Tri-Cities Holdings LLC v. City of Johnson City

• Decision Date: 12 June 2013
• Docket Number: NO. 2:13-CV-108,2:13-CV-108
• Parties: Tri-Cities Holdings LLC, Jane Doe Nos. 1-2, and John Doe Nos. 1-6, Plaintiffs, v. City of Johnson City, Tennessee, Johnson City Board of Commissioners, and the Johnson City Board of Zoning Appeals, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Tri-Cities Holdings LLC, Jane Doe Nos. 1-2, and John Doe Nos. 1-6, Plaintiffs,

v. City of Johnson City, Tennessee, Johnson City Board of Commissioners,and the Johnson City Board of Zoning Appeals, Defendants.

NO. 2:13-CV-108

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE

Dated: June 12, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is an action brought by plaintiffs ("Tri-Cities Holdings") against the defendants (collectively "Johnson City") for alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., ("Rehabilitation Act") and the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Currently pending before the Court is a motion by Tri-Cities Holdings for a preliminary injunction, [Doc. 2], Johnson City's response in opposition, [Doc. 27], and Tri-Cities Holdings' reply, [Doc. 28]. An evidentiary hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction was held on May 24, 2013. The Court has now determined that the issues are not ripe for disposition and, for the reasons which follow, plaintiffs' complaint will be DISMISSED.

A threshold issue in this case is ripeness. "Ripeness becomes an issue when a case is anchored in future events that may not occur as anticipated, or not at all." Kentucky Press Ass'n. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 454 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nat'l Rifle Assoc. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 284 (6th Cir. 1997)). Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed "to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985). The doctrine of ripeness "is more than a mere proceduralquestion; it is determinative of jurisdiction. If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint must be dismissed." Dealer Services, Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 547 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting River City Capital, L.P. v. Board of County Comm'rs., 491 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Ripeness "draw[s] both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." Id. at 560-61 (quoting Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n. v. Dept. of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)). "Enforcing ripeness requirements discourages 'premature adjudication' of legal questions and judicial entanglement in abstract controversies." Id. at 561 (citing Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). The ripeness doctrine "focuses on the timing of the action," United States Postal Service v. Nat'l Ass'n. of Letter Carriers, 330 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir. 2003), and requires the court to exercise its discretion to determine whether the issues are appropriate for immediate judicial resolution. See Brown v. Ferro Corp., 763 F.2d 798, 801 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The ripeness doctrine not only depends on the finding of a case and controversy and hence jurisdiction under Article III, but it also requires that the court exercise its discretion to determine if judicial resolution would be desirable under all of the circumstances.").

Thus, the doctrine serves as a bar to judicial review whenever a court determines a claim is filed prematurely. Dealer Computer Services, 547 F.3d at 561. Plaintiff has the burden to allege facts in its complaint sufficient to establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Cincinnati School District v. Board of Education, 2005 WL 6781829 (6th Cir. Oct. 17, 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)); Board of Trustees of Painesville Tp. v. City of Painesville, 200 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1999); Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1996). The factors to be considered when assessing the ripeness of a dispute are: (1) The likelihood that the harm alleged by the party will ever come to pass; (2) the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at this stage in theproceedings; and (3) whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to produce a fair adjudication of the merits. Dealer Computer Services, 547 F.3d at 561 (citing Letter Carriers, 330 F.3d at 751). The Sixth Circuit has held that a claim is ripe when it is "highly probable" that the alleged harm or injury will take place. See Kardules v. City of Columbus, 95 F.3d 1335, 1344 (6th Cir. 1996).

Tri-Cities Holdings is a Georgia limited liability company which intends to establish an outpatient methadone maintenance treatment service in Johnson City. The individual John Doe and Jane Doe plaintiffs are opiate addicted residents of the Johnson City area and prospective patients at the proposed methadone clinic to be operated by Tri-Cities Holdings. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Johnson City. More specifically, they ask the Court to declare Johnson City's zoning ordinance relating to methadone clinics facially invalid and in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. They further seek a preliminary injunction requiring Johnson City to cease withholding of the necessary permits and permission for Tri-Cities Holdings to open and operate its methadone clinic "subject to [Tri-Cities Holdings] obtaining the Certificate of Need from the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency and a license from the Tennessee Department of Health for such methadone treatment clinic." [Doc. 3 at 2].

The zoning ordinance at issue limits the location and operation of a methadone clinic to areas zoned MS-1 (medical service district) within the city of Johnson City and limits the location of methadone clinics to arterial streets not within 200 feet of any school, day-care facility, park, or establishment that sells either on-premise or off-premise alcoholic beverages. Clinics may be operated only between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. and the facility must be fully licensed by the appropriate state regulating agency and obtain the necessary certificate of need from the appropriate state agency. Tri-Cities Holdings has obtained an option to lease property located at 4 Wesley Court inside the city limits of Johnson City which does not comply with the requirements of the Johnson City zoningordinance but which is "[t]he only available and suitable MS-1 zoned property" in Johnson City, [Doc. 1 at 64].

Tri-Cities Holdings has applied for a Certificate of Need ("CON") for a "Non-residential Methadone Treatment Facility" ("methadone clinic") from the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency (the "state agency"). The state agency is expected to consider the CON application on June 26, 2013. After the CON is granted, Tri-Cities Holdings must apply for a license to operate its methadone clinic from the Tennessee Department of Health,¹ [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 65-67]. Tri-Cities Holdings alleges that Johnson City's refusal to grant zoning approval of its methadone clinic "is interfering with [Tri-Cities Holdings'] application for a CON" and "potentially interferes" with Tri-Cities Holdings' application for a license." [Id. at ¶¶ 67-68].

Some understanding of the CON process in Tennessee is necessary to the resolution of the issue before the Court.² The "Tennessee Health Services and Planning Act of 2002," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1601 et seq., requires a CON granted by the state agency before a person/entity may initiate certain health care services, or construct, develop or establish certain health care institutions , including opiate addiction treatment provided through a nonresidential substitution-based treatment center for opiate addiction. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-11-1607(a)(1) and (4), 1602(2) and (7)(A). A CON may not be granted "unless the action proposed in the application is necessary to provide needed health care in the area to be served, can be economically accomplished and maintained, and will contribute to the orderly development of adequate and effective health care facilities or services." Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-609(b). In making its determinations, the state agency uses "as guidelines the goals, objectives, criteria and standards in the state health plan." Id.

After an application for a CON is commenced, any health care institution opposed to the application must file written notice with the agency no later than fifteen days before the meeting at which the application is scheduled and any other person wishing to oppose the application must do so at or prior to the consideration of the application by the agency. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1607(c)(1)(A) and (B). As to any application for a methadone clinic, the statute explicitly grants local governing bodies the right to participate in the hearing and an opportunity to appear and express support or opposition to the granting of a CON. Support of local governing bodies is not a requirement for the granting of a CON by the state agency. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1624. After consideration of the application, it may be approved in whole or in part "upon any lawful conditions that the agency deems appropriate and enforceable on the grounds that those parts of the proposal appear to meet applicable criteria." Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1609(a)(1).³ Any conditions placed on the CON shall also be made conditions of any corresponding license. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1609(a)(1)(A).

Within fifteen days of the approval or denial of the CON application, "any applicant, health care institution that filed a written objection . . ., or any other person who objected to the application . . . may petition the agency in writing" for a contested case hearing to be conducted in accordance with the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101 et seq. A person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case may then file a petition for review in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).

Given the Court's concerns about whether or not this matter is ripe for adjudication, and becauseripeness "even in a...