Trevino v. Thaler
Decision Date | 28 May 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 11–10189.,11–10189. |
Parties | Carlos TREVINO, Petitioner v. Rick THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Warren A. Wolf, San Antonio, TX, for Petitioner.
Andrew S. Oldham, for Respondent.
Warren Alan Wolf, Counsel of Record, Law Office of Warren Alan Wolf, John J. Ritenour, Jr., The Ritenour Law Firm, P.C., San Antonio, TX, Seth P. Waxman, Catherine M.A. Carroll, Annie L. Owens, Nicole Ries Fox, Ari Holtzblatt, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Daniel T. Hodge, First Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Adam W. Aston, Andrew S. Oldham, Deputy Solicitors General, Counsel of Record, James P. Sullivan, Arthur C. D'Andrea, Assistant Solicitors General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent.
In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), we considered the right of a state prisoner to raise, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In that case an Arizona procedural rule required a defendant convicted at trial to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during his first state collateral review proceeding—or lose the claim. The defendant in Martinez did not comply with the state procedural rule. But he argued that the federal habeas court should excuse his state procedural failing, on the ground that he had good "cause" for not raising the claim at the right time, namely that, not only had he lacked effective counsel during trial, but also he lacked effective counsel during his first state collateral review proceeding.
We held that lack of counsel on collateral review might excuse defendant's state law procedural default. We wrote:
"[A] procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective." Id., at ––––, 132 S.Ct., at 1320.
At the same time we qualified our holding. We said that the holding applied where state procedural law said that "claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel mustbe raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding." Ibid. (emphasis added).
In this case Texas state law does not say "must." It does not on its face require a defendant initially to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a state collateral review proceeding. Rather, that law appears at first glance to permit (but not require) the defendant initially to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. The structure and design of the Texas system in actual operation, however, make it "virtually impossible" for an ineffective assistance claim to be presented on direct review. See Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 810–811 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). We must now decide whether the Martinez exception applies in this procedural regime. We conclude that it does.
A Texas state court jury convicted petitioner, Carlos Trevino, of capital murder. After a subsequent penalty-phase hearing, the jury found that Trevino "would commit criminal acts of violence in the future which would constitute a continuing threat to society," that he "actually caused the death of Linda Salinas or, if he did not actually cause her death, he intended to kill her or another, or he anticipated a human life would be taken," and that "there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment" rather than death. 449 Fed.Appx. 415, 418 (C.A.5 2011). The judge consequently imposed a sentence of death.
Eight days later the judge appointed new counsel to handle Trevino's direct appeal. App. 1, 3. Seven months after sentencing, when the trial transcript first became available, that counsel filed an appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals then considered and rejected Trevino's appellate claims. Trevino's appellate counsel did not claim that Trevino's trial counsel had been constitutionally ineffective during the penalty phase of the trial court proceedings. Id., at 12–24.
About six months after sentencing, the trial judge appointed Trevino a different new counsel to seek state collateral relief . As Texas' procedural rules provide, that third counsel initiated collateral proceedings while Trevino's appeal still was in progress. This new counsel first sought postconviction relief (through collateral review) in the trial court itself. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief; and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that denial. Id., at 25–26, 321–349. Trevino's postconviction claims included a claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the penalty phase of Trevino's trial, but it did not include a claim that trial counsel's ineffectiveness consisted in part of a failure adequately to investigate and to present mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase of Trevino's trial. Id ., at 321–349; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) ( ).
Trevino then filed a petition in federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Federal District Court appointed another new counsel to represent him. And that counsel claimed for the first time that Trevino had not received constitutionally effective counsel during the penalty phase of his trial in part because of trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate and present mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase. App. 438, 456–478. Federal habeas counsel pointed out that Trevino's trial counsel had presented only one witness at the sentencing phase, namely Trevino's aunt. The aunt had testified that Trevino had had a difficult upbringing,that his mother had an alcohol problem, that his family was on welfare, and that he had dropped out of high school. She had added that Trevino had a child, that he was good with children, and that he was not violent. Id., at 285–291.
Federal habeas counsel then told the federal court that Trevino's trial counsel should have found and presented at the penalty phase other mitigating matters that his own investigation had brought to light. These included, among other things, that Trevino's mother abused alcohol while she was pregnant with Trevino, that Trevino weighed only four pounds at birth, that throughout his life Trevino suffered the deleterious effects of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, that as a child Trevino had suffered numerous head injuries
without receiving adequate medical attention, that Trevino's mother had abused him physically and emotionally, that from an early age Trevino was exposed to, and abused, alcohol and drugs, that Trevino had attended school irregularly and performed poorly, and that Trevino's cognitive abilities were impaired. Id., at 66–67.
The federal court stayed proceedings to permit Trevino to raise this claim in state court. The state court held that because Trevino had not raised this claim during his initial postconviction proceedings, he had procedurally defaulted the claim, id., at 27–28; and the Federal District Court then denied Trevino's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, id., at 78–79. The District Court concluded in relevant part that, despite the fact that "even the most minimal investigation ... would have revealed a wealth of additional mitigating evidence," an independent and adequate state ground (namely Trevino's failure to raise the issue during his state postconviction proceeding) barred the federal habeas court from considering the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Id., at 131–132. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).
Trevino appealed. The Fifth Circuit, without considering the merits of Trevino's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, agreed with the District Court that an independent, adequate state ground, namely Trevino's procedural default, barred its consideration. 449 Fed.Appx., at 426. Although the Circuit decided Trevino's case before this Court decided Martinez , the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in a later case, Ibarra v. Thaler, 687 F.3d 222 (2012), makes clear that the Fifth Circuit would have found that Martinez would have made no difference.
That is because in Ibarra the Circuit recognized that Martinez had said that its good-cause exception applies where state law says that a criminal defendant must initially raise his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in initial state collateral review proceedings. 687 F.3d, at 225–226. Texas law, the Circuit pointed out, does not say explicitly that the defendant must initially raise the claim in state collateral review proceedings. Rather Texas law on its face appears to permit a criminal defendant to raise such a claim on direct appeal. Id., at 227. And the Circuit held that that fact means that Martinez does not apply in Texas. 687 F.3d, at 227. Since the Circuit's holding in Ibarra ( would similarly govern )this case, we granted certiorari here to determine whether Martinez applies in Texas.
We begin with Martinez . We there recognized the historic importance of federal habeas corpus proceedings as a method for preventing individuals from beingheld in custody in violation of federal law. Martinez, 566 U.S., at ––––, 132 S.Ct., at 1315–1316. See generally Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484–485, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). In general, if a convicted state criminal defendant can show a federal habeas court that his conviction rests upon a violation of the Federal...
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