TRI COUNTY LANDFILL ASS'N v. Brule County, 22012, 22019.

Decision Date06 March 2002
Docket NumberNo. 22012, 22019.,22012, 22019.
PartiesTRI COUNTY LANDFILL ASSOCIATION, INC, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BRULE COUNTY, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Robert R. Schaub of Larson, Sundall, Larson, Schaub and Fox, Chamberlain, for plaintiff and appellant.

Sheila S. Woodward, Steven M. Johnson, A. Russell Janklow of Johnson, Heidepriem, Miner, Marlow & Janklow, Yankton & Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee.

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] Brule County (County) sold Tri County Landfill Association, Inc. (Landfill), 40 acres of land to develop a regional solid waste facility. Landfill received tentative approval from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), but the Board of Minerals and Environment (BME) denied the permit pending a resolution by County re-approving the landfill. County refused and Landfill sued for damages under 42 USC § 1983. Landfill now appeals the trial court's granting of summary judgment upon a determination that, while County's denial of the permit was arbitrary and capricious, it was not "truly irrational" and was therefore insufficient to sustain a substantive due process claim. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 2.] Landfill was formed in 1992 as a non-profit corporation to develop, construct, and maintain a regional solid waste facility in Brule County, South Dakota. Landfill members are county and municipal governmental bodies exercising joint power agreements, and Landfill's voting delegates are officials of the member counties and cities. County became a member of Landfill in 1992 and subsequently sold forty acres to Landfill for development of the solid waste facility. On April 27, 1993, County's zoning board granted Landfill a special exception necessary to construct the solid waste facility on the property. Landfill then filed a permit application with DENR, which was tentatively approved on July 29, 1993.

[¶ 3.] On August 26, 1993, Clifford Lantz (Lantz), an adjoining landowner and resident of County, filed a contested case petition and a request for a hearing.1 The hearing was held on January 19, 1994, and BME announced its conclusion a month later. BME determined that Landfill had complied with South Dakota's regulations, but it had failed to obtain County's approval within six months prior to BME's approval, as required by SDCL 34A-6-103.2 Therefore, issuance of Landfill's permit was postponed pending re-approval by County.

[¶ 4.] A change in the County Commission's membership resulted in a denial of Landfill's request. Landfill was unable to garner the majority vote necessary to gain approval. Landfill appealed this denial to the circuit court, which determined County's actions to be "arbitrary and capricious." On appeal to this Court in Tri County I,3 we affirmed the circuit court's decision and ordered County to reissue the permit approval to Landfill. The facility eventually opened on November 4, 1996.

[¶ 5.] On June 20, 1994, Landfill sued County under 42 USC § 1983 for a violation of substantive due process. County moved to dismiss and, in the alternative, moved for summary judgment. Landfill moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. The trial court granted Landfill's motion and the trial went forward on the issue of damages. Landfill was awarded $628,428.03 in damages, prejudgment interest, attorney's fees and costs.

[¶ 6.] On appeal to this Court in Tri County II,4 we reversed the trial court's determination that County's "arbitrary and capricious" violation of state law automatically amounted to a violation of substantive due process. We remanded the action for a factual determination of whether County's conduct was "truly irrational" in order to sustain Landfill's § 1983 claim and whether Landfill had a protected property interest in the approved permit.

[¶ 7.] On remand, the trial court determined that County was exercising a discretionary function under SDCL 34A-6-103, which eliminated any protected property interest. The court also determined that, in drawing all inferences in favor of Landfill, County's conduct was not truly irrational because there was sufficient evidence to indicate "a conceivable rational relationship between the denial of the permit and a legitimate governmental interest." Finally, the court denied County's application for costs under SDCL 15-17-37.

[¶ 8.] Landfill now appeals, asking that the trial court's summary judgment in favor of County be reversed and instead, granted in favor of Landfill. In oral argument, Landfill conceded that no genuine issue of material fact remained and that the only remaining issues were legal conclusions to be drawn from uncontested facts. Therefore, Landfill raises the following issues:

1. Whether Landfill possesses a protected property interest in the approved permit.
2. Whether County's conduct, in denying re-approval of the solid waste facility, was "truly irrational" and in violation of substantive due process.

County, through notice of review, presents only one issue for appeal:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying County's claim for costs and disbursements in the amount of $14,771.26.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 9.] Our standard of review for summary judgment is well settled.

Summary judgment is authorized "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Holzer v. Dakota Speedway, Inc., 2000 SD 65, ¶ 8, 610 N.W.2d 787, 792 (quoting SDCL 15-6-56(c)) (additional citations omitted). As neither party now argues that questions of fact remain, a prevailing party must show the facts entitle it to summary judgment as a matter of law.

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[¶ 10.] Landfill seeks relief under 42 USC § 1983 for due process violations. "The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state governments from depriving `any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of the law ....'" Young v. City of St. Charles, Mo., 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting USConst amend XIV, § 1). This protection may be split into its two counterparts, procedural due process and substantive due process. Id. A violation of substantive due process occurs when "certain types of governmental acts [violate] the Due Process Clause regardless of the procedures used to implement them." Tri County II, 2000 SD 148 at ¶ 14, 619 N.W.2d at 668 (citations omitted). Landfill alleges that County's refusal to re-approve the placement of the solid waste facility in County, while Landfill remained in compliance with the appropriate state regulations, was a violation of Landfill's right to substantive due process.

[¶ 11.] In order to maintain a cause of action under 42 USC § 1983, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally protected property right or interest. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972)

; Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, Minn., 126 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1997); Tri County II, 2000 SD 148 at ¶ 10, 619 N.W.2d at 667 (citations omitted). In the context of a zoning or land-use dispute, the plaintiff must go one step further to show that the "government action was `sufficiently outrageous' or `truly irrational, that is, something more than ... arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of state law.'" Young, 244 F.3d at 628 (quoting Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir.1993)) (additional citations omitted). Because the parties do not dispute that County acted under color of state law, our focus is upon determining the presence or absence of a protected property interest and truly irrational conduct, given the uncontested facts.

[¶ 12.] 1. Whether Landfill possesses a protected property interest in the approved permit.

[¶ 13.] Analysis of a substantive due process claim "must begin with an examination of the interest allegedly violated." Young, 244 F.3d at 627 (citing Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 444-46 (8th Cir.1995)). See also SDDS, Inc. v. State of SD, 994 F.2d 486, 491 (8th Cir.1993)

(recognizing determination of plaintiff's protected property rights is threshold issue). In Tri County II, this Court stated that, in order to demonstrate it held a protected property interest, Landfill must show that County did not have the discretion to deny its permission, despite Landfill's failure to meet the six-month deadline requirement. 2000 SD 148 at ¶ 29, 619 N.W.2d at 674. In other words, Landfill must demonstrate that it had a clear entitlement to the permit. Id.

[¶ 14.] Landfill claims that so long as it remained in compliance with South Dakota regulations, County could not withhold its approval. Yet, Landfill overlooks one regulation that it was not in compliance with—the deadline provision of SDCL 34A-6-103. Projects inevitably change over time, as was evidenced by the record in this case. The Legislature intentionally built in this deadline requirement to ensure that the project presented to BME not only remained in compliance with South Dakota safety and health standards, but that it also remained consistent with the concept originally approved by the county.

[¶ 15.] County relies on SDCL 34A-6-103 to establish its discretion to deny re-approval of the project and thereby negate any protected property interest in the permit. SDCL 34A-6-103 provides:

Any application to the Board of Minerals and Environment for a permit for a facility for the transportation, storage or disposal of solid waste or medical waste pursuant to this chapter shall include a resolution by the governing body of the county
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