Tribble v. State

• Decision Date: 19 April 1906
• Citation: 40 So. 938,145 Ala. 23
• Parties: TRIBBLE v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

40 So. 938

145 Ala. 23

TRIBBLE v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 19, 1906

Appeal from Circuit Court, Limestone County; D. W. Speake, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Steve Tribble was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

The defendant was indicted and tried for killing one Beddingfield by shooting him with a gun. The evidence showed without conflict that the defendant shot and killed deceased. There was conflict in the evidence as to who brought on the difficulty that resulted in the killing, and as to whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense when he fired the fatal shot.

In his oral charge to the jury, the court used the following language: "To establish to your reasonable satisfaction that at the time he killed Beddingfield the defendant was in imminent danger of life or limb, the burden of proof is on the defendant. If the jury have a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant was in imminent danger of life or limb they must give him the benefit of the doubt. As to proving imminent peril and the inability to escape, the burden of proof is on the defendant; that if the proof failed to show that defendant was in imminent danger, or that he had impressed on his mind a reasonable belief that he was in such danger, then self-defense is not made out."

The following charges were requested by the state and given by the court: Charge A: "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if, after considering all the evidence, you have a fixed conviction that the defendant went to the spring with his gun for the purpose of killing the deceased, and waited until the deceased came, and then shot and killed him, he would be guilty of murder in the first degree." Charge B: "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that all 12 of you must agree before you can acquit or convict the defendant." Charge C: "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the doubt that would justify an acquittal must be actual and substantial, not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending on moral testimony is open to some possible or imaginary doubt." Charge D: "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that a reasonable doubt that would justify an acquittal must grow out of the evidence after the consideration of the whole of the evidence in the case."

The defendant requested the following charges, which the court refused to give: "(a) If the defendant entertained a reasonable and honest belief that his life or limb was in imminent danger from the assault or threatened assault of the deceased, if there was any such assault, or if the jury have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant entertained such a belief, you will find the defendant not guilty. (b) I charge you that the dicta of Mr. Justice Stone read to you by the solicitor in his closing argument is not the law in this case. (c) I charge you that the law read you by the solicitor from the case of Ex parte Nettles, 58 Ala. 274, has no application to this case. (d) That portion of the opinion of the Supreme Court, 58 Ala. 274, read in your hearing by the solicitor in his closing argument, was written in condemnation of the opinion of the Supreme Court of the state of Mississippi in the case of Ex parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673 and the same is not the law, and has no application in this case. (e) I charge you that that portion of the opinion of the Supreme Court from the case of Ex parte Nettles read to you by the solicitor in the closing argument was mere dicta and is not law, and the said opinion was on an appeal from a hearing on application for habeas corpus, and was not such a trial as is being held in this case. (f) The law does not require that a person upon whom is made a felonious assault with a deadly weapon shall retreat; nor does the law require that the danger of life or limb should be real, but authorizes him to act upon appearances when sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable man a just apprehension of imminent danger to life or limb. (g) While the burden of proof is in some sense upon the defendant to establish his plea of self-defense, yet if, upon all the evidence, the jury have a reasonable doubt as to that matter, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of that doubt, and to a verdict of not guilty. (h) You cannot take the law as read by the solicitor from the books, but you must take it as given you by the court, both in his oral charge and the written charges given you. (i) In considering whether the defendant acted in self-defense, the jury will look to the character of and the threats made by the deceased, and all the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of the shooting. (j) Threats by the deceased against the defendant, when communicated to the latter, in connection with the known violent, dangerous, and bloodthirsty character of the deceased, may be looked to by the jury as justifying prompt and decisive measures by the defendant when a demonstration was made by the deceased at the time of the difficulty, if in fact any such demonstration was made. (k) The defendant had the right to consider the previous threats of the dead man against his life, in connection with the demonstration made by the deceased at the time of or just prior to the fatal shot, if any demonstration was in fact made by the deceased at such time. (l) The defendant, by attempting to retreat would have placed himself in greater peril than he then was then there was no duty upon him to retreat. * * * (n) I charge you that in arriving at your verdict you must consider the character of the deceased, Charles Beddingfield, as it was offered and admitted in evidence. (o) I charge you that if the deceased was a known violent, dangerous, and bloodthirsty character, or if he had made threats against the defendant which had been communicated to the defendant, the defendant was justified under the law in meeting force with force, and in striking even unto the death, when a hostile demonstration was...