Trevor A., In re

• Decision Date: 15 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 1729,1729
• Citation: 55 Md.App. 491,462 A.2d 1245
• Parties: In re TREVOR A.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 491

55 Md.App. 491

462 A.2d 1245

In re TREVOR A.

No. 1729.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

July 15, 1983.

Julia D. Haskins, Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender of Maryland on brief, for appellant.

Jillyn K. Schulze, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Andrew L. Sonner, State's Atty. for Montgomery County and Dwight Price, Asst. State's Atty., for Montgomery County on brief, for appellee.

Submitted before LOWE, BISHOP and ADKINS, JJ.

BISHOP, Judge.

On April 27, 1982, a juvenile petition was filed in the District Court of Montgomery County, ¹ Maryland, sitting as a Juvenile Court, alleging that Trevor A., appellant, had committed a delinquent act by performing acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of daytime housebreaking, theft of goods valued in excess of $300.00 and malicious destruction of the property of another. On August 26, 1982, an adjudicatory hearing was held and, as part of a plea agreement, appellant admitted involvement in malicious destruction of a motor vehicle and daytime housebreaking. A hearing on restitution, originally scheduled to be held at the time of disposition on September 24, 1982, was postponed, over appellant's objection, because the State had not obtained restitution affidavits from the victims.

On October 22, 1982, the rescheduled hearing date, and the 27th day after the disposition hearing date, the State was again unable to proceed because it had a restitution affidavit from only one of the victims. The court granted a continuance, again over appellant's objection.

On November 19, 1982, the restitution hearing occurred. The appellant moved to dismiss on the ground that the restitution hearing, had not been held within thirty days of the disposition hearing as required by Maryland Annotated Code, C.J. 3-829(d) (1980 repl. vol.) and good cause had not been shown for the granting of an extension. The court denied the motion to dismiss and directed that restitution be made in the amount of $1,550.00.

Four issues are raised by the appellant:

I. In the absence of good cause, the Juvenile Court erred in holding the restitution hearing more than thirty days after the disposition hearing.

II. The State's failure to notify appellant of the claims against him deprived him of due process of law.

III. There was insufficient evidence to support the judgment of restitution.

IV. The Juvenile Court erred in failing to consider appellant's age and circumstances before entering a judgment of restitution against him.

I.

Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, section 3-829, sub-section (d) provides:

"A restitution hearing to determine the liability of a parent or a child, or both, shall be held not later than 30 days after the disposition hearing and may be extended by the court for good cause."

Our inquiry, then, is (a) what is "good cause", (b) did the reasons for postponements in this case amount to good cause, and (c) if not, what should be the sanction?

(a)

Clearly, good cause is to be determined within the sound discretion of the court, and the court's determination of good cause, vel non, will not be set aside unless that discretion has been abused. In In Re: Robert G., --- Md. ---, 461 A.2d 1 (1983), Judge Smith pointed out that "... without exception we have applied an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing action by a trial judge [in determining good cause, vel non ]." Webb v. Chevy Chase Cars, Inc., 259 Md. 284, 269 A.2d 810 (1970); Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969), both cited with approval in Robert G.

In Re: Robert G. decided that revealing the contents of a juvenile court record in order that the State might use the information in deciding whether to ask the death penalty for an offense committed by Robert G. was good cause under the statute prohibiting the disclosure of the contents of a juvenile court record "except upon order of court upon good cause shown." Annotated Code of Maryland 1974 (1980 repl. vol., 1982 cum. supp.), section 3-828(b).

The Robert G. Court quoted with approval the following from Stanford v. District Title Insur. 260 Md. 550, 273 A.2d 190 (1971), wherein Judge Digges said:

"The decision to permit the redemption of a cause lost through delay involves subtle judgment requiring the trial judge to balance the individual litigant's right to ultimately have his day in court against the public's paramount interest in insuring that all citizens can obtain a prompt resolution of conflicts while they still remain current. The primary focus of his inquiry should be on diligence and whether there has been a sufficient amount of it during an eighteen month period of inaction for the court to affirmatively conclude that the case should not be automatically dismissed. That decision, whatever it may be, rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge and we will only invade his province on appeal in extreme cases of clear abuse. Tydon v. Spong, [237 Md. 107,] 110 [, 205 A.2d 220 (1964) ]." 260 Md. at 555, 273 A.2d 190. (Emphasis added).

Judge Smith in In Re: Robert G. went on to point out that the Court relied upon Stanford in Langrall, Muir & Nopp'r v. Gladding, 282 Md. 397, 384 A.2d 737 (1978) wherein the Court, through Judge Cole, stated:

"We placed the responsibility on the trial judge to weigh and balance the rights, interests, and reasons of the parties in light of the public demand for prompt resolution of litigation when inactivity characterized a cause of action. We suggested that the trial judge, on the scene, will have a perception and understanding of the legal environment in which the case is temporarily mired. Therefore, he was vested with the discretion to be exercised consistent with the spirit of the law while subserving the ends of justice and fairness to the parties." Id. 400-01, 384 A.2d 737. (Emphasis added).

In In Re: Robert G. Judge Smith pointed out that Maryland's view of good cause is that stated by Black's Law Dictionary, 623 (5th ed. 1979):

"Substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. Legally sufficient ground or reason. Phrase 'good cause' depends upon circumstances of individual case, and finding of its existence lies largely in discretion of officer or court to which decision is committed... 'Good cause' is a relative and highly abstract term, and its meaning must be determined not only by verbal context of statute in which term is employed but also by context of action and procedures involved in type of case presented." (Citations omitted.)

" 'Good cause' depends upon the facts and circumstances." (Maryland Rule 741 g was being interpreted). Id. --- Md. at ---, 461 A.2d at 3 and Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 456 A.2d 29, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2114, 76 L.Ed.2d --- (1983).

Judge Smith went on to point out that "good cause" has been equated with "substantial reason", Kay Constr. Co. v. County Council, 227 Md. 479, 177 A.2d 694 (1962), "a legal excuse," State v. Churchill, 82 Ariz. 375, 380, 313 P.2d 753 (1957); "... an adequate cause, a cause that comports with the purpose of" the statute involved, Syrek v. California Unemployment Appeals Insurance Board, 54 Cal.2d 519, 529 , 354 P.2d 625 (1960);" ... substantial or legal cause ..." Tucker v. People, 136 Colo. 581, 586, 319 P.2d 983 (1957); that "good cause ground is provided to take care of unanticipated circumstances " (Emphasis added by Hawaii Court). State v. Estencion, 63 Hawaii Reports 264, 267, 625 P.2d 1040 (1981), and, finally, that " 'good cause' ... is a flexible term ... not amenable to general rules or rigid formulas ... its meaning must be deduced from the facts of each case in a manner that is consistent with" the fundamental purpose of the act within which the term is used. Trexler v. Com., Unemployment Comp. Bd., 27 Pa.Comm. 180, 365 A.2d 1341, 1344 (1976).

(b)

The record in this case indicates that the State made no real effort to obtain the restitution affidavits except through the mail. Something more than this is required to support a finding that there had been a sufficient amount of diligence on the part of the State to comply with the rule.

Based on the facts and circumstances in this case, and the foregoing analysis of the law, we hold that the second and crucial postponement from October 22, 1982 to November 19, 1982, was not based upon "good cause" as that term has been defined by the Court of Appeals in Robert G., supra. We must determine, then, what sanction is appropriate for this unexcused delay.

(c)

In re: Dewayne H., 290 Md. 401, 430 A.2d 76 (1981) addressed the sanction to be applied to a violation of Maryland Rule 915 a, which required the juvenile court to hold a disposition hearing within thirty days of adjudication. The disposition hearing was not held within the thirty days and the juvenile judge dismissed the proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating:

"The language here is clear and unambiguous. However, its mandatory nature does not indicate the sanction to be applied nor does the sanction necessarily inure to the benefit of the juvenile. It must not be forgotten that one of the purposes of the juvenile statute as set forth in § 3-802(a)(2) is '[t]o remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior...." Therefore, § 3-820(b) relative to disposition provides, 'The overriding consideration in making a disposition is a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation best suited to the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child consistent with the public interest.' As pointed out by Judge Gilbert for the Court of Special Appeals in In Re Appeal Misc. No. 32, Term 1975, 29 Md.App. 701, 704, 351 A.2d 164 (1976), 'Judges in juvenile cases do not think in terms of guilt, but rather in terms of the need of the child for protection, guidance, or rehabilitation,' citing Matter...