Tribune-Review Pub. Co. v. Allegheny County Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 17 July 1995
• Docket Number: TRIBUNE-REVIEW
• Citation: 662 A.2d 677
• Parties: PUBLISHING COMPANY and Eric Heyl v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 677

662 A.2d 677

TRIBUNE-REVIEW PUBLISHING COMPANY and Eric Heyl v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 15, 1995.

Decided July 17, 1995.

Vicki L. Beatty, for appellant.

Susan A. Yohe, for appellees.

Before COLINS, P.J., and DOYLE, McGINLEY, SMITH, PELLEGRINI, KELLEY and NEWMAN, JJ.

COLINS, President Judge.

The appellant Allegheny County Housing Authority (ACHA) brings this appeal from a decision in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County ordering appellant to allow appellee Allegheny County Tribune Review (Tribune) access to ACHA payroll records. We reverse the order on the ground that the payroll records of ACHA are not subject to disclosure under 65 P.S. § 66.3. ¹

On June 18, 1993, Eric Heyl, a reporter for the Tribune requested ACHA provide the Tribune with a list of all ACHA employees, their dates of birth, their addresses and their dates of employment. ACHA responded by providing the Tribune with a list of all its employees and their dates of employment. On July 14, 1993, the Tribune formally requested access to the payroll records of ACHA. The payroll records are prepared and maintained by ACHA. The payroll records contain the name, address, telephone number, social security number, salary and employment information of every ACHA employee. ACHA denied the Tribune access to its payroll records but did release to the Tribune a list of all ACHA employees and corresponding salary and employment information.

The Tribune initiated a statutory appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County requesting an order granting it access to the ACHA payroll records. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to ACHA being an agency as defined by the Act. The court of common pleas granted the Tribune's request finding that ACHA payroll records are public records and do not themselves harm reputation or sense of security and therefore must be made public. ACHA took a timely appeal to this Court.

Our review of the issues on appeal is limited to a determination of "whether the grant or denial of appellee's request for information was for just and proper cause." 65 P.S. § 66.4; Times Publishing Company, Inc. v. Michel, 159 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 398, 633 A.2d 1233 (1993), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 538 Pa. 618, 645 A.2d 1321 (1994).

I. THE RIGHT TO KNOW ACT

The common law right of a party to inspect public records was codified by our General Assembly in 1957 and is titled the Right to Know Act. The intent of the Act is to assure the availability of government information to citizens of the Commonwealth by permitting access to official information. Under the Act, a broad construction is given to the initial determination of whether a document is a public record "to be tempered as an opposing party brings into play the enumerated exceptions." Marvel v. Dalrymple, 38 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 67, 72, 393 A.2d 494, 497 (1978).

Section 2 of the Right to Know Act, 65 P.S. § 66.2, provides that:

Every public record of an agency shall, at reasonable times, be open for examination and inspection by any citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Section 1 of the Right to Know Act, 65 P.S. § 66.1(1), defines an agency as:

any State or municipal authority or similar organization created by or pursuant to a statute which declares in substance that such organization performs or has for its purpose the performance of an essential government function.

The Act defines "public record", in relevant part, as any account, voucher or contract dealing with the receipt or disbursement of funds. Excluded from the Act's definition of "public record" is any record, document, material, exhibit, pleading, report, memorandum, or other paper, access to or the publication of which is prohibited, restricted or forbidden by statute or order or decree of court, or which would operate to While the overall emphasis of the Act is on disclosure, it seeks to provide a balanced formula which opens the administrative process to the scrutiny of the general public, and, simultaneously, protects the confidential nature of specific types of information. The question presented herein is whether the Act foresees an individual's right to privacy in certain personal information and, if so, whether the Act demands or excludes the release of that information.

the prejudice or impairment of a person's reputation or personal security. ²

In that vein, ACHA argues that its payroll records are a composite of information, containing, among other things, an employee's name, home address, home telephone number and social security account number. ACHA contends that while on its face the payroll records are a "public record", they are nonetheless an embodiment of an employee's confidential information which may not be disclosed without trampling on the employee's right to privacy and threatening an employee's personal security. Therefore, ACHA reasons, the payroll records are not a "public record" as defined in the Act. ³

The Tribune argues that the payroll records are a "public record" in which a public employee has no right to privacy. The cornerstone of its argument is the postulate that even if a right to privacy does exist, the countervailing benefits afforded by releasing the information far outweigh a public employee's right to privacy. In support thereof, the Tribune focuses on this Court's decision in Moak v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 18 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 599, 336 A.2d 920 (1975).

An examination of Moak reveals that the Court was concerned with whether the disclosure of the payroll records of the Philadelphia Police Department would operate to prejudice or impair a police officer's reputation and was therefore excluded by the Act. The Court found that the police department's payroll records contained each employee's full name, class and department, payroll number, sex, date of birth, annual salary and various other personnel data. The Court found the records themselves did not operate to prejudice or impair reputation and were incapable of such harm. Id. at 605, 336 A.2d at 924. Therefore, the Moak Court concluded the payroll records therein at issue were "public records" subject to disclosure pursuant to the Act.

Nowhere in Moak is there a discussion concerning personal information of the nature presented by this case, i.e., home addresses, home telephone numbers and social security account numbers. Additionally, Moak does not address the issue of whether an employee has an expectation of privacy in any of this information. For these reasons we find Moak does not control. Instead, we look to Times Publishing for guidance.

Times Publishing involved firearms applications and whether the application was a "public record" and therefore subject to disclosure; or, whether the application containing confidential information in which the applicant had a right to privacy was subject to the exclusionary provisions of the Act and thus not a "public record". The Court noted that the firearms application contained, among other things, an applicant's home address, home telephone number and social security account number. The Court found an applicant did have an expectation of privacy in this information and held that disclosure of the home addresses, home telephone numbers and social security account numbers of firearms applicants was violative of an applicant's right to privacy. The Court also concluded that disclosure of the information would impair the applicant's personal security. The Court then affirmed the trial court's order granting access to the applications, except for the applicant's home address, home telephone number and social security account number.

The gravamen of the Court's holding rested in concern for protecting the individual's right to privacy not in protecting the individual's right to bear arms. Notably, the factual Moreover, Times Publishing and PG Publishing Company v. County of Washington, 162 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 196, 638 A.2d 422 (1994), are grounded in the same analysis. PG Publishing involved cellular phone records of public employees and whether the phone bills, prepared by the phone company, could be disclosed under the Act or whether the phone bills fell into one of the enumerated statutory exceptions to the Act. The Court concluded that the phone bills were subject to disclosure because cellular phone records revealed the manner in which the tax dollar was spent. In so holding, the Court specifically stated that "if public money is spent then the Act entitles the public to know where the money goes." Id. at 211, 638 A.2d at 429 (quoting Morning Call, Inc. v. Lower Saucon Township, 156 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 397, 627 A.2d 297 (1993)). In our holding today, we are not retreating from that position.

dissimilarity in Times Publishing and the case at hand pertains only to the type of document sought. In all other respects Times Publishing and the case at hand are consistent.

While the Act makes disclosure the general rule, it is restrictive in that it recognizes certain limitations when determining whether a document is a "public record". Unlike the previous cases, we are now challenged to determine whether the payroll records of ACHA are a "public record"; in order to make that determination we must examine whether any statute restricts the release of the specific information contained in the payroll records.

II. THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

The right to privacy is one of the most closely guarded treasures of our society. It is characterized as an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Company v. City of Akron, 70 Ohio St.3d 605, 640 N.E.2d 164 (1994). Its existence in Pennsylvania arises under and is guaranteed by Article 1, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Denoncourt v. Commonwealth State Ethics Commission, 504 Pa. 191, 197, 470 A.2d 945, 948 (1983). The Tribune herein argues...