Tribune Reporter Printing Co. v. Homer

• Decision Date: 26 November 1917
• Docket Number: 3095
• Citation: 169 P. 170,51 Utah 153
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: TRIBUNE REPORTER PRINTING CO. v. HOMER (QUINN, Intervener.)

169 P. 170

51 Utah 153

TRIBUNE REPORTER PRINTING CO. v. HOMER (QUINN, Intervener.)

No. 3095

Supreme Court of Utah

November 26, 1917

Appeal from District Court of Salt Lake County, Third District; Hon W. H. Bramel, Judge.

Action by the Tribune Reporter Printing Company against Thomas Homer; B. B. Quinn intervening.

Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant and intervener appeal.

AFFIRMED.

M. M Warner for appellants.

Morgan & Huffaker for respondent.

THURMAN J. FRICK, C. J., and McCARTY, CORFMAN, and GIDEON, JJ., concur.

OPINION

THURMAN, J.

The facts in this case are stipulated to be that defendant, Homer, at all times covered by the record was a public officer, to wit, county clerk, of Salt Lake County; that on the 27th day of June, 1916, he assigned his unearned official salary for the month of September of the same year to the intervener, B. B. Quinn, who immediately presented the same to the county auditor, and it was by him accepted and filed; that on the 14th day of August, 1916, plaintiff procured judgment against Homer in the city court of Salt Lake City, and on the 28th day of September, 1916, garnished the sum of $ 248.90 of the official salary of Homer due and owing to him for official services rendered in said month. The auditor's return on said garnishment stated:

"That on the 27th day of June, 1916, the defendant assigned his salary for September, 1916, to the said B. B. Quinn."

The case was tried to the court without a jury, and judgment rendered for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. The sole question presented is: Was the assignment of the salary from Homer to Quinn valid as against a garnishment proceeding instituted by plaintiff for the satisfaction of its judgment?

Appellant in his brief says:

"There has been a universal rule of law with one or two exceptions, that the unearned salary of public officers could not be assigned, neither was such salary subject to execution or garnishment. It is unnecessary for me to collect and cite the numerous cases to uphold the contention of the defendant that the salary of public officers, as a matter of public policy, are exempt from execution and garnishment, and that such exemption is based upon the same reasons assigned by counsel in his brief for prohibiting the assignment by appellant of his salary."

While this concession by appellant as to what the general law is on this subject renders it wholly unnecessary that we should cite authority to the same effect, yet the following paragraphs from Mechem on Public Officers, which declare the doctrine, are exceedingly instructive. Section 874:

"While the compensation already earned by a public officer may validly be assigned by him, it is settled by a clear preponderance of authority that an assignment of future compensation not yet earned, whether payable by salary or fees, is opposed to public policy and void. 'Salaries,' it is said in one case, 'are, by law, payable after work is performed, and not before, and, while this remains the law, it must be presumed to be a wise regulation, and necessary, in the view of the lawmakers, to the efficiency of the public service. The contrary rule would permit the public service to be undermined by the assignment to strangers of all the funds appropriated to salaries. It is true that, in respect to officers removable at will, this evil could in some measure be limited by their removal when they were found assigning their salaries; but this is only a partial remedy, for there would still be no means of preventing the continued recurrence of the same difficulty. If such assignments are allowed, then the assignees, by notice to the government, would, on ordinary principles, be entitled to receive pay directly and to take the place of their assignors in respect to the emoluments, leaving the duties as a barren charge to be borne by the assignors. It does not need much reflection or observation to understand that such a condition of things could not fail to produce results disastrous to the efficiency of the public service.'"

Section 875:

"It is well settled that the public, whether it be the United States, state, or municipal government such as that of counties, townships, cities, and school districts, cannot be charged in garnishment or attachment for the compensation due to its public officers. This exemption is based upon public policy, and is not for the benefit of the officer, but for that of the public, that the latter may not be harassed or inconvenienced by suit against it, and that the efficiency of its servants be not interfered with by any uncertainty as to their payment."

See, also, 4 Cyc. 19, 20 Cyc. 990; Chamberlain v. Watters, 10 Utah 298, 37 P. 566; Van Cott v. Pratt, 11 Utah 209, 39 P. 827.

It being both established and conceded that it is a general law of this country, unless modified by statute, that an assignment by a public officer of his unearned official compensation is against public policy and void, and that a garnishment proceeding to subject such compensation to satisfy a judgment obtained against such officer is subject to the same infirmity, we next proceed to determine whether or not the general law above stated has been changed or modified by the statutes of this state. Comp. Laws Utah 1907, section 3113x, reads as follows:

"The state of Utah, or any county, city, town, district, board of education, or other subdivision of the state, or any officer, board, or...