Tripathy v. Schneider

• Decision Date: 01 October 2021
• Docket Number: 21-CV-6392-FPG
• Parties: SANJAY TRIPATHY, Plaintiff, v. ANDREA N. SCHNEIDER Acting Superintendent Gowanda CF, Gowanda NY, D. LOCKWOOD Acting Deputy Superintendent of Security, Gowanda CF, Gowanda NY, M.D. JOHN MORLEY Deputy Commissioner and Chief Medical Officer, DOCCS, Albany, NY, ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI Acting Commissioner, DOCCS, Albany, NY, and ANDREW M. CUOMO Governor, New York State, Albany, NY, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

SANJAY TRIPATHY, Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREA N. SCHNEIDER Acting Superintendent Gowanda CF, Gowanda NY, D. LOCKWOOD Acting Deputy Superintendent of Security, Gowanda CF, Gowanda NY, M.D. JOHN MORLEY Deputy Commissioner and Chief Medical Officer, DOCCS, Albany, NY, ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI Acting Commissioner, DOCCS, Albany, NY, and ANDREW M. CUOMO Governor, New York State, Albany, NY, Defendants.

No. 21-CV-6392-FPG

United States District Court, W.D. New York

October 1, 2021

ORDER

HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR. DISTRICT JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Sanjay Tripathy, an inmate incarcerated at the Fishkill Correctional Facility, filed this action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) regarding events which occurred while he was incarcerated at the Gowanda Correctional Facility (“Gowanda”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants exposed him to risks related to the COVID-19 pandemic in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the ADA and RA. In its initial screening order, the Court dismissed the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) with leave to amend. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint,

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ECF No. 5, and, for the reasons discussed below, the conditions of confinement claim will proceed to service against Defendants Schneider, Lockwood, and Haque, and the remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice.

DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), this Court is required to screen the Amended Complaint. Section 1915A “provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, if the court determines that the action (1) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).

I. The Amended Complaint

In evaluating the Amended Complaint, the Court must accept all factual allegations as true and must draw all inferences in Plaintiff's favor. See Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam); King v. Simpson, 189 F.3d 284, 287 (2d Cir. 1999). "Specific facts are not necessary, ” and the plaintiff “need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing pleading standard in pro se cases after Twombly: "even after Twombly, dismissal of a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the

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most unsustainable of cases."). Although “a court is obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations, ” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2004).

II. Section 1983

“To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir.1994)). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)).

To establish liability against a prison official under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that individual's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; it is not enough to assert that the defendant is a link in the prison's chain of command. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004). Moreover, the theory of respondeat superior is not available in a § 1983 action. See Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2003). “[T]here is no special rule for supervisory liability. Instead, a plaintiff must plead and prove that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own

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individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Plaintiff's Allegations^[1]

The Amended Complaint is substantially similar to the original Complaint in alleging Defendants' failure to implement or enforce safety protocols to control the spread of COVID-19. Presumed true at this stage of the proceedings, the amended pleadings state that Gowanda has failed to implement social distancing, “especially in Plaintiff's [dorm, ] which has been stuffed with 51 inmates.” ECF No. 5 at 11. The masking mandates are “rarely and sporadically enforced, ” and testing is “[n]on-existent and inadequate.” Id. There are “[p]oor, non-existent cleaning, quarantine and sanitation protocols, ” and inmates are moved between housing dorms and prison “without adequate testing.” Id. at 12. Critical care is delayed by staff members who are untrained in handling COVID-related emergencies. Id. The facility has “very poor ventilation” and “high amounts of indoor[] smoking.” Id. Plaintiff, “per CDC[, ] has the highest risk of death from Covid-19, due to severe underlying medical conditions.” Id. at 11. Plaintiff suffers from a “constant fear of death, ” poor mental health, and increased stress. Id.

Plaintiff spoke about his deteriorating heath and COVID-19 exposure “on many occasions” with Defendant Haque, who said there was “nothing” he could do and that Plaintiff “should suffer the consequences” because “he is in jail.” Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff “engaged with” Defendants Lockwood and Schneider, who denied his reasonable accommodation requests and similarly asserted that, as a prisoner, he would have to

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suffer the consequences of the pandemic, or “he should not be in jail.” Id. at 13. All three Defendants denied relief, discriminated against Plaintiff, and deliberately refused to take more action to mitigate the excessive risk of COVID-19 exposure. Id. at 13-14. Many of Plaintiff's “roommates and dorm-mates were Covid-19 positive and were showing symptoms of Covid-19 but [were] neither tested nor segregated.” Id. at 14.

Defendant Morley, the Chief Medical Officer for DOCCS, ignored Plaintiff's petitions, letters, and grievances, suggested that Plaintiff seek medical parole, which was unsuccessful, and “pushed the problem to local medical staff.” Id. He has also “failed to implement DOCCS[‘] own Covid-19 policies” and “ignore[d] CDC and health guidelines.” Id. Defendant DOCCS caused Plaintiff “irreparable harm from excessive exposure to Covid-19.” Id. Defendant Cuomo failed to protect Plaintiff “by not mitigating the impact of Covid-19 in prisons” or reducing “prison overcrowding.” Id. at 14-15.

Plaintiff has severe underlying conditions that place him at the “highest risk of death” from COVID-19, including stroke, diabetes, obesity, high blood pressure, respiratory illness, asthma, allergies, high cholesterol, and low vitamin D, iron, vitamin B-12 and testosterone. Id. at 17-18. Plaintiff “suffered increasingly since the onset” of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, and Defendants' “lack of” action “directly impacted his health and well-being.” Id. at 18. Further, Plaintiff's exposure to “constant and unprecedented” second-hand tobacco smoke during his incarceration increases his risk of death from COVID-19.^[2] Id. Plaintiff also experienced an “[i]ncreased fear of death”

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and “negative impact on mental health and overall well-being, ” as well as increased stress, high blood pressure, asthma, pulmonary disease, and “bone density ailments.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and his rights under the ADA and RA. Plaintiff requests an expedited scheduling of his case, an order restraining DOCCS staff from retaliating against him, and monetary damages. ECF No. 5 at 30-31.

IV. Constitutional Claims

A. Conditions of Confinement

The Court construes Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants exposed him to harmful conditions of confinement by failing to enforce pandemic safety protocols as claiming a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the conditions were so serious that they constituted a denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, ” and (2) the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 298 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Branham v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1996).

“To meet the objective element, the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage...