Trimble v. Montgomery Pulmonary Consultants, P.A.

Citation587 F.Supp.3d 1135
Decision Date24 February 2022
Docket NumberCASE NO. 2:21-CV-93-WKW
Parties Lakesha TRIMBLE, Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY PULMONARY CONSULTANTS, P.A., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

587 F.Supp.3d 1135

Lakesha TRIMBLE, Plaintiff,
v.
MONTGOMERY PULMONARY CONSULTANTS, P.A., Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:21-CV-93-WKW

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed February 24, 2022


587 F.Supp.3d 1137

Anthony David Michel, Joshua Aaron Wrady, Courtney Brooks Crampton, Wrady Michel & King, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

John Alec Henig, Jr., Shannon Lynn Holliday, Copeland Franco Screws & Gill PA, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W. Keith Watkins, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In March 2013, Plaintiff Lakesha Trimble ("Trimble"), an African American woman, began working for Montgomery Pulmonary Consultants, P.A. ("Defendant" or "MPC"), as a medical assistant. Trimble maintained this position for over six years until her employment was allegedly terminated in December 2019. Following the end of her employment, Trimble sued Defendant. She brings the following four claims: (1) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e – 2000e-17 (Count 1); (2) race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count 2); (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count 3); and (4) retaliation in violation of § 1981 (Count 4).

Before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment in which Defendant argues that a state agency's decision in an unemployment compensation hearing collaterally estops Trimble from arguing that she was terminated.1 (Doc. # 7.) The motion has been fully briefed. (See Docs. # 14 & 15.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion is due to be denied.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

587 F.Supp.3d 1138

Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court views the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez , 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010).

The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for the motion." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. Alternatively, a movant who does not have a trial burden of production can assert, without citing the record, that the nonmoving party "cannot produce admissible evidence to support" a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee note ("Subdivision (c)(1)(B) recognizes that a party need not always point to specific record materials .... [A] party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact.").

If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish—with evidence beyond the pleadings—that a genuine dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc. , 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).

III. BACKGROUND2

In March 2013, Defendant hired Trimble to work as a medical assistant. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13.) At the end of her employment, Trimble worked as a medical assistant for Dr. William Saliski ("Saliski"). Trimble received positive performance reviews from her employer throughout her employment and believes she was the highest paid medical assistant at MPC. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 16.) Trimble was never formally promoted from her medical assistant position during the course of her employment at MPC.

In July 2019, Defendant hired Ms. Julie Paul ("Paul"), a white woman, as the practice administrator. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 18.) Soon after starting her employment, Paul created a new job position titled clinical coordinator. In August 2019, Defendant selected Kristen Mosheim ("Mosheim"), a white woman employed at MPC, to fill the clinical coordinator position, without opening the position to all employees. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 20.) Defendant did not permit any African American employees, including Trimble, to apply. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 21.)

In late August 2019, Trimble spoke with Paul about the decision to hire Mosheim. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 24.) Trimble shared that the decision to promote Mosheim without considering

587 F.Supp.3d 1139

African American employees was discriminatory. Paul stated that she did not "want to hear that in this office on the floor," that the doctors had her "back 100%," and that Trimble could just "deal with it." (Doc. # 1, ¶ 27.) Trimble next shared her concerns with Saliski that Paul's decision was discriminatorily based on race. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 29.)

Over the following months, Trimble repeatedly shared with Saliski her concerns that Paul's decision was discriminatory and that Paul and Mosheim were subjecting her to retaliatory hostility for voicing her concerns. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 30.) Defendant did not subsequently take any investigatory or remedial action. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 32.)

In November 2019, Trimble received an annual performance review and bonus from Paul. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 33.) Trimble's bonus had been reduced by a third of the amount she received the previous year, despite her having received another positive performance review. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 34.) Trimble was told by Paul that it was because of their "differences." (Doc. # 1, ¶ 35.) Trimble asked to clarify if it was because of the concerns she raised about the hiring process for the clinical coordinator position, and Paul replied that it was, and that Trimble should have been fired. (Doc. # 1, ¶¶ 36–37.)

Later in November 2019, Paul, at a staff meeting, announced that Trimble had resigned and would be leaving MPC. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 38.) At that time, Trimble informed Paul that she had not resigned or been terminated. (Doc. # 1, ¶ 40.) Again, on December 10, 2019, Paul called Trimble into her office and instructed her to tender her resignation, threatening to withhold Trimble's last paycheck if she did not comply. Paul reiterated...

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