Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.

Decision Date16 September 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-6584,97-6584
Citation154 F.3d 1284,1998 WL 633673
Parties12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 83 David L. TRIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN CRUMP TOYOTA, INC.; World Omni Financial Corporation, a.k.a. World Omni Financial Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Garve Ivey, Jr., Jasper, AL, Barry A. Ragsdale, King, Ivey & Warren, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jarred O. Taylor, II, Lee E. Bains, Jr., John A. Truitt, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., William A. Mudd, Hall, Conerly, Mudd & Bolvig, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Adam Sloane, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Evan Tager, Washington, DC, Amicus for ACOLI.

Brian Anderson, Washington, DC, amicus for PLAC.

Pamela Moore, Mobile, AL, amicus for IAODC and LFCJ.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and PAINE *, Senior District Judge.

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents an interesting question relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and fraudulent joinder in the context of a class action. Adopting a novel approach, the district court found fraudulent joinder and diversity of citizenship. The district court retained jurisdiction. We reverse.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff-appellant Triggs is an Alabama resident. He filed a class action fraud suit in Alabama state court against World Omni Financial Corp ("Omni"), a Florida corporation, and John Crump Toyota ("Crump"), an Alabama corporation. Plaintiff alleges that Crump and other dealerships sold cars in Alabama to Omni at inflated prices pursuant to a scheme whereby Omni then leased the cars to the plaintiff class and passed the excess cost on to them. Plaintiff alleges that Omni and Crump and the other dealers implemented this fraudulent scheme through misrepresentations and suppressions of material fact. The named plaintiff, Triggs, dealt with Omni through Crump.

Defendants-appellees filed a Notice of Removal, alleging diversity jurisdiction. The case was removed to the Northern District of Alabama. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand. The district court found that the putative class which Triggs seeks to represent includes over 17,000 people, all of whom had dealt with Omni, but that only 371(2%) of them had dealt through Crump. The court held that Crump had been fraudulently joined. Because there was complete diversity between Triggs and Omni, the only remaining parties if Crump is disregarded, the motion to remand was denied. The district court then asserted supplemental jurisdiction over the 371 plaintiffs who had dealt with Omni through Crump.

The district court entered its order finding that Crump had been fraudulently joined and denying the motion for remand, and later certified the order for immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This court granted the petition for permission to appeal.

II. Issue

The issue presented by this appeal is: has defendant Crump been fraudulently joined merely because 98% of the members of the putative plaintiff class would have no claim against Crump, notwithstanding the fact that the named plaintiff has a potential claim to impose joint and several liability on defendants Crump and Omni?

III. Standard of Review

Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir.1996).

IV. Discussion

A civil case filed in state court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if the case could have been brought originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 1 Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000 2 and the action is between the citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 3 Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity; every plaintiff must be diverse from every defendant. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1355 (11th Cir.1996).

The named plaintiff, Triggs, is a citizen of Alabama. Defendant Omni is a citizen of Florida. Defendant Crump is a citizen of Alabama. Accordingly, on the face of the pleadings, there is a lack of complete diversity which would preclude removal of the case to federal court.

However, an action may nevertheless be removable if the joinder of the non-diverse party, defendant Crump, were fraudulent. Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1359. 4 Fraudulent joinder is a judicially created doctrine that provides an exception to the requirement of complete diversity. Joinder has been deemed fraudulent in two situations. The first is when there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause of action against the resident (non-diverse) defendant. Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir.1983), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 991 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir.1993). The second is when there is outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional facts. Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440. In Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1355 (11th Cir.1996), a third situation of fraudulent joinder was identified--i.e., where a diverse defendant is joined with a nondiverse defendant as to whom there is no joint, several or alternative liability and where the claim against the diverse defendant has no real connection to the claim against the nondiverse defendant. Id. at 1360. In the instant case, the parties do not suggest that there has been "outright fraud in the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional facts," so we concern ourselves only with the first and third types of fraudulent joinder. Turning to the first type, "If there is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court." Coker, 709 F.2d at 1440-41 (emphasis added). The plaintiff need not have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant; he need only have a possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be legitimate. In the instant case, Triggs has asserted facts which clearly state a potential cause of action against Crump in state court. He has alleged that Crump and Omni, working in concert, defrauded him by misrepresenting and suppressing material facts with regard to automobile lease transactions. Therefore, Triggs's complaint states a potential cause of action against Crump in state court. With regard to Triggs, Crump is not fraudulently joined.

Indeed, the joinder of Crump fits comfortably within the rule for permissive joinder of parties as provided in Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With respect to the joinder of defendants, Rule 20 provides:

All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. In this case, the named plaintiff (and incidentally 2% of the putative class in addition) is asserting a claim for relief against Omni and Crump jointly and severally arising out of the same transaction, and giving rise to common questions of law and fact. Of course, in this case, the joinder of the members of the putative plaintiff class is pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We note also, however, that the permissive joinder standards of Rule 20 are satisfied. With respect to joinder of plaintiffs, Rule 20 provides:

All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. In the instant case, the members of the putative plaintiff class assert such rights against Omni, Crump and the other unnamed dealers arising out of the series of automobile lease transactions allegedly orchestrated by Omni, which give rise to common questions of law and fact. Of particular importance for this case, Rule 20 specifically provides that "[a] plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities." Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. In other words, the fact that a great many of the members of the putative plaintiff class can seek no relief against one of the defendants, Crump, would be no obstacle to the permissive joinder of Crump under Rule 20. Accordingly, we readily conclude that the joinder of defendant Crump satisfies the standards of Rule 20.

The contention of defendants in this case focuses upon the claims of the members of the putative plaintiff class, rather than upon the named plaintiff. Defendants argue that Crump must be deemed to have been fraudulently joined merely because 98% of the members of the putative plaintiff class would have no claim against Crump. This focus is inconsistent with the well-settled rule for class actions that a court should consider only the citizenship of the named parties to determine whether there is diversity jurisdiction. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673 (1921). Accord Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 1059, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969) (dictum) ("Under current doctrine, if one member of a class is of diverse citizenship from the class' opponent, and no nondiverse members are named parties, the suit may be brought in federal court even though all other members of the...

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