Trimble v. State

• Decision Date: 20 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 40A01-0311-CR-437.,40A01-0311-CR-437.
• Citation: 816 N.E.2d 83
• Parties: Robert TRIMBLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

816 N.E.2d 83

Robert TRIMBLE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 40A01-0311-CR-437.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

October 20, 2004.

Ryan W. Redmon, Montgomery, Elsner & Pardieck, LLP, Seymour, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joby Jerrells, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

MAY, Judge.

Robert Trimble appeals his convictions of abandonment or neglect of an animal, a Class B misdemeanor,¹ and harboring a non-immunized dog, a Class C infraction.² He raises three issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive and restate as whether a warrantless search of a doghouse and seizure of a dog located in Trimble's yard was permissible under the Indiana and United States constitutions.³

We reverse.

FACTS

Trimble lives on a farm in Jennings County where he kept a number of animals. For one to two years before the incident that gave rise to this action, he kept a miniature Doberman named Butchie for Butchie's owners, Michael and Vera Wilcox.

On February 17, 2003, Trimble was injured while working in his barn and he called Michael to take him to the hospital. After returning from the hospital Michael noticed Butchie's leg was entangled in a chain. Butchie was emaciated and his ears appeared frostbitten. His water pan was frozen and there was no food in the area. Michael told his wife about Butchie's condition. She contacted her sister, who contacted the sheriff's department. A deputy spoke with Michael, then sometime after 10:00 that night went to the Trimble farm to investigate. The deputy did not attempt to obtain a search warrant. He pulled into Trimble's driveway and saw a doghouse behind Trimble's house by the edge of the driveway. The doghouse was located in Trimble's yard about three to five feet from the driveway and about thirty feet from Trimble's back door.

The deputy knocked on Trimble's back door but there was no response. He then went to the doghouse. Butchie was inside and would not come out. The deputy could see only Butchie's head. Because the deputy could not coax Butchie out, he grabbed the cable to which Butchie was secured and pulled Butchie out of the doghouse.⁴ The deputy observed that Butchie was emaciated and had an injured leg. Animal control officials were summoned, and they seized Butchie. Trimble was convicted of abandonment or neglect of an animal and harboring a non-immunized dog.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is similar to that regarding other sufficiency issues. Divello v. State, 782 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied 792 N.E.2d 43 (Ind.2003). We determine whether the trial court's denial of the motion was supported by substantial evidence of probative value. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence, and any conflicting evidence is considered in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Id. However, this review is different from other sufficiency matters in that we also consider uncontested evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Id.

1. The Fourth Amendment Claim

Trimble asserts the warrantless search that resulted in Butchie's seizure was improper because the doghouse was within an area where he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.⁵ The State asserts the evidence was admissible under the "open fields" doctrine.

Under the Fourth Amendment, our analysis focuses on whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 436. Any evidence found as a result of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed. Id. at 439. An individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, but may expect privacy in the area immediately surrounding the home. Id. at 436. That area is known as "curtilage," a term derived from Medieval Latin for "court" or "yard." Id. at 437.

Outbuildings on the grounds surrounding a dwelling are within the curtilage of the dwelling and are protected from intrusion⁶ by the Fourth Amendment and by the Constitution of Indiana, Art. I, § 11. Hadley v. State, 251 Ind. 24, 53, 238 N.E.2d 888, 903 (1968) (Hunter, J. dissenting),reh'g denied 251 Ind. 24, 242 N.E.2d 357 (1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 1012, 89 S.Ct. 1629, 23 L.Ed.2d 39 (1969). There, the dissent surveyed a number of Indiana and federal decisions finding unreasonable searches of such buildings as a barn 70 to 80 yards from the dwelling; a metal garage adjacent to the dwelling house; a shed consisting of a chicken house and garage; a garage of a fraternity house in Indianapolis; a fire escape; a barn; and a smokehouse.

When police enter onto private property in order to conduct an investigation or for another legitimate purpose and restrict their entry to places that other visitors would be expected to go, such as walkways, driveways, or porches, any observation made from these areas is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 437. Accordingly, an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to things or activities within a residence that may be observed by persons using their natural senses from places impliedly open to a visitor's entry. Id.

In general, this means that "if police utilize normal means of access to and egress from the house for some legitimate purpose, such as to make inquiries of the occupant ... it is not a Fourth Amendment search for the police to see or hear or smell from that vantage point what is happening inside the dwelling." Id. (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(c) (3d ed.1996) (internal quotation omitted)). The implied invitation, however, applies only to recognized access routes reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 436-37.

The circumstances determining which portions of property may reasonably be viewed as open to visitors are determined on a case-by-case basis and will necessarily include consideration of the features of the property itself, such as the existence of walkways and fences or other obstructions to access or viewing, the location of primary residential entryways, as well as the nature or purpose for the visitor's call. Id. at 438. Common experience teaches that under normal circumstances, uninvited visitors coming to a residence to speak with an owner or resident are expected to come to the residence's most direct, obvious and prominent entryway, which in most cases is its front door. Id. Under most circumstances, uninvited visitors are also expected to leave by the same route after knocking on the front door and receiving no response. Id. The nature of the circumstances surrounding the visit can also affect the scope of the property open by implication. Id. For example, persons coming to the property on truly pressing or emergency matters could reasonably be expected to seek out residents through areas other than the front door. Id.

Two Indiana decisions offer guidance in distinguishing "curtilage" from "open fields." In Blalock v. State, 483 N.E.2d 439 (Ind.1985), Blalock purchased seventy-seven acres of heavily wooded land in an isolated area. Near the entrance to the property was a mobile home Blalock apparently used as a residence. Blalock erected a greenhouse "in a remote section" of the property. Id. at 440. Police officers arranged a flight in a State Police airplane to view the area. The officers identified the greenhouse and noted the isolated and remote location and absence of farm implements. Through the translucent roof of the greenhouse the officers saw what they determined was marijuana. Based on the warrantless aerial surveillance an officer signed an affidavit for a search warrant and a search warrant was issued for Blalock's pole barn and greenhouse. Blalock's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his pole barn and greenhouse was denied. Id. at 441.

The Blalock court quoted Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir.1984), aff'd 476 U.S. 227, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986):

The doctrine of curtilage is grounded in the peculiarly strong concepts of intimacy, personal autonomy and privacy associated with the home. The home is fundamentally a sanctuary, where personal concepts of self and family are forged, where relationships are nurtured and where people normally feel free to express themselves in intimate ways. The potent individual privacy interests that inhere in living within a home expand into the areas that enclose the home as well. The backyard and area immediately surrounding the home are really extensions of the dwelling itself. This is not true simply in a mechanical sense because the areas are geographically proximate. It is true because people have both actual and reasonable expectations that many of the private experiences of home life often occur outside the house. Personal interactions, daily routines and intimate relationships revolve around the entire home place. There are compelling reasons, then, for applying Fourth Amendment protection to the entire dwelling area.

In Blalock, as in the case before us, the application of the Fourth Amendment turned on the question whether the area the police viewed was an "open field" or "curtilage." The Blalock court noted an "open field" need not be "open" nor a "field" and it addressed the status of a structure based on its location:

Where such structures are part of the curtilage or have some nexus with the curtilage, they will be afforded Fourth Amendment protection. But where, as here, the structure is separate from the curtilage and any relation with the curtilage is totally lacking, and the structure is situated in the midst of an open field, the open field doctrine will apply. We interpret the "open fields" doctrine as being concerned primarily with the character of the area as distinguished from the more highly protected curtilage.

Id. at 442-43.⁷...