Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Robert P. Stapp, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 October 1963
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 745
• Citation: 177 So.2d 102,278 Ala. 209
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. ROBERT P. STAPP, INC.

Page 102

177 So.2d 102

278 Ala. 209

TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. ROBERT P. STAPP, INC.

6 Div. 745.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Oct. 17, 1963.

Rehearing Denied July 15, 1965.

Sadler, Sadler, Sullivan & Herring and W. J. Sullivan, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.

Rives, Peterson, Pettus & Conway, Birmingham, for appellee.

LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice.

This suit is on a policy of insurance issued by the defendant corporation, the appellant here, to the plaintiff corporation. It is stipulated by the parties that the premium had been paid and that the policy was in force and effect on January 30, 1959, the date of the accident with which we are here concerned. The policy was one of cargo insurance issued specifically to cover certain dump truck bodies which were to be transported by the plaintiff; it did not purport to cover plaintiff's truck. The policy insured plaintiff against damages to the cargo caused by fire, tornado, windstorm, collision, and various other mishaps. The clause we are concerned with here is the collision clause, which reads as follows:

'THIS POLICY INSURES: Against loss or damage directly caused by: * * *

'(b) collision, i. e., accidental collision of the vehicle with any other vehicle or object (the striking of curbing or any portion of the roadbed or the striking of rails or ties of street, steam or electric railroads, or contact with any stationary object in backing for loading or unloading purposes, or the coming together of trucks and trailers during coupling or uncoupling, shall not be deemed a collision);'

On the date in question, the plaintiff's truck driver, Mr. Forney D. Naylor, had picked up four tail gate assemblies for dump-type garbage trucks and was transporting them from Wayne, Michigan, to Madison, Illinois, where he was to pick up the rest of his cargo. He was passing through Champaign, Illinois, at about 9:00 in the morning when the accident occurred. The highway was covered with ice and snow. Mr. Naylor had just made a right-angle turn when he saw before him a railroad underpass (or overpass) about 150 feet from the turn. Realizing that there was insufficient clearance for his cargo, he applied his brakes. This caused the tractor-trailer to 'fish tail,' or sway from side to side. The highway sloped slightly downward as it approached the underpass, and in addition to the usual curbstone, a concrete wall about three feet high arose from immediately behind the curbstone; the sidewalk was located on top of this wall. As the trailer swerved from side to side, one of its rear wheels struck something, possibly the wall, on the right side of the road, about 75 feet from the underpass. The effect of this, if any, upon the operation and control of the tractor-trailer is not clear. The driver testified at one point that it lessened the fish-tailing, and at another point that he had no doubt that he could have stopped before reaching the underpass had the wheel not struck something. He had succeeded in bringing the truck under partial control when it went under the underpass. As it did so, three of the tail gate assemblies struck the underpass and were damaged. The tractor-trailer itself did not strike the underpass in any way.

The amount of damages was not disputed. In the court below, the trial judge gave the affirmative charge with hypothesis in favor of the plaintiff, explaining that he thought the collision clause of the policy covered the accident in question. It was his opinion that the term 'vehicle' as used in the phrase 'collision of the vehicle with any other vehicle or object' embraced not only the bare vehicle itself, but also the loaded vehicle, so that a collision of the cargo would fall within the terms of the policy. Appellant assigns as error the giving of this charge.

As was stated by the trial judge, there are no Alabama cases directly in point; other jurisdictions which have been faced with the problem are well divided.

It is well settled that generally insurance policies, being framed by the insurer, are to be construed most favorably to the insured. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Shotts, 267 Ala. 525, 103 So.2d 181; McKee v. Exchange Insurance Ass'n., 270 Ala. 518, 120 So.2d 690. And where a policy is fairly susceptible to different interpretations, it will be construed most strongly in favor of the insured. Trans-Continental Mutual Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 262 Ala. 373, 78 So.2d 917, 51 A.L.R.2d 917. However, when the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed as it reads, and courts are not at liberty to raise doubt where none exists. Central Mutual Ins. Co. v. Royal, 269 Ala. 372, 113 So.2d 680, 72 A.L.R.2d 1283; Woodall v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 269 Ala. 606, 114 So.2d 889; Chemstrand Corporation v. Maryland Casualty Co., 266 Ala. 626, 98 So.2d 1. A court cannot read something into an insurance policy which is not there. McDowell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 260 Ala. 412, 71 So.2d 64.

To hold that a vehicle's cargo was a part of the vehicle for purposes of this policy would do violence to the express and explicit language of the policy. The most recent case in point which we have been able to find is the 1957 Georgia decision of Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Jack Jordan, Inc., 213 Ga. 299, 99 S.E.2d 95. In that case, the insured's truck passed under an overhead bridge and some machinery, which was on the truck, struck the bridge and was damaged. The truck itself did not strike the bridge. With the single exception that the collision clause of the policy in the present case included a parenthetical sentence enumerating certain exceptions to what was to be considered a collision, the collision clauses in the two policies are identical. In reversing the decision of the trial court for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated:

'* * * The plain words of the policy insure against losses to the insured property which result directly to the property from a collision of the vehicle on which the property is being transported. This is the plain, unambiguous, literal meaning of the policy. The policy does not expressly cover damage to property caused simply 'by collision' or 'by collision of the vehicle or property'; but this particular type of coverage is restricted to loss or damage to the property caused by collision of the vehicle described in the policy. The petition does not allege that the...