Trimble v. Helwig
| Decision Date | 02 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | 7:19-CV-5015 |
| Parties | CLEVE TRIMBLE, Plaintiff, v. BEN HELWIG, and WILDLIFE OUTDOOR PRODUCTIONS LLC, a New Jersey limited liability company; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This case comes before the Court on defendant Wildlife Outdoor Production, LLC's ("Wildlife's") Motion to Dismiss and Strike. Filing 13. Defendant Ben Helwig joins that motion and Wildlife's briefing in support thereof.1 Filing 16. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's, Cleve Trimble's, unenumerated claims for violations of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 et seq; replevin and/or damages pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 37-722; and common-law unjust enrichment and disgorgement. Filing 14 at 3-9. Defendants also request an order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) striking plaintiff Trimble's request for punitive damages from his Complaint (Filing 1) on the basis that Nebraska law controls and prohibits punitive damages. Filing 14 at 9-10. Defendants do not seek to dismiss any claim for trespass to land. Additionally, Defendants question whether the amount in controversy is adequate to confer subject-matter jurisdiction.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds it has subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court then grants in part and denies in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss by dismissing any claim predicated upon the Lacey Act and Nebraska's criminal trespass statute but denying the motion as to Plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment, disgorgement, and replevin. The Court finds thatNebraska law controls and grants Defendant's Motion to Strike the request for punitive damages. Thus, Plaintiff's remaining claims include unjust enrichment and disgorgement, replevin, and common-law trespass to land.
Plaintiff Trimble owns land in Cherry County, Nebraska (the "Trimble Property"). Filing 1 at 2. Public records show Plaintiff has owned the Property since 1986. Filing 1 at 2. Public records further indicate that the Trimble Property is and has been subject to a conservation easement prohibiting commercial hunting since 2006. Filing 1 at 3. The Trimble Property's boundaries are and have been marked by a fence line and attached to that fence are "no hunting" and "no trespassing" signs. Filing 1 at 3.
The Nebraska Board of Educational Lands and Funds ("BELF") owns land adjoining the Property to the west and north. Filing 1 at 2. The boundaries between BELF's land and the Trimble Property are marked by a fence line and the aforementioned signs, and the Cherry County plat book, aerial maps, and GIS maps all show the ownership of and boundaries between BELF's land and the Property. Filing 1 at 3. Defendant Helwig is a subtenant of BELF's land, and both defendants use BELF's land for commercial hunting purposes. Filing 1 at 2-3. Since 2016, Defendants have "entered and occupied" the Trimble Property for commercial hunting purposes without Trimble's permission. Filing 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges Defendants (1) removed the "no hunting" and "no trespassing" signs from the Trimble fence line, (2) entered the Trimble Propertyto install wildlife cameras and attract animals, (3) used photographs of the Trimble Property on their website to promote their commercial hunting business, (4) used the Trimble Property to hunt and kill wild animals, and (5) earned revenue and profit as a result of these actions. Filing 1 at 4-5.
While the Trimble Property is located in Nebraska, in support of their claim that New Jersey law applies to this dispute, Plaintiff alleges that "Defendants are based in New Jersey, the scheme of wrongful conduct was devised, implemented, controlled and directed in and from New Jersey, and all benefits, monetary and otherwise, to Defendants by reason of their wrongful conduct have been received in New Jersey. Filing 1 at 5.
Trimble filed this action on December 10, 2019. Filing 1. The Complaint (Filing 1) does not enumerate any particular causes of action. Instead, it makes sporadic references to statutes and some common-law causes of action. First, it alleges Defendants' actions violate Neb. Rev. Stat. § 37-722 which prohibits the taking of "any wildlife upon any private lands without permission" and expressly allows for replevin of animals or pelts taken from private land without permission. Filing 1 at 4. Second, it alleges Defendants were unjustly enriched by their actions and should disgorge that enrichment. Filing 1 at 5. Third, Trimble alleges Defendants' conduct violates the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 et seq, relating to the illegality of taking wildlife in violation of state law.3 Filing 1 at 5. Fourth, Trimble alleges he is entitled to punitive damages under federal and New Jersey law. Filing 1 at 6. Finally, Trimble appears to request actual damages, punitive damages,disgorgement, replevin, and costs. Filing 1 at 6. Trimble seeks "actual damages in an amount to be determined by the jury, but not less than $75,000." Filing 1 at 6.
On February 10, 2020, Wildlife filed the present Motion to Dismiss and Strike. Filing 13. On February 14, Helwig filed a motion joining Wildlife's motion and briefing. Filing 16. The Court addresses these motions below.
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Corrado v. Life Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 804 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court must "accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but [is] not bound to accept as true '[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements' or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations." McDonough v. Anoka Cty., 799 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a Court to strike certain material from a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "Because the rule is stated in the permissive . . . it has always been understood that the district court enjoys 'liberal discretion' thereunder." Stanbury Law Firm v.I.R.S., 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Thor Corp. v. Automatic Washer Co., 91 F. Supp. 829, 832 (S.D. Iowa 1950)).
Defendants do not dispute the diversity of the parties but in passing argue the amount in controversy required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is lacking. Filing 14 at 6. Specifically, Defendants contend replevin is the only proper cause of action and argue Trimble failed to allege the value of the animals and pelts taken, which Defendants contend was not greater than $75,000. Filing 14 at 6.
"[T]he amount in controversy is measured by the value to the plaintiff of the right sought to be enforced," exclusive of interest and costs. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moody Station & Grocery, 821 F.3d 973, 976-77 (8th Cir. 2016). Generally, a complaint making a good faith allegation of the jurisdictional amount in controversy is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Universal Crop Prot. All., LLC, 620 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 2010). However, "[i]f the defendant challenges the plaintiff's allegations of the amount in controversy, then the plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Peterson v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 867 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884-85 (8th Cir. 2002)). A complaint will be dismissed if it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.4 Kopp, 280 F.3d at 884. "The legal certainty standard is metwhere the legal impossibility of recovery is so certain as virtually to negative the plaintiff's good faith in asserting the claim." Peterson, 867 F.3d at 995.
Trimble has alleged the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because "[t]he amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interests and costs" and requests "actual damages . . . not less than $75,000." Filing 1 at 2, 6. Defendants only challenge the amount in controversy because they ignore, or assume dismissal of, Trimble's trespass, unjust enrichment, and disgorgement claims.
The Court cannot conclude with "legal certainty" by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff's claims will total less than $75,000. Peterson, 867 F.3d at 995. Phrased differently, "the legal impossibility of recovery is" not "so certain as virtually to negative [Trimble's] good faith in asserting the claim." Id. Accordingly, Trimble has established that the amount in controversy requirement is met, and the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a).
While the Court finds it has diversity jurisdiction at this point in the proceedings, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Accordingly, should discovery conclusively illustrate that the amount in controversy is not met, the Court would be obligated to reconsider at that time.
Defendants seek to dismiss Trimble's entire Complaint and argue (1) the Lacey Act does not provide a private right of action; (2) ...
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