Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank

Decision Date17 July 2001
Citation343 N.J. Super. 73,777 A.2d 993
PartiesRobert J. TRIFFIN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SOMERSET VALLEY BANK, Pavon Flores, Geovany Ayala, Mario Gomes, Marcelina Mejia, George Lopez Martinez, Pedro Lopez, Saul A. Beltran, Noe Cuadra, Marvin O. Rodriges, Defendants, and Hauser Contracting Co., Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., Third-Party Defendant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court

Ronald V. Farneski, argued the cause for appellant.

Robert J. Triffin, argued the cause pro se.

Before Judges HAVEY, CUFF and LISA.

The opinion of the court was delivered by CUFF, J.A.D.

This case concerns the enforceability of dishonored checks against the issuer of the checks under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as implemented in New Jersey in N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101 to 3-605.

Plaintiff purchased, through assignment agreements with check cashing companies, eighteen dishonored checks, issued by defendant Hauser Contracting Company (Hauser Co.). Plaintiff then filed suit in the Special Civil Part to enforce Hauser Co.'s liability on the checks. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Hauser Co. appeals the grant of summary judgment. It also argues, for the first time, that plaintiff lacked standing to file suit against Hauser Co. We affirm.

In October 1998, Alfred M. Hauser, president of Hauser Co., was notified by Edwards Food Store in Raritan and the Somerset Valley Bank (the Bank), that several individuals were cashing what appeared to be Hauser Co. payroll checks. Mr. Hauser reviewed the checks, ascertained that the checks were counterfeits and contacted the Raritan Borough and Hillsborough Police Departments. Mr. Hauser concluded that the checks were counterfeits because none of the payees were employees of Hauser Co., and because he did not write the checks or authorize anyone to sign those checks on his behalf. At that time, Hauser Co. employed Automatic Data Processing, Inc. (ADP) to provide payroll services and a facsimile signature was utilized on all Hauser Co. payroll checks.

Mr. Hauser executed affidavits of stolen and forged checks at the Bank, stopping payment on the checks at issue. Subsequently, the Bank received more than eighty similar checks valued at $25,000 all drawn on Hauser Co.'s account.

Plaintiff is in the business of purchasing dishonored negotiable instruments. In February and March 1999, plaintiff purchased eighteen dishonored checks from four different check cashing agencies, specifying Hauser Co. as the drawer. The checks totaled $8,826.42. Pursuant to assignment agreements executed by plaintiff, each agency stated that it cashed the checks for value, in good faith, without notice of any claims or defenses to the checks, without knowledge that any of the signatures were unauthorized or forged, and with the expectation that the checks would be paid upon presentment to the bank upon which the checks were drawn. All eighteen checks bore a red and green facsimile drawer's signature stamp in the name of Alfred M. Hauser. All eighteen checks were marked by the Bank as "stolen check" and stamped with the warning, "do not present again." Each of the nine payees on the eighteen checks are named defendants in this case.

Plaintiff then filed this action against the Bank, Hauser Co., and each of the nine individual payees.1 Plaintiff contended that Hauser Co. was negligent in failing to safeguard both its payroll checks and its authorized drawer's facsimile stamp, and was liable for payment of the checks.

The trial court granted plaintiff's summary judgment motion, concluding that no genuine issue of fact existed as to the authenticity of the eighteen checks at issue. Judge Hoens concluded that because the check cashing companies took the checks in good faith, plaintiff was a holder in due course as assignee. Judge Hoens also found that because the checks appeared to be genuine, Hauser Co. was required, but had failed, to show that plaintiff's assignor had any notice that the checks were not validly drawn.

On appeal, Hauser Co. contends for the first time that plaintiff lacked standing to sue. As a general rule, an appellate court will not consider matters not properly raised below, unless the issue goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court or substantially implicates a matter of public interest. Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 230, 708 A.2d 401 (1998); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234, 300 A.2d 142 (1973). Even if the matter satisfies that test, the court will not consider the issue if the record before the court is incomplete as to the newly presented issue. Alan J. Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 230, 708 A.2d 401. Because the issue of plaintiff's standing is ascertainable from the existing record, there is no factual barrier to appellate review of this issue. We also conclude that the issue of standing is of substantial importance because standing involves a threshold determination which governs the ability of a party to initiate and maintain an action before the court. In re Adoption of Baby T., 160 N.J. 332, 340, 734 A.2d 304 (1999).

The "essential purpose" of the standing doctrine in New Jersey is to

assure that the invocation and exercise of judicial power in a given case are appropriate. Further, the relationship of plaintiffs to the subject matter of the litigation and to other parties must be such to generate confidence in the ability of the judicial process to get to the truth of the matter and in the integrity and soundness of the final adjudication. Also, the standing doctrine serves to fulfill the paramount judicial responsibility of a court to seek just and expeditious determinations on the ultimate merits of deserving controversies.
[New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 82 N.J. 57, 69, 411 A.2d 168 (1980).]

Consequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that "standing is an element of justiciability that cannot be waived or conferred by consent." In re Adoption of Baby T., supra, 160 N.J. at 341, 734 A.2d 304 (citing New Jersey Citizen Action v. Riviera Motel Corp., 296 N.J.Super. 402, 411, 686 A.2d 1265 (App.Div.), certif. granted, 152 N.J. 13, 702 A.2d 352 (1997), appeal dismissed as moot, 152 N.J. 361, 704 A.2d 1297 (1998)).

Standing is governed by R. 4:26-1, which provides that "[e]very action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest...." There is no distinction between a party in interest and standing in New Jersey. New Jersey Citizen Action, supra, 296 N.J.Super. at 413, 686 A.2d 1265; see also Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 4:26-1 (2001) (stating that "real party in interest rule is ordinarily determinative of standing to prosecute an action").

Case law further states that standing refers to a party's "ability or entitlement to maintain an action before the court." New Jersey Citizen Action, supra, 296 N.J.Super. at 409,686 A.2d 1265. To be entitled to sue, a party must have "a sufficient stake and real adverseness with respect to the subject matter of the litigation." In re Adoption of Baby T., supra, 160 N.J. at 340, 734 A.2d 304. Additionally, "[a] substantial likelihood of some harm visited upon the plaintiff in the event of an unfavorable decision is needed for the purposes of standing." Ibid. Standing has been broadly construed in New Jersey as "our courts have considered the threshold for standing to be fairly low." Reaves v. Egg Harbor Township, 277 N.J.Super. 360, 366, 649 A.2d 904 (Ch. Div.1994).

Under this standard, it is evident that plaintiff has standing to sue Hauser Co. Plaintiff is the purchaser and assignee of eighteen checks, which he now seeks to have honored by Hauser Co., the drawer of the checks. See Triffin v. Cigna Ins. Co., 297 N.J.Super. 199, 202, 687 A.2d 1045 (App.Div.1997)

.

We reject Hauser Co.'s argument that our recent case, Triffin v. Bridge View Bank, 330 N.J.Super. 473, 750 A.2d 136 (App.Div.2000), means plaintiff lacks standing to sue it. In Bridge View Bank, we held that plaintiff had no standing to sue the bank for failure to comply with N.J.S.A. 12A:4-302, the midnight deadline rule. This rule imposes accountability on a payor bank for the amount of an item presented to and received by the payor bank, if the bank "retains the item beyond midnight of the banking day of receipt without settling for it or, ... does not pay or return the item or send notice of dishonor until after its midnight deadline." N.J.S.A. 12A:4-302(a)(1). We held that standing was limited to those entities who received the check prior to its dishonor because the statute confers standing to sue on a limited class, " `comprised of those involved in the collection and payment of the check at issue who may be directly harmed ... by the failure of the payor bank to adhere to the ... midnight deadline.' " Bridge View Bank, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 477, 750 A.2d 136 (quoting American Title Ins. Co. v. Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Co., 813 F.Supp. 423, 428 (E.D.Va.1993), aff'd o.b., 25 F.3d 1038 (4th Cir.1994)).

There is nothing in Bridge View Bank to indicate that the holding should be expanded beyond actions brought under N.J.S.A. 12A:4-302. The case was decided on narrow grounds; restricted to the issue of standing to sue a payor bank. Thus, it bears no relevance to plaintiff's standing to sue Hauser Co., the drawer of the checks.

As to the merits of the appeal, Hauser Co. argues that summary judgment was improperly granted because the court failed to properly address Hauser Co.'s defense that the checks at issue were invalid negotiable instruments and therefore erred in finding plaintiff was a holder in due course.

Our review of the order is limited to whether, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there was any issue of material fact, and whether plaintiff was...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 12 d1 Fevereiro d1 2018
    ...People for Open Gov't v. Roberts, 397 N.J. Super. 502, 508–09, 938 A.2d 158 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank, 343 N.J. Super. 73, 80, 777 A.2d 993 (App. Div. 2001) ). Whether a party has standing is "a threshold justiciability determination," In re Six Month Extensi......
  • Petro v. Platkin
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • 10 d5 Junho d5 2022
    ...standing to be fairly low." Reaves v. Egg Harbor [Twp.], 277 N.J. Super. 360, 366 (Ch. Div. 1994).[ Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank, 343 N.J. Super. 73, 80-81, 777 A.2d 993 (App. Div. 2001).] In light of the voluntary nature of the Act as established by its express terms and operation, we f......
  • Galvin v. Emc Mortg. Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire
    • 25 d4 Setembro d4 2014
    ...or incompleteness must indicate that the instrument may not be what it purports to be.”); cf. Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank, 343 N.J.Super. 73, 777 A.2d 993, 1000 (N.J.Super.App.Div.2001) (for § 3–302 of Uniform Commercial Code to preclude enforcement, “it must be apparent on the face of ......
  • Galvin v. EMC Mortg. Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire
    • 25 d4 Setembro d4 2014
    ...or incompleteness must indicate that the instrument may not be what it purports to be.”); cf. Triffin v. Somerset Valley Bank, 343 N.J.Super. 73, 777 A.2d 993, 1000 (N.J.Super.App.Div.2001) (for § 3–302 of Uniform Commercial Code to preclude enforcement, “it must be apparent on the face of ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT