Tri-State Transit Co. of Louisiana v. Dixie Greyhound Lines

• Decision Date: 09 October 1944
• Docket Number: 35691.
• Citation: 19 So.2d 441,197 Miss. 37
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: TRI-STATE TRANSIT CO. OF LOUISIANA, Inc., v. DIXIE GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.

19 So.2d 441

197 Miss. 37

TRI-STATE TRANSIT CO. OF LOUISIANA, Inc., v. DIXIE GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.

No. 35691.

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 9, 1944

Stevens & Stevens, of Jackson, for appellant.

Watkins & Eager, of Jackson, Longstreet Heiskell, of Memphis Tenn., and McClure & Fant, of Sardis, for appellee.

ANDERSON Justice.

The appellant, the Tri-State Transit Company, has a certificate of public necessity and convenience (a franchise) from the Interstate Commerce Commission to do an interstate business between Jackson and the Tennessee line, which is only a few miles south of Memphis in that state, and from the Public Service Commission of this State to do a local business between those points. It makes six round trips per day between Memphis and Jackson, four of which operate as through busses and two local.

The appellee, the Dixie Greyhound Lines, has a franchise from the Interstate Commerce Commission to carry on an interstate business between Jackson and the same point on the Tennessee line with closed doors; in other words, under the franchise it can neither take on nor let off passengers between those two points. It applied to the Public Service Commission of the State for a franchise to add a local business and in addition the right to take on and let off in the State interstate passengers. It had no such right from the Interstate Commerce Commission but claimed that it would apply for it after the State had granted the franchise it was asking for. The Tri-State Company protested against the granting to the Dixie Company of such additional franchise. There was a hearing before the Public Service Commission at which thirty-nine witnesses testified for the Dixie Greyhound Company and thirty-one for the Tri-State Company. The Public Service Commission denied the franchise. From that judgment an appeal was prosecuted to the Circuit Court by the Dixie Company where there was a trial on the record made before the Public Service Commission. The Circuit Judge reversed the judgment of the Public Service Commission to the extent that he permitted the Dixie Company to operate busses as applied for until the expiration of six months after the end of the war. From that judgment the Tri-State Company appeals to this Court and the Dixie Company cross-appeals.

In considering the questions involved it would be very well to have in mind the language of the statute declaring the policy of the State regarding the use of its highways for public traffic, which is found in Section 2, Chapter 142, Laws 1938 Section 7633, Vol. 6, Code 1942:

"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the legislature to regulate motor carriers in the public interest to the end that the safety and welfare of the public in its use of the highways and of the transportation agencies by motor vehicle used thereon may be practiced; that the property of the State in its highways may be protected from unreasonable, improper and excessive use that the inherent advantages of highway transportation may be recognized and preserved; that sound economic conditions in such transportation and among such carriers may be fostered; that the service by motor carriers may be adequate, economical, and efficient; that reasonable charges may be made therefor, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, and unfair or destructive competitive practices; that relations between motor carriers and other carriers may be improved and coordinated; and that cooperation may be maintained with the governments of the United States, and the several States, and with their duly authorized officials in carrying out the purposes and provisions of this Act. This Act shall apply to persons and motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce to the extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United States and as provided herein."

Pond on Public Utilities, page 10, has this to say with reference to the policy: "If, as experience seems to justify and require, regulation is to take the place of competition in this as in other fields of public utilities, in order to avoid the expense of needless duplication of investment and operating cost for the purpose of securing the best possible service at the least expense, motor buses, trucks, and all similar forms of common carrrier service must be regulated and controlled by impartial state commissions of trained experts having jurisdiction over public utilities generally, and especially over all forms of communication and transportation."

The evidence for the Dixie Company tended to show that the public convenience and necessity would be promoted by granting the franchise it applied for. The evidence for the Tri-State Company, which was substantial, tended to show the contrary. Everybody knows that during the war there has been and is now great overcrowding on all public carriers of passengers. The courts are authorized to take judicial notice without any proof of what everybody knows. It is true that the evidence tended to show that the Dixie Company had some vacant seats on its busses operating between Memphis and Jackson. It also tended to show that the busses operated by it on Highway 49 were as much overcrowded as any in the state. It appeared from the evidence that the overcrowding on the Tri-State's busses between Memphis and Jackson occurred principally between local stations. No one ever made complaint before the Public Service Commission that the Tri-State Company was not furnishing adequate service, nor did the Commission of its own initiative make such complaint.

With reference to the finding of facts by the Public Service Commission, Section 7815, Vol. 6, Code 1942, provides as follows: "All findings of the commission and the determination of every matter by it shall be made in writing and placed upon its minutes, and proof thereof shall be made by a copy of the same duly certified by the secretary under the seal of the commission; and whenever any matter has been determined by the commission, in the course of any proceeding before it the fact of such determination, duly certified shall be received in all courts and by every officer in civil cases as prima facie evidence that such determination was right and proper; and the record of the proceedings of the commission shall be deemed a public...