Triblet v. State

• Decision Date: 25 May 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-1686
• Citation: 169 N.E.3d 430
• Parties: Christian TRIBLET, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

169 N.E.3d 430

Christian TRIBLET, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-1686

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED May 25, 2021

Attorney for Appellant: Michael C. Borschel, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Josiah Swinney, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Bradford, Chief Judge

Case Summary

[1] On the evening of May 14, 2019, Indiana State Police Trooper Nathaniel Raney and two Indianapolis Metropolitan Police detectives were driving in a high-crime area in Indianapolis when Trooper Raney noticed a vehicle driving with an expired license plate. Trooper Raney stopped the vehicle, gathered the identifications of the three occupants, and ran their information. One passenger had a prior handgun without a license charge, another had an outstanding warrant for a parole violation, and the driver, Christian Triblet, had been charged with robbery in the past. Trooper Raney decided to tow the vehicle, and when Triblet exited the vehicle Trooper Raney observed a large bulge in Triblet's right pocket and that he was pinning that side of his body against the car. Trooper Raney, concerned that Triblet might have a firearm, patted him down and immediately detected a firearm tucked in Triblet's sweatpants.

[2] Triblet was charged with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. On interlocutory appeal, Triblet contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the handgun. Triblet argues that Trooper Raney's warrantless search and seizure was not founded on a "reasonable suspicion" and therefore violates both the United States’ and Indiana's constitutions. Because we believe that Trooper Raney was justified in determining that Triblet presented a threat to officer safety, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History¹

[3] On the evening of May 14, 2019, Trooper Raney and two Indianapolis Metropolitan Police detectives were driving in a high-crime area in which Trooper Raney had conducted numerous criminal investigations in the past and was actively working cases concerning heroin and methamphetamine. Trooper Raney, who had been a police officer for twelve years, primarily worked firearms or narcotics cases. While patrolling the area, Trooper Raney stopped a vehicle that he noticed had expired plates. Trooper Raney noticed that the area which in he was stopping the vehicle was not well lit. Trooper Raney observed one passenger in the front passenger seat, another in a back seat, and Triplet in the driver's seat. Trooper Raney returned to his police vehicle with the three individuals’ identifications to check for open warrants and to verify their identities. Trooper Raney discovered that passenger Alan Richardson had an open arrest warrant for a parole violation for robbery, passenger Phillip Rickets had a prior handgun without a license charge, and Triblet had been previously charged with robbery and possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.

[4] Trooper Raney had been trained in a "mechanics of arrest" class at the Indiana Law Enforcement Academy, in which he learned that persons hide contraband by pinning themselves against a surface. Trooper Raney also knew from his experience that most persons carrying firearms are right handed and will carry the firearm on the right, in a pocket or waistband.

[5] While another officer detained Richardson, Trooper Raney decided to tow the vehicle due to the expired license plate and because the car was stopped in a lane of travel. Trooper Raney approached the vehicle and asked Triblet to exit the vehicle. When Triblet exited the vehicle, Trooper Raney noticed a rigid bulge on the right side of Triblet's pants that was larger than a mobile telephone. Trooper Raney later testified that, at this point, he believed it was "highly possible" that Triblet had had a firearm in his right pocket. Tr. Vol. II p. 13. Triblet then stood close to the vehicle and pinned the right side of his body to the car in what Trooper Raney believed was an effort to conceal the bulge. Trooper Raney saw this as a red flag, and asked Triblet to back up. Trooper Raney informed Triblet that he was going to conduct a pat-down for officer safety. When Trooper Raney conducted the pat-down, he "immediately" felt what he identified as a firearm, which he confirmed after opening the loose-fitting jeans that Triblet wore over his sweatpants and retrieving the firearm from the sweatpants. Tr. Vol. II p. 16.

[6] On May 16, 2019, the State charged Triblet with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and Triblet filed a motion to suppress the evidence raising the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. At an April 7, 2020 hearing on the motion, Triblet argued that the pat-down was unconstitutional because Trooper Raney's articulable facts did not amount to reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. On June 2, 2020, the trial court found that after Trooper Raney returned to his police vehicle to insert names into police databases, he believed Triblet had a predicate conviction that would allow him to be charged as a serious violent felon. The trial court elected not to consider Trooper Raney's knowledge of Triblet's criminal history because he had not known the specific facts underlying each case. Still, the trial court concluded that the pat-down for weapons was justified given Trooper Raney's other articulable facts. On August 18, 2020, Triblet petitioned for the certification of this interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the trial court, and we accepted jurisdiction on October 8, 2020.

Discussion and Decision

I. Fourth Amendment

[7] Triblet argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless search of Triblet's person because Trooper Raney lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.

Our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is similar to other sufficiency issues. Jackson v. State , 785 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans denied. We determine whether substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the denial of the motion. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence that is most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. However, the review of a denial of a motion to suppress is different from other sufficiency matters in that we must also consider uncontested evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Id. We review de novo a ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we give deference to a trial court's determination of facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Campos v. State , 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008).

Westmoreland v. State , 965 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual's privacy and possessory interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Howard v. State , 862 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Generally, a search warrant is a prerequisite to a constitutionally proper search and seizure. Halsema v. State , 823 N.E.2d 668, 676 (Ind. 2005). When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. Malone [v. State] , 882 N.E.2d [784,] [ ] 786 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2008)]. One such exception is that a police officer may briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes without a warrant or probable cause if, based upon specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, the official intrusion is reasonably warranted, and the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Moultry v. State , 808 N.E.2d 168, 170–71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] [...] (1968) ).

"In addition to detainment, Terry permits a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where the officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime." Malone, 882 N.E.2d at 786–87 (citing Terry , 392 U.S. at 27 ). "The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Id.

Washington v. State , 922 N.E.2d 109, 111–12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A traffic stop presents sufficient concern for officer safety to justify the "minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car" without violating the Fourth Amendment. State v. Cunningham , 26 N.E.3d 21, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Additionally, as Justice Ginsburg noted in Arizona v. Johnson , "[M]ost traffic stops, this Court has observed, resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry . Furthermore, the Court has recognized that traffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers." 555 U.S. 323, 330, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (quotations and citations omitted).

[8] To determine whether Trooper Raney was justified in searching Triblet, we must determine "whether the facts available to the officer at the moment ... would warrant a reasonable caution in believing the action taken was appropriate." Pearson v. State , 870 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The State argues that because an officer "need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger" and...