Trigg v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 31 July 1858
• Citation: 27 Mo. 245
• Parties: TRIGG, Appellant, v. TAYLOR et al., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

27 Mo. 245

TRIGG, Appellant,

v.TAYLOR et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1858.

1. A material alteration of a promissory note or bill of exchange will render the same invalid, even in the hands of an innocent holder, as against any party thereto not consenting to the alteration.

2. This rule applies to an accommodation note fraudulently altered before it is negotiated.

Appeal from Cooper Court of Common Pleas.

This was an action upon a negotiable promissory note for $1,500, dated May 8, 1857, made by W. W. Norris and John Taylor, in favor of said Norris, and endorsed by Norris to plaintiff, Trigg. Norris failed to answer. Taylor answered, denying the execution of the note sued on. At the trial it appeared in evidence that Taylor signed a note for $500 with said Norris, and for his accommodation; that this note was fraudulently altered by Norris to a note for $1,500 and endorsed to plaintiff. This note, as altered, is the note sued on in this suit. The evidence conduced to show that the alteration was so skillfully done that in the ordinary transactions of business it would not have been noticed.

The cause was tried by the court without a jury. The plaintiff asked the court to give the following instructions or declarations of law: “1. Defendant, Taylor, admits that he signed the note offered in evidence. 2. Even if the court find from the evidence that the instrument sued upon was altered by Norris after it was executed by Taylor, yet the court must find for the plaintiff, unless the court shall further find that the alteration was made after the note came to the hands of plaintiff, or that said alteration was so obvious or apparent upon the face of said instrument as to prevent a person, exercising reasonable care and diligence, from the purchase of the same. 3. The presumption of law is that the alteration or erasure, if any exist, was made at the time of, or anterior to, the execution of the note; and it devolves upon the defendant to show otherwise, unless the note presents upon its face such marks of alteration or erasure as would excite the suspicion of a man reasonably prudent and cautious in the transaction of business. 4. If the instrument sued upon was prepared by the defendants, Norris and Taylor, as an accommodation note, for the benefit of Norris, for the sum of $500, and the same was altered by the defendant, Norris, so as to make it appear upon its face a note for $1,500 before it came to the hands of plaintiff, or before it became an available instrument in the hands of any other person, then the court will find for the plaintiff the amount of said note, unless the court shall further find that the alteration was such as ought to have excited the suspicion of a prudent and careful man in the purchase of said note. 5. If the court find from the evidence that the note sued upon was executed by defendant for the sum of $500, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover that amount, unless said instrument was altered after it came into the hands of plaintiff.” Of these declarations of law, the court gave the 1st and 3d, and refused the others.

The court gave the following declaration at the request of defendant, Taylor: “6. If the court find from the evidence that the note sued upon was for $500 when it was executed by defendant, Taylor, and further finds that the same was afterwards altered by Norris, without the consent or knowledge of defendant, Taylor, before it was transferred to plaintiff, then said note is void as to defendant, Taylor.

The court rendered judgment against plaintiff.

Stephens & Vest, for appellant.

I. The court erred in refusing the fourth declaration asked by plaintiff. (See 8 Mo. 235; 2 Mason, 278; Byles on Bills, 255, 256; 8 Ad. & El. 136; 1 C. & M. 721; 1 C., M. & R. 127; 4 Tyrw. 598.) The court erred in refusing the second instruction asked by plaintiff. ( Id.; 15 Mo. 342.) So also in refusing the fifth instruction. (8 Mo. 235; 2 Mason, 478; Story on Bills, 187, 191.) The court also erred in giving instruction asked by defendant. ( Id.; 3 Kent, Comm. 79; Bayley on Bills, 512, 516; 9 Cranch, 37.)Adams, for respondents.

I. The alteration of the note by Norris before he passed it to Trigg was a forgery and rendered the note absolutely void as to Taylor. (Byles on Bills, 253.) The fact that the alteration is so skillfully executed as to deceive a prudent man in the ordinary transaction of business is wholly immaterial.

RICHARDSON, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is a general rule that any alteration in a material part of a bill of exchange or promissory note, as in the date, sum, or time when payable, or consideration, or place of payment,...