Trexler v. Dodge City
| Decision Date | 26 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 20-06983 (RBK/AMD) |
| Parties | JOSEPH TREXLER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DODGE CITY, INC. d/b/a DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP CITY, FCA US LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter comes before the Court upon (1) FCA US LLC's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8); (2) Dodge City, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration (Doc. 15); and (3) Huntington National Bank's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16). For the reasons stated herein, (1) FCA US LLC's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; (2) Dodge City, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration is DENIED; and (3) Huntington National Bank's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
This action arises out of a dispute over the purchase and financing of a used motor vehicle. Plaintiffs are Joseph and Carolyn Trexler. During an internet search, Plaintiffs visited Defendant Dodge City's website, which advertised a Certified Pre-Owned 2016 Jeep Cherokee Trailhawk 4WD ("2016 Jeep Cherokee") at a sale price of $23,595. (Compl. ¶11.) Plaintiffs went to Dodge City's dealership to purchase the 2016 Jeep Cherokee. (Compl. ¶12.) Upon approval, Defendant Dodge City presented Plaintiffs with a contract for sale listing the price of the 2016 Jeep Cherokee at $26,500. (Compl. ¶13.) Despite the difference in price between the website and the contract, Plaintiffs purchased the 2016 Jeep Cherokee for $26,500. (Compl. ¶15.) Plaintiffs paid $1,495 upfront and financed the remaining amount through Defendant Dodge City. (Compl. ¶15.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Dodge City obtained institutional financing for Plaintiffs through its credit department, which was initially approved by Ally Bank; however, Defendant Dodge City thereafter changed the lender to Defendant Huntington1 National Bank ("Huntington"). (Compl. ¶16.) Plaintiff contends that this was done without consent or explanation, and the new loan terms were less favorable to them. (Compl. ¶16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dodge City provided them with a Certified Pre-Owned Vehicle Warranty issued by Defendant FCA US, which provided that the vehicle was subject to a 125-point check prior to its pre-owned vehicle certification, which included a visible inspection for fluid leaks and clear title. (Compl. ¶17.) Plaintiffs contend that the 2016 Jeep Cherokee did not, in fact, have clear title and had an engine oil leak. (Compl. ¶¶19-20.)
After these events, Plaintiffs filed the present suit. The Complaint—barely five pages long and containing only ten paragraphs with factual allegations—purports to allege several causes of action under two separate counts. Count I alleges (1) violation of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z as to Defendants Dodge City and Huntington Bank and (2) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as to Defendants Dodge City and FCA US. Count II alleges (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of express and implied warranty; (3) common law fraud; (4) violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (5) violation of the New Jersey Plain Language Review Act; and (6) violation of the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Notice and Warranty Act.
Defendant FCA US and Defendant Huntington each filed a motion to dismiss. (Docs. 8, 16.) Defendant Dodge City additionally filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement in the sales contract. (Doc. 15.) Plaintiffs opposed each motion. (Docs. 19, 20, 21.)
When deciding a motion to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court limits its review to the face of the complaint. Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2011). The court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). In other words, a complaint is sufficient if it contains enough factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "The inquiry is not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail in a trial on the merits, but whether [he or she] should be afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in support of [his or her] claims." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Prop., Inc., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002). However, legal conclusions and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To determine whether a complaint is plausible on its face, courts conduct a three-part analysis. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at680). Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). This plausibility determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint cannot survive where a court can infer only that a claim is merely possible rather than plausible. Id. In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court may rely on "the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record" without converting the motion to one of summary judgment. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
On a motion to compel arbitration, the Court must inquire two issues: (1) whether the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement and (2) whether the dispute at issue falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 584 F.3d 513, 523 (3d Cir. 2009). "If the response is affirmative on both counts, then the [FAA] requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms." Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 4.
The Third Circuit has established a two-tiered framework for assessing motions to compel arbitration. See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 2013). If the face of the complaint and documents relied on in the complaint clearly show that a party's claim is subject to an enforceable arbitration clause, the Court will use a "Rule 12(b)(6) standard without discovery's delay." Id. at 777 (internal citation omitted). The motion to dismiss standard is inappropriate, however, where "either the motion to compel arbitration does not have as its predicate a complaint with the requisite clarity to establish on its face that the parties agreed to arbitrate or the opposing party has come forth with reliable evidence that is more than a merenaked assertion . . . that it did not intend to be bound by the arbitration agreement, even though on the face of the pleadings it appears that it did." Id. at 774. In such circumstances, "the parties should be entitled to discovery on the question of arbitrability before a court entertains further briefing." Id. at 776. After this limited discovery is completed, the court "may entertain a renewed motion to compel arbitration, this time judging the motion under a summary judgment standard." Id.
Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (1) violation of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z as to Defendants Dodge City and Huntington Bank; (2) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as to Defendants Dodge City and FCA US; (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of express and implied warranty; (5) common law fraud; (6) violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act; (7) New Jersey Plain Language Review Act; and (8) violation of the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Notice and Warranty Act. Defendants seek to dismiss each of the claims. Accordingly, the Court addresses each claim in turn.2
Plaintiffs first assert a claim under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). The TILA is intended to "assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use ofcredit." 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). Further, "[b]ecause the TILA is a remedial consumer protection statute, . . . it 'should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer.'" Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat'l Ass'n, 280 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir.2002) (citation omitted). To achieve this end, the statute "requires creditors to provide borrowers with clear and accurate disclosures of terms," Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998), and imposes strict liability on creditors who fail this mandate, see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (). The TILA also authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations to implement the statute, which the Board did with Regulation Z. 15 U.S.C. § 1604; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq. (2008). Together, TILA and Regulation Z require lenders to make a series of material disclosures to borrowers for transactions that do not involve a continuing line of credit, such as Plaintiffs' loan with Defendants. See 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (listing required disclosures); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17, 226.18 (requiring disclosures).
In order to state a claim for a TILA violation under federal pleading standards, a plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial