Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, No. 84-1942

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtBefore CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, and GRAY; GRAY
Citation766 F.2d 299
Parties38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 361, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,340, 54 USLW 2049, 26 Ed. Law Rep. 48 Hattie M. TRIGG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORT WAYNE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee.
Docket NumberNo. 84-1942
Decision Date25 June 1985

Page 299

766 F.2d 299
38 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 361,
37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,340, 54 USLW 2049,
26 Ed. Law Rep. 48
Hattie M. TRIGG, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FORT WAYNE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 84-1942.
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued April 25, 1985.
Decided June 25, 1985.

W. Paul Helmke, Jr., Helmke, Beams, Boyer & Wagner, Ft. Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.

Page 300

James P. Fenton, Barrett, Barrett & McNagny, Ft. Wayne, Ind., for defendant-appellee.

Before CUMMINGS, Chief Judge, CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, and GRAY, Senior District Judge. *

GRAY, Senior District Judge.

This is an appeal from the summary judgment granted by the district court to defendant Fort Wayne Community Schools on appeallant's claim, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, for alleged racial and sexual discrimination in her employment. We reverse.

The appellee discharged the appellant from her position as "liaison aide" at the appellee's "opportunity school" located in Fort Wayne, Indiana, assertedly because of her insubordination and her excessive tardiness or absenteeism. The appellant contends that she was discharged because her supervisor "did not like to work with black women," and that she had been subjected to harassment on account of her race and sex.

The district court held that Ms. Trigg's complaint clearly stated a claim for employment discrimination, for which the remedy is found in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., and that she was bound by Title VII's administrative exhaustion requirements, including the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the receipt of notice of a right to sue in federal court. The plaintiff had not accomplished these exhaustion requirements in pursuing her Sec. 1983 claim, and the district court accordingly granted summary judgment against her.

The appellant contends that as a state government employee, she can base her Sec. 1983 claim on the alleged violations of her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, irrespective of whether the appellee's conduct also violated Title VII. The appellee asserts that the appellant's Fourteenth Amendment rights are not independent of the rights provided her under Title VII, and that Congress intended Title VII to preempt Sec. 1983 in the area of public employment discrimination.

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination based on membership in a particular class, see Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Services, 716 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir.1983), including acts of employment discrimination. Cf. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2271-72, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979)(The Fifth Amendment prohibits invidious sexual discrimination). 1 Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 does not by itself confer substantive rights, Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 618, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1916, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979). To bring an action under Sec. 1983, a plaintiff must cite a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities "secured by the Constitution and laws." Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1170. The appellant contends that the substantive basis of her Sec. 1983 action is the appellee's violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 2

The appellee contends that Sec. 2 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, which extended the protection of Title VII to state and local government employees, was intended to make Title VII the exclusive remedy for public sector employment

Page 301

discrimination. For that proposition, the appellee cites Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) and Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979). Brown, however, discussed Sec. 11of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16, which...

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89 practice notes
  • Hamilton v. Dist. Of D.C., Civil Action No. 09-0892 (JDB).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • July 6, 2010
    ...on § 1985(3) would have been legally sufficient if he could have asserted Constitutional violations.” Trigg v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 766 F.2d 299, 301-02 (7th Cir.1985); see Novotny, 442 U.S. at 379-81, 99 S.Ct. 2345 (Powell, J., concurring) and 383-85 (Stevens, J., concurring). Every circ......
  • Blalock v. Dale County Bd. of Educ., No. CIV. A. 97-D-650-S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Alabama
    • December 15, 1999
    ...based on membership in a particular class, including acts of employment discrimination." Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir.1985) (internal citation omitted) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-235, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979)); see also Elsto......
  • Baumgardt v. Wausau School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 06-C-487-C.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Western District of Wisconsin
    • February 26, 2007
    ...determining that Congress intended to preempt a constitutional claim brought pursuant to § 1983. In Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir.1985), the court concluded that a sex discrimination claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act did not preempt a ......
  • Bullington v. Bedford Cnty., No. 17-5647
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • September 25, 2018
    ...one." Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis , 319 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Trigg v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch. , 766 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1985) ).In Bullington's case, however, the district court concluded that the ADA precludes a remedy under § 1983 for a parallel con......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
89 cases
  • Hamilton v. Dist. Of D.C., Civil Action No. 09-0892 (JDB).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • July 6, 2010
    ...on § 1985(3) would have been legally sufficient if he could have asserted Constitutional violations.” Trigg v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 766 F.2d 299, 301-02 (7th Cir.1985); see Novotny, 442 U.S. at 379-81, 99 S.Ct. 2345 (Powell, J., concurring) and 383-85 (Stevens, J., concurring). Every circ......
  • Blalock v. Dale County Bd. of Educ., No. CIV. A. 97-D-650-S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Alabama
    • December 15, 1999
    ...based on membership in a particular class, including acts of employment discrimination." Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir.1985) (internal citation omitted) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-235, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979)); see also Elsto......
  • Baumgardt v. Wausau School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 06-C-487-C.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Western District of Wisconsin
    • February 26, 2007
    ...determining that Congress intended to preempt a constitutional claim brought pursuant to § 1983. In Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir.1985), the court concluded that a sex discrimination claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act did not preempt a ......
  • Bullington v. Bedford Cnty., No. 17-5647
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • September 25, 2018
    ...one." Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis , 319 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Trigg v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch. , 766 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1985) ).In Bullington's case, however, the district court concluded that the ADA precludes a remedy under § 1983 for a parallel con......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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