informer neve......
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Lewandowski v. State, 579S130
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Lang v. Tucker, Case No. 5:09cv229/RS/EMT
...thePage 15burden is on the defendant claiming an exception to the rule to show why he is entitled to disclosure. See Treverrow v. State, 194 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1967). The first component necessarily centers around a specific defense asserted by the defendant in the case, as to which the ......