Trigg v. City of Yuma

• Decision Date: 26 October 1942
• Docket Number: Civil 4462
• Citation: Trigg v. City of Yuma, 59 Ariz. 480, 130 P.2d 59 (Ariz. 1942)
• Parties: C. H. TRIGG and LENA TRIGG, Husband and Wife, Appellants, v. THE CITY OF YUMA, a Municipal Corporation, and FAMA E. TOWNSEND, Appellees
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

130 P.2d 59

59 Ariz. 480

C. H. TRIGG and LENA TRIGG, Husband and Wife, Appellants, v. THE CITY OF YUMA, a Municipal Corporation, and FAMA E. TOWNSEND, Appellees

Civil No. 4462

Supreme Court of Arizona

October 26, 1942

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Yuma. Wm. G. Hall, Judge. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Mr. R C. Bennett, for Appellants.

Mr William H. Westover, for Appellees.

Mr John A. McGuire, Amicus Curiae.

OPINION

ROSS, J.

This action was brought by C. H. Trigg and Lena Trigg, husband and wife, to quiet their title to "a strip of land forty (40) feet in width off the rear of Lots One (1) and Two (2) of Block Ninety-five (95) of the City of Yuma."

The defendants, the City of Yuma and Fama E. Townsend, filed a joint answer to such complaint in which it is alleged that the city taxes on said property for the years 1932-1937, respectively, were:

1932

$ 8.50

1933

8.50

1934

8.50

1935

6.45

1936

12.36

1937

5.10,

and that plaintiffs had paid no part thereof; that said taxes were levied and assessed against saidproperty under and by virtue of the provisions of Ordinances No. 130 and No. 175 of the City of Yuma, relating to the collection of taxes, and in all respects in accordance with the terms and conditions of such ordinances; that thereafter and on, to wit, May 29, 1939, the City Tax and License Collector of Yuma, having theretofore duly published notice thereof, offered said delinquent property for sale to the highest bidder; that no one appeared to bid thereon, whereupon the same was sold to the City of Yuma for the sum of $70.42, being the amount of taxes plus interest, penalties and costs; that a certificate of sale of said property was issued to said city, as provided in said ordinances; that after the expiration of one year from the date of sale the said City Tax and License Collector executed and delivered to the city his tax deed conveying title to the described premises; that thereafter, on January 11, 1941, the city advertised the property for sale in accordance with law and within the time specified in the notice of sale and on, to wit, February 18, 1941, sold said property to defendant Fama E. Townsend for the sum of $275 cash, and thereafter the Mayor and City Recorder, being thereunto duly authorized, executed to her a deed of said property.

The case was tried before the court without a jury and resulted in a judgment in favor of defendants. From such judgment and the order denying their motion for a new trial, plaintiffs have appealed.

The evidence introduced by plaintiffs to support their action to quiet title to said property in them consisted of a deed from the city to C. H. Trigg, dated November 12, 1931, and delivered "between the early part of 1935 and June 1936." The reason for the long delay in delivering the deed to Trigg was that the property was sold to him for labor and material and the city withheld delivery until the value of such labor and material was equal to the consideration for the deed, which was stipulated to be $2,500.

While there is some doubt as to the legality of the transaction between Trigg and the city through which Trigg claims title to the described property, we think the city may not in this proceeding raise the question, for, when it assessed the property as belonging to Trigg, it admitted his title. That seems to have been the view of the trial court. The question, then, resolves itself to this: Were the taxes for which the property was sold a legal charge against the property, and was the procedure followed in the levy, assessment and collection of such taxes regular and in accordance with the law? The judgment of the trial court answered this question in the affirmative, and the question is was the court right in so doing.

Property taxes in the City of Yuma are levied, assessed and collected by the city under its own system of taxation and independent of state law. This power is given the city under its Charter, section 50, Article III, and sections 2 and 13, Article XIV. Ordinances No. 130 and No. 175 provide a system for the levy, assessment and collection of city taxes. It was under and by virtue of these provisions that the taxes here involved were levied and assessed.

Plaintiffs' position is that the provisions of sections 73-601 to 73-608, Arizona Code 1939, provide an exclusive method of taxation by cities and towns of the state; that such method was not followed and that, therefore, the property tax levied and assessed by the city was not legal. Section 73-601, Arizona Code 1939 (identical with section 3102, Revised Code of 1928, and a consolidation and revision of sections 1, 2 and 3 of Chapter 37, Laws of 1917), provides that the equalized value fixed by the board of supervisors of the county shall be the valuation for the purposes of city and town taxation. It is to be observed that the equalized valuation mentioned in said section is not binding upon "a city or town organized and operating under the provisions of any special act or charter," but that such city or town "may avail itself of the benefits and privileges hereof, as if organized and operating under the general law." Section 73-601, supra.

Yuma is a charter city organized under the provisions of section 2, Article XIII of the Constitution. It is a home-rule city. Its charter is its organic law, which must be "consistent with, and subject to, the constitution and the laws of the state." Section 2, Article XIII, supra.

In Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. City of Phoenix, 51 Ariz. 455, 77 P.2d 818, 822, we said:

"... Unquestionably the city possesses the power to supply itself with the means to sustain life and to that end may assess and collect from its property owners taxes for its corporate purposes. As we said in Barrett v. State, 44 Ariz. 270, 36 P.2d 260, 261:

"'It is plain that the securing of revenue for a city is peculiarly and emphatically a matter of local concern.'" In Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 135, 297 P. 1037, 1041, it was said:

"The general powers conferred on the city by the freeholders' charter are those concerning municipal or local affairs.... The city does not assume under its charter all the powers that the state may exercise within its limits, but only powers incident to a city government. 'Rightful subjects' of legislation thereunder are therefore local or municipal concerns of the city. Under this grant of power the city cannot enter the field of general legislation, but must confine itself to the making of by-laws for its local government. In the latter field, under the Constitution so long as the legislation is in harmony with that instrument and the laws of the state it is valid and, under the provisions of section 398, Revised Code of 1928, prevails over state legislation conflicting therewith. If, however, a city by-law is not about a matter of municipal concern but a matter of general statewide concern, it would not be a 'rightful subject' of legislation, as defined by the general grant of power in the charter...."

While the legislature provided for a system of equalizing city and town taxes by giving that power to the board of supervisors of the county, it, at the same time and in the same act, negatived any notion that such method of fixing tax valuations was exclusive. On the contrary, it recognized that the constitution gave such units the right to adopt their own system of assessing and equalizing their taxable property for municipal purposes. If the legislature has the power under the constitution to provide that all cities and towns in the state shall have a uniform system of equalizing their property taxes, it has not exercised such power but has left it optional with chartered cities and towns as to whether they will have their own system of taxation and equalization or the method that empowers the board of supervisors to equalize their taxes.

We are satisfied that under the law the City of Yuma's plan of assessing, equalizing and collecting property taxes for the maintenance and operation of its governmant is in accordance with law and that plaintiffs' contention to the contrary is not tenable. the City of Phoenix has the same system of taxation.

Plaintiffs say the deed from the City of Yuma to them was not delivered until 1936. In other words, they contend that the title to the property remained in the city until the deed was delivered to them and that during the interim the property being municipal was exempt from taxation under subdivision 1 section 73-201, Arizona Code 1939. The record shows that the parties went through the form of completing the transaction on November 21, 1931; that on that day the city executed a deed of the property to Trigg and the latter paid it with his checkfor $2,450, $50 having been theretofore paid on account of purchase price. It is true the deed was not delivered until 1936 and Trigg says the reason it was not...