Tribbitt v. State

• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Harrell
• Citation: Tribbitt v. State, 403 Md. 638, 943 A.2d 1260 (Md. App. 2008)
• Decision Date: 13 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 72, September Term, 2007.,72, September Term, 2007.
• Parties: Christopher Larry TRIBBITT v. STATE of Maryland.

943 A.2d 1260

403 Md. 638

Christopher Larry TRIBBITT v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 72, September Term, 2007.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 13, 2008.

Gary E. Bair (Bennett & Bair, LLP, Greenbelt), on brief, for Petitioner.

Cathleen C. Brockmeyer, Asst. Atty. General (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. General, Baltimore), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued Before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ALAN M. WILNER, (Retired, specially assigned) and DALE R. CATHELL, (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

I.

HARRELL, Judge.

Maryland Code (2002, 2007 Cum.Supp.), Criminal Law Article § 3-602 states that "`[s]exual abuse' means an act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation of a minor. . . ." Christopher Larry Tribbitt, Petitioner, convicted of violating this statute, argues essentially that § 3-602 should be given a much more restrictive meaning, with the result that his conduct in this case was not criminal. We do not agree.

II.

During the 2003 through 2006 school years, Kylie, the victim,¹ was a student in a physical education class taught by Tribbitt at a Queen Anne's County public middle school. Over this time, Tribbitt and the victim grew "close."

According to Kylie's testimony at trial, Tribbitt requested, in the Spring of 2005, that she show him her thong underwear by pulling up her shirt and pulling down her pants. She complied.² In August 2005, at the beginning of her ninth grade year, Kylie joined the school volleyball team. Tribbitt was its coach. Over the course of the volleyball season, Tribbitt touched Kylie inappropriately on four or five occasions in the school's locker room. Kylie testified that he requested that she hug him and rub her thighs up against him. During this hug, she noticed Tribbitt's tumescence. Kylie also claimed that Tribbitt grabbed her "butt" as they walked through the locker room.

On one occasion, when Tribbitt's shoe was untied, he said to Kylie, "can you bend down there and tie it and while you're down there," and, winking at her, "pretty much tugged on his penis. . . ."³ They then walked together into the equipment room. Kylie testified that, while in the equipment room, Tribbitt "rubbed [her] butt and inner thighs." Next, they walked into the girls' locker room where Tribbitt rubbed Kylie's vaginal area through her pants.

In an encounter later during the volleyball season, Tribbitt grabbed Kylie and played with her thong. She described yet another incident where Tribbitt grabbed her and, with his hand, started "really going down [her] pants and he got like half way down there . . .," stopping just above her vagina.

Following a bench trial on 17 November 2006 in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County, the trial judge made the following relevant findings of fact:

[T]here are several things that, probably a lot more than these, that are not in dispute. There was no oral sex; there was no sexual intercourse; there was no digital penetration. In my mind, there was no child pornography. There clearly was somebody who was responsible and that was you, Mr. Tribbitt, in your role, not only as Kylie's teacher, coach, and what you did was obviously, completely inappropriate, and we'll get to whether it was criminal momentarily.

. . . .

With respect to the statute, 3-602, sexual abuse of a minor, . . . there's no dispute that the supervisor here was Mr. Tribbitt. The issue is whether or not, in this case, that sexual abuse is exploitation of a minor and would include sexual offense in any degree.

. . . .

What is clear to me is that over this period of time, there were inappropriate acts that are criminal in nature, that involve sexual offenses which is improper touching. Clear to me, four or five occasions when in middle school, four or five occasions in high school, that there was contact, purposeful contact, where you felt Kylie's butt, not her hip; her vaginal area, rubbed against her. There's no question in my mind that all that occurred. So with respect to Count 1, I have absolutely no doubt that that involves sexual exploitation of Kylie by you, that that was for your own sexual gratification. So as to Count 1, child abuse of a minor, the verdict is guilty.

Tribbitt was sentenced to 25 years in prison, with all but 18 months suspended, and five years of supervised probation. The Court of Special Appeals, in Tribbitt's direct appeal, affirmed in an unreported opinion. We granted Tribbitt's petition for certiorari to consider a single question: "[m]ay sexual contact that does not constitute a sexual offense in any degree or otherwise violate any provision of Maryland law nonetheless provide the basis for `sexual abuse' within the meaning of Section 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article?"

III.

Maryland Rule 8-131(c) directs:

When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

Thus, we refrain from engaging in de novo fact-finding and accept the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 221-22, 792 A.2d 1160, 1165-66 (2002). When we review a trial court's determinations of legal questions or conclusions of law based on those findings of fact, however, the clearly erroneous standard does not apply. Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chem. Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591, 578 A.2d 1202, 1205 (1990). Instead, we review de novo the trial court's "relation of those facts to the applicable law." Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 397 Md. 37, 50, 915 A.2d 991, 998 (2007); see also Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535, 907 A.2d 175, 184 (2006) (noting that when an issue "involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are `legally correct' under a de novo standard of review").

IV.

Tribbitt does not challenge the facts as found by the trial court. Rather, Tribbitt contends that Maryland Code (2002, 2007 Cum. Supp.), Criminal Law Article § 3-602⁴ does not criminalize the acts that the trial court found that he committed on Kylie. Section 3-602 states:

Sexual abuse of a minor.

(a) Definitions. — (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.

(2) "Family member" has the meaning stated in § 3-601 of this subtitle.

(3) "Household member" has the meaning stated in § 3-601 of this subtitle.

(4)(i) "Sexual abuse" means an act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation of a minor, whether physical injuries are sustained or not.

(ii) "Sexual abuse" includes:

1. incest;

2. rape;

3. sexual offense in any degree;

4. sodomy; and

5. unnatural or perverted sexual practices.

(b) Prohibited. — (1) A parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor may not cause sexual abuse to the minor.

(2) A household member or family member may not cause sexual abuse to a minor.

(c) Penalty. — A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 25 years.

(d) Sentencing. — A sentence imposed under this section may be separate from and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for:

(1) any crime based on the act establishing the violation of this section; or a(2) violation of § 3-601 of this subtitle involving an act of abuse separate from sexual abuse under this section.

Tribbitt's main focus is on the interpretation of § 3-602(a)(4). He argues that § 3-602(a)(4), which defines sexual abuse, requires that, in order to be convicted of a violation of the statute, a defendant's particular acts as found by the trial court must be "otherwise criminal" in nature. We disagree.

The fundamental rules of statutory interpretation are well-settled. "`The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.'" Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 613, 937 A.2d 242, 257 (2007) (quoting Kushell v. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-78, 870 A.2d 186, 193-94 (2005)). "When construing a statute, we recognize that it `should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.'" Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 691, 861 A.2d 727, 732 (2004) (quoting James v. Butler, 378 Md. 683, 696, 838 A.2d 1180, 1187 (2003)). We will "neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. . . ." Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not then need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent, external rules of construction, for `the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.'" The Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004) (quoting Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 220, 817 A.2d 229, 233 (2003)). "If, however, the meaning of the plain language is ambiguous or unclear, we seek to discern legislative intent from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior case law, and the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based." Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998) (citing Haupt v. State, 340 Md. 462, 471, 667 A.2d 179, 183 (1995)).

"It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that criminal statutes are to be construed narrowly so that courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used." Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 36,...