Triarch Industries, Inc. v. Crabtree, No. SC 86107.
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Writing for the Court | Laura Denvir Stith |
Citation | 158 S.W.3d 772 |
Parties | TRIARCH INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellant, v. Paul A. CRABTREE, d/b/a Crabtree Painting, Inc., Respondent. |
Docket Number | No. SC 86107. |
Decision Date | 05 April 2005 |
v.
Paul A. CRABTREE, d/b/a Crabtree Painting, Inc., Respondent.
[158 S.W.3d 773]
Susan Eisenbraun, David A. Kraft, Art J. Neuhedel, Ronald S. Weiss, Kansas City, for Appellant.
Martin M. Meyers, James L. Baker, Kansas City, for Respondent.
LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.
Triarch Industries, Inc., appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to compel Paul Crabtree to arbitrate the parties' contract dispute. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. The contract gave Triarch the option of choosing either to litigate or to arbitrate any dispute. Triarch chose to litigate and filed suit in the Jackson County Circuit Court. The contract did not give it a right to change its mind and compel arbitration once it had first chosen to litigate its dispute with Crabtree. Having made its choice, it was bound by it. Because of its resolution of this issue, the Court does not reach Crabtree's arguments that the arbitration provision is unenforceable because it lacks mutuality and is unduly vague because it permits Triarch to unilaterally set all rules governing arbitration.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June of 2000, Triarch Industries, Inc., a Texas-based corporation, entered into a "Qualified Applicator Agreement" with Paul Crabtree, doing business as Crabtree Painting, Inc., in Kansas City, Missouri. The contract, drafted by Triarch, appointed Crabtree as a "Factory Qualified Applicator" of Triarch's paint products and stated that Crabtree would pay Triarch for materials purchased "in accordance with Triarch's written conditions of sale and credit terms by check or credit card."
Triarch filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Jackson County in August 2001, alleging that Crabtree failed to pay money owed on an open account for merchandise supplied by Triarch under the contract. Crabtree filed an answer in October 2001, alleging that Triarch had sent defective and non-conforming goods that were unusable for their intended purpose. In April 2002, Crabtree filed a counterclaim in which it sought reimbursement for the allegedly non-conforming goods that Triarch had supplied. With its counterclaim, Crabtree served requests for admissions, followed shortly by Crabtree's first set of interrogatories and first request for production of documents.
In May 2002, after receipt of Crabtree's discovery requests, Triarch filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay the litigation. It based the motion to compel on an arbitration clause contained within the "Conditions of Sale" attached to the parties'"Qualified Applicator Agreement." The arbitration clause states in full:
ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES: Any controversy or claim arising out of this contract or the breach thereof may, at Seller's option, be referred to non-binding mediation under rules of Seller's choice. If mediation does not result in settlement of the dispute, (or if Seller does not elect to pursue mediation), Seller shall have the right to refer the dispute to binding arbitration under rules of its choice, or to commence litigation.
Crabtree opposed the motion to compel arbitration. It argued that the arbitration clause was not enforceable because it was too one-sided to constitute an agreement to arbitrate and that the provision permitting Triarch to set all rules governing arbitration made the clause too vague and unconscionable to be enforced. Crabtree alternatively argued that the final part of the arbitration clause merely gave Triarch the right to make an initial choice whether to seek arbitration or to commence litigation and that, having chosen to commence litigation, it was bound by its election.
The trial court held that Triarch was not entitled to compel arbitration and overruled its motion. Triarch appealed. Following a decision by the Court of Appeals, Western District, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.
II. ANALYSIS OF ARBITRABILITY OF DISPUTE
A. Appealability of Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration.
The question of whether Triarch's motion to compel arbitration should have been granted is one of law, to be decided by this Court de novo. Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo. banc 2003), citing, Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, 370 U.S. 254, 256, 82 S.Ct. 1346, 8 L.Ed.2d 474 (1962). The Federal Arbitration Act (the FAA) requires courts to enforce a valid contractual agreement to arbitrate if it is contained in a contract that comes within the FAA's purview. 9 U.S.C. sec. 2 (1999).1 The FAA also provides that an order denying a motion to compel arbitration under such a contract is subject to immediate appellate review. 9 U.S.C. sec. 16(a)(1)(B). There is no dispute that the contract between Triarch and Crabtree is governed by the FAA, or that Triarch was entitled to appeal the trial court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration.2
B. Enforceability of Arbitration Clause Providing Only Seller with Right to Choose and Set all Rules of Arbitration.
Crabtree attacks the existence of an agreement to arbitrate in the first instance, arguing that the purported arbitration clause is invalid because it is unilateral rather than mutual, giving sole authority to Triarch to decide to arbitrate and set the rules for arbitration. The courts of other jurisdictions have come to varying conclusions as to the validity of such non-mutual agreements to arbitrate. This results from the fact that the question whether the agreement to arbitrate must be mutual or can be unilateral is determined by application of state contract principles rather than as a matter of federal statutory law. Robert Hollis et al., Is State Law Looking for Trouble? The Federal Arbitration Act Flexes its Preemptive Muscle, 2003 J. Disp. Resol. 483-89.
As Crabtree notes, many state courts, and federal courts applying state law, have invalidated similar non-mutual arbitration
provisions because they are so one-sided as to be illusory or unconscionable and, therefore, are unenforceable under applicable state law. See, e.g., Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir.2002), and other cases cited in Hollis et al., State Law, 2003 J. Disp. Resol. at 483-89.3 Other courts have upheld such clauses on the basis that the particular state's law does not require mutuality if there is otherwise sufficient consideration for the agreement considered as a whole.4 Id. Missouri has not addressed this issue in the context of an arbitration clause.
Crabtree also argues that the clause is so vague that it is unenforceable even if mutuality were not required under Missouri law, noting that the clause is just that, a single clause. None of the rules governing arbitration are set forth. Instead, the contract simply provides that Triarch has the unilateral right to "refer the dispute to binding arbitration under rules of its choice" (emphasis added). In support, Crabtree cites to cases such as Harold Allen's Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc....
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State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, No. SC 93846
...it is a well-settled rule that “[i]f ambiguous, [a contract] will be construed against the drafter.” Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. banc 2005). The Rams had the burden to incorporate the terms in such a way that Mr. Hewitt could manifest his consent. Having faile......
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State ex rel. Greitens v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. SC95422
...agreement, and the customary rules of state contract law and contract interpretation apply. Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree , 158 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. banc 2005). When construing an arbitration clause, courts must ascertain the intent of the parties and give effect to that intent. Id. The ......
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Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., DOCKET NUMBER WD67440
...1-16, is applicable generally when there is an arbitration contract affecting interstate commerce. See Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 774 n.1 (Mo. banc 2005); Mueller v. Hopkins & Howard, P.C., 5 S.W.3d 182, 185 (Mo. App. 1999) (both citing 9 U.S.C. section Under Hallmark......
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Arcese v. Daniel Schmitt & Co., ED 103087
...own admission and intent, the $5,500 payment falls under the realm of the liquidated damages provision. Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. banc 2005) ("The guiding principle of contract interpretation under Missouri law is that a court will seek to ascertain the inte......
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State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, No. SC 93846
...it is a well-settled rule that “[i]f ambiguous, [a contract] will be construed against the drafter.” Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. banc 2005). The Rams had the burden to incorporate the terms in such a way that Mr. Hewitt could manifest his consent. Having faile......
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State ex rel. Greitens v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. SC95422
...agreement, and the customary rules of state contract law and contract interpretation apply. Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree , 158 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. banc 2005). When construing an arbitration clause, courts must ascertain the intent of the parties and give effect to that intent. Id. The ......
-
Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., DOCKET NUMBER WD67440
...1-16, is applicable generally when there is an arbitration contract affecting interstate commerce. See Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 774 n.1 (Mo. banc 2005); Mueller v. Hopkins & Howard, P.C., 5 S.W.3d 182, 185 (Mo. App. 1999) (both citing 9 U.S.C. section Under Hallmark......
-
Arcese v. Daniel Schmitt & Co., ED 103087
...own admission and intent, the $5,500 payment falls under the realm of the liquidated damages provision. Triarch Indus., Inc. v. Crabtree, 158 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Mo. banc 2005) ("The guiding principle of contract interpretation under Missouri law is that a court will seek to ascertain the inte......