Tri-Park Coop. Hous. Corp. v. Carrasquillo, SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2019-155
| Decision Date | 02 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2019-155 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Tri-Park Cooperative Housing Corporation v. Michelle A. Carrasquillo* et al. |
Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division
DOCKET NO. 254-7-18 Wmcv
Trial Judge: Robert P. Gerety, Jr.
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Tenant appeals pro se from the judgment in favor of landlord and writ of possession issued by the civil division in this eviction case. We affirm.
Landlord Tri-Park Cooperative Housing Corporation owns a mobile home park in Brattleboro. Tenant Michelle Carrasquillo rented a lot in the park. In July 2018, landlord filed a complaint for eviction against tenant.* Landlord alleged that tenant had failed to pay rent and substantially violated the terms of her lease by allowing her male companion to live in her home for more than thirty days in a calendar year and engaging in behavior that unreasonably disturbed other residents and violated the law.
In October 2018, landlord moved for summary judgment against tenant. Because it was undisputed that tenant had not paid rent, the court granted the motion, entered final judgment, and issued a writ of possession in favor of landlord. Tenant paid her overdue rent before the writ of possession was executed. The court vacated the judgment and writ. It dismissed the count alleging failure to pay rent but not the remaining counts. The court subsequently permitted landlord to amend its complaint to add another count alleging that tenant had violated the lease by engaging in criminal behavior in November 2018.
After a bench trial in February 2019, the court issued a written decision in landlord's favor. The court found insufficient evidence to establish that tenant had violated the lease provision prohibiting guests from residing with tenants for more than thirty days in a calendar year. However, it found that landlord had proved its claims that tenant violated the lease by engaging in unreasonably disruptive and criminal behavior. The court found that police had been called to the park numerous times from April 2018 onward because tenant was screaming and yelling obscenities outside her home or other residents' homes. In August 2018, police responded to thepark to address tenant's disruptive behavior four times in one day. On another occasion, tenant screamed racial slurs in the presence of children who were members of a minority group during a neighbor's birthday party. On several other occasions tenant operated her car at unsafe speeds while driving out of the park in a rage. She nearly collided with another resident who was returning to the park during one of these incidents. On Thanksgiving Day in 2018, tenant yelled and screamed at her companion and chased him with her car through the park while blowing her car horn for an extended period of time. She was arrested and charged with a crime as a result of this behavior. The court found that tenant's behavior was disturbing and disruptive to the neighbors and constituted disorderly conduct as defined by 13 V.S.A. § 1026.
The court stated that tenant appeared to be suffering from mental health difficulties and would likely benefit from treatment. However, it was unable to conclude that tenant's behavior was caused by any particular mental illness. It further stated that even if her behavior was related to a mental illness, it was not aware of any legal authority that would excuse her breaches of the lease and prevent landlord from seeking possession. It therefore entered judgment in favor of landlord and awarded reasonable legal fees and expenses of $15,120.25. The court granted tenant's subsequent motion to stay the writ of possession pending appeal on the condition that tenant continue to pay rent.
On appeal, tenant argues that once she mentioned her mental illness, the court should have stopped the eviction proceeding, tested her competency, and ensured she had representation. If this were a criminal case, tenant's argument might have merit. Section 4817 of Title 13 provides that if the issue of a defendant's competency to stand trial is raised at any time before final judgment, the court must hold a hearing to determine competency and may not try the defendant if the defendant is found incompetent. However, there is no equivalent statute applicable to civil proceedings.
The civil rules do permit the court to appoint a guardian ad litem for an individual who is found to be incompetent. V.R.C.P. 17(b); In re H.L., 143 Vt. 62, 65 (1983). In this case the court determined that it could not make the findings necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem. We cannot say that this ruling was clearly erroneous. See State v. Bean, 171 Vt. 290, 295 (2000) (). The fact that tenant asserted that she had a mental illness does not necessarily mean that she was incompetent to participate in the eviction proceeding. See State v. Curry, 2009 VT 89, ¶ 17, 186 Vt. 623 (mem.) ( that "mental illness is not a necessary or sufficient condition for incompetency," and mentally ill defendants can be competent to stand trial). The transcripts of the hearings below show that tenant understood that she was being evicted for her disruptive behavior. She was able to question witnesses and communicate her objections to the court. Because it appeared that tenant had a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against her, the court was not required to appoint a guardian ad litem for her. See In re C.L., 143 Vt. 554, 558-59 (1983) ().
Tenant's argument that she was entitled to have an attorney appointed to represent her likewise fails. In general, the constitutional right to counsel does not apply to civil proceedings, In re G.G., 2017 VT 10, ¶ 10, 204 Vt. 148, and tenant has not identified a statutory provisionentitling her to state-appointed counsel in this eviction case. The court therefore was not obligated to appoint a lawyer to represent tenant.
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