Tripati v. Hale

• Decision Date: 02 March 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2: 13-cv-0830
• Parties: ANANT KUMAR TRIPATI, Plaintiff, v. MARK W. HALE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

ANANT KUMAR TRIPATI, Plaintiff, v. MARK W. HALE, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2: 13-cv-0830

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 2, 2015

United States District Judge Terrence F. McVerry

United States Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Recommendation

For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants (ECF No. 28) be granted in part and denied in part. It is further recommended that this action be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

II. Report

A. Relevant and Material Facts

Plaintiff, Anant Kumar Tripati ("Plaintiff" or "Tripati") is a state prisoner committed to the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections ("DOC") and currently confined at the State Correctional Institution at Tucson, Arizona ("SCI-Tucson"). Tripati, acting pro se, initiated this Section 1983 prisoner civil rights action on June 19, 2013, by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1). The Court denied Tripati's motion on July 20, 2013, citing Tripati's failure to comply with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). (ECF No. 2).

On July 23, 2013, Tripati filed a second motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 3). On July 25, 2013, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation that Tripati's motion to proceed in forma pauperis be denied because he had already accrued "three strikes" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)¹ and could not satisfy the "imminent danger" exception to the three strikes rule.² (ECF No. 5). On August 12, 2013, United States District Judge Terrence F. McVerry adopted the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 7).

Tripati initially appealed the denial of his in forma pauperis motion, but later mooted that appeal by paying the filing fee. (ECF Nos. 10, 13). His Amended Complaint was docketed on February 6, 2014. (ECF No. 15). In his Amended Complaint, Tripati primarily seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 1) based on allegations that the defendants repeatedly failed to provide adequate health care for his serious medical needs during the course of his confinement. (ECF No. 15 ¶¶ 8-9, 23). In addition to his Section 1983 claim, Tripati asserts state law claims of negligence (Count 2), breach of contract (Count 3), fraud (Count 4), unjust enrichment (Count 5), conspiracy (Count 6), and violations of Arizona's racketeering statute(Counts 7-14). (Id. at ¶¶ 22-63). As Defendants, Tripati named Wexford Health Sources, Inc. ("Wexford"), the entity contracted to provide health care to the Arizona DOC from July 1, 2012 through March, 2013, and six of Wexford's corporate officers: Mark Hale (President), Daniel L. Conn (Chief Operating Officer), Elaine Gedman (Senior VP - HR), Darius Holmes (Senior VP - Operations), John M. Froehlich (Chief Financial Officer), and Dr. Thomas M. Lehman (Corporate Medical Director). (Id. at ¶¶ 18a - 18hii).

In broad brush, Tripati complains that he suffers from various medical impairments including food allergies, a painful renal cyst, cardiac issues, chest pain, urological problems, and symptoms such as "shakes, tremors, inability to walk, sleep, urinate, difficulty with bowel movements, [and] pain that is unbearable." (Id. at ¶¶ 11a, 11j, 12b, 12d, 12m, 12n). Tripati complains that various prison medical professionals - primarily Dr. Dimitric Catsaros, Dr. Admando De Guzman, and "Nurse Dawsey" - failed to adequately treat these issues. (Id. at ¶¶ 12c, 12e, 12g, 12r-12si). None of these individuals is named as a defendant in the Amended Complaint; instead, Tripati seeks to impose liability against Wexford and its corporate officers for allegedly engaging in a scheme to reap financial profits by obtaining large prison health care contracts and then systematically depriving inmates of timely and necessary medical services and refusing to provide adequate medical staff. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-17h, 20-21i). Tripati describes the gist of the scheme as follows:

The scheme or artifice is very simple, [the Defendants] agreed to utilize their credentials to influence public officials so as to obtain contracts for health care all around the United States of America; they bribed them, obtained millions of dollars in contracts, obtained monies on these contracts, charged fees and did not perform the services as provided for in these contracts.

(Id. at ¶ 19).

In furtherance of this scheme, Tripati contends that Wexford denied inmates the right to see specialists or to receive follow-up medical tests "as a matter of practice." (Id. at ¶ 19vii). With respect to his own medical care, Tripati alleges that Wexford refused to send him to a urologist for a recommended follow-up visit, refused to allow him to be examined by an allergist, did not permit him to receive a physician-requested ultrasound on his right renal cyst, denied him a follow-up visit with a cardiologist, and exchanged several of his medications with generic versions. (Id. at ¶¶ 11j, 12c, 12f, 12m, 12o). He also suggests that Wexford routinely delayed or refused to fill necessary prescriptions in order to save money. (Id. at ¶¶ 12p, 12q). Finally, Tripati vaguely suggests that Wexford has a history of providing negligent medical care and that Wexford used "tricks and other methods of concealment" to hide their prior negligence from Arizona in order to obtain the contract with the Arizona DOC.³ (Id. at ¶¶ 14-17h).

By way of relief, Tripati seeks $5,000,000 in damages from each Defendant and to have "all monies collected by Wexford . . . returned to the states." (Id. at p. 13).

Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, with a brief in support, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 28 and 29). Tripati filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 33), and Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 34). This matter is ripe for disposition.

B. Standard Of Review For Motions to Dismiss

1. Pro Se Litigants

Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Ifthe court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir.1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read "with a measure of tolerance").

In a § 1983 action, the court must liberally construe the pro se litigant's pleadings and "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.") (quoting Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688). Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378, (5th Cir. 2002).

2. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) - The Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiently of the complaint. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts and allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff.Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 62 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 1861 (2012) (citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010)). However, as the Supreme Court of the United States made clear in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, such "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that, while the Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a constitutional claim and must state a claim that is plausible on its face) (quoting Twombly, and providing further guidance on the standard set forth therein).

To determine the legal sufficiency of a complaint after Twombly and Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit instructs that a district court must conduct a three-step analysis when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that although Iqbal describes the process as a "two-pronged approach," it views the case as outlining three steps) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). First, "the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Id. at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675) (alteration in original). Second, the court "should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Third, '"where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then...