Triggs v. Risinger

Decision Date13 June 1989
Docket NumberNo. 55626,55626
Citation772 S.W.2d 381
PartiesJohnny TRIGGS and Diane Triggs, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mark RISINGER and Janice Risinger, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Raymond Howard, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Nicholas J. Lamb, Mike W. Bartolacci, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.

REINHARD, Judge.

Plaintiffs filed a petition alleging that defendants fraudulently concealed the existence of a 15 year lease which encumbered a portion of the property they purchased from defendants. They sought rescission of the contract and deed, as well as actual and punitive damages. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment relying on various documents and depositions of the parties. The trial court sustained the motion. Plaintiffs appeal; we affirm.

Plaintiffs purchased defendants' residence at 138 Powell in St. Louis County. The record reveals that this property is located at Lot 4 of Royal Oaks subdivision in St. Louis County, Missouri. Lot 4 fronts Powell Avenue on the north and can be roughly described as follows: beginning at the northeast corner, running west 95.00 feet along Powell Avenue; thence, south 188.81 feet; thence, east 70.50 feet; thence, south 41.19 feet; thence, east 24.50 feet; thence, north 230.00 feet to the point of beginning.

A ten to twelve foot wooden fence runs the entire 95 feet across the lot on a line 189 feet south of the lot line on Powell Avenue. The fence divides the lot into two separate areas, blocking the view between them. The area where the house is located is 95 feet X 189 feet. The other area is 24.5 feet X 41 feet and is encumbered by the lease.

In their sole point on appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment "for the reason that in the sale of real property, the sellers have a duty to disclose an encumbrance on title and such failure is false representation by concealment. Thus mere silence of respondents, in their relationship with the purchasers concerning the encumbrance, is not unassailable proof of no fraud entitling them to a summary judgment."

The tort of fraud and deceit consists of the following elements:

(1) a false, material representation;

(2) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or his ignorance of its truth;

(3) the speaker's intent that it should be acted upon by the hearer in the manner contemplated;

(4) the hearer's ignorance of falsity of the statement;

(5) the hearer's reliance on its truth and the right to rely thereon; and

(6) proximate injury.

Strebler v. Rixman, 616 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Mo.App.1981). The failure to establish any one of these elements is fatal to recovery. Twiggs v. National Old Line Ins. Co., 581 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Mo.App.1979). Concealment of a fact which one has a duty to disclose properly serves as a substitute element for a false and fraudulent representation. Osterberger v. Hites Construction Co., 599 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Mo.App.1980).

Plaintiffs contend that they were not informed of the encumbrance on the property by "either defendants, or their [defendants'] agents, nor their [plaintiffs'] agent." This silence, according to plaintiffs, amounted to a breach of defendants' duty to disclose and therefore constituted a false representation.

In reviewing a summary judgment, we scrutinize the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was entered and accord that party the benefit of every doubt. Edwards v. Heidelbaugh, 574 S.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Mo.App.1978). However, summary judgment is appropriate when the documents before the trial court, including pleadings, depositions, admissions and exhibits show that there is no genuine of issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04(c), Signature Pool, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 743 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo.App.1987). If there is the slightest doubt about the facts, a material issue of fact exists. Edwards, 574 S.W.2d at 27.

In reaching its decision, the trial court had before it the depositions of the parties, along with various exhibits filed by the parties including the sales contract, the general warranty deed conveying the property to plaintiffs, the lease encumbering the property, the warranty deed conveying the property to defendants from the prior owner, and the title insurance commitment for the plaintiffs. The documentary evidence and admitted facts lead to our resolution of this case.

On February 22, 1984, the parties entered into the sales contract. The contract contained the following property description: "in the County of St. Louis, Missouri, known and described as (legal description on sellers title to govern): 138 Powell ..." The contract further provided that the Seller shall furnish general warranty deed, subject to deed restrictions, easements, right-of-way of record, and zoning regulations, also subject to leases and to occupancy of tenants existing on the date contract is executed by the purchasers....

Title will be marketable in fact, or purchaser will accept insurance policy issued by qualified title insurance company in lieu of strictly marketable title....

The warranty deed granting defendants title was recorded November 16, 1978, and contained the following legal description:

in the County of St. Louis and State of Missouri, to wit:

Lot 4 of ROYAL OAKS, according to the plat thereof recorded in Plat Book 46 Page 17 of the St. Louis County Records.

Subject to a 15 year Lease on the southern 41.19' quadrant, which Lease was executed on May 15, 1978 to run with the land and in favor of the owner of Lot 14 of said Royal Oaks Subdivision, and which Lease contains an option to purchase said quadrant.

138 Powell Avenue

11H 430 401.

The general warranty deed, executed April 27, 1984, conveying title to plaintiffs contains a legal description similar to that in the deed granting defendants title, and its description of the 15 year lease is verbatim. The title insurance commitment issued to plaintiffs on March 7, 1984, states the following: "the title to the land described in Schedule A hereof is at this date vested in fee simple in [defendants] subject only to the defects, objections, liens and encumbrances, all as shown as Schedule B hereof." Schedule A contains the following description: "Lot A of ROYAL OAKS SUBDIVISION, according to the plat thereof recorded in Plat Book 46 Page 17 of the St. Louis County Recorder's Office." The following appears on Schedule B:

9. NOTICE of un-recorded 15...

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15 cases
  • Blaine v. J.E. Jones Const. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • September 29, 1992
    ...failure to disclose the information serves as a substitute for the false representation element required in fraud. Triggs v. Risinger, 772 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo.App.1989); see, also, Scott v. Hill, 330 Mo. 490, 50 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1932). But, in these situations, the real question is, as it i......
  • Germania Bank v. Thomas
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • May 28, 1991
    ...743 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo.App.1987). If there is the slightest doubt about the facts, a material issue of fact exists. Triggs v. Risinger, 772 S.W.2d 381 (Mo.App.1989). A fact is material if it is "of such legal probative force as would control or determine the litigation." Ware v. St. Louis ......
  • Johnson v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • August 4, 1992
    ...to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If there is the slightest doubt about the facts, a material issue of fact exists. Triggs v. Risinger, 772 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo.App.1989). FELA cases are governed by federal law. Kestner v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 785 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Mo.App.1990). No caus......
  • Schneider v. Forsythe Group, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • December 29, 1989
    ...no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04(c); Triggs v. Risinger, 772 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo.App.1989). Material facts are facts that have such legal probative value as would control or determine the litigation. Dunbar v. ......
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