Triplett v. Daniel, 7 Div. 70
| Decision Date | 15 March 1951 |
| Docket Number | 7 Div. 70 |
| Citation | 255 Ala. 566,52 So.2d 184 |
| Parties | TRIPLETT v. DANIEL. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Ellis & Fowler, of Columbiana, for appellant.
Knox, Dixon & Wooten, of Talladega, for appellee.
The following charge was given for defendant:
C. I charge you gentlemen of the jury if you believe the evidence in this case you must find the plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in failing to give signals for stopping as required by law and if you further believe from the evidence that such negligence proximately contributed to her alleged injuries and damages your verdict in this case must be for the defendant.
Mrs. Della Triplett (appellant) brought suit against L. M. Daniel for damages on account of alleged personal injuries sustained by her in a traffic accident on January 1, 1948 on Broad Street in the City of Sylacauga, Alabama. The case was tried on a count alleging simple negligence to which the defendant pleaded in short by consent the general issue with leave to give in evidence any matter which would be admissible in evidence if well pleaded. Trial of the case resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant. Hence this appeal.
Reversal is sought on the rulings of the court made in connection with certain charges given by the court at the request of the defendant.
On January 1, 1948 the plaintiff was driving her automobile along Broad Street, a public street or highway in the City of Sylacauga. She was proceeding in a northerly direction approaching 8th Street. Three blocks south of the intersection a railroad crosses Broad Street. A train blocked the street and this stopped traffic. There were some three, four or five cars immediately ahead of the plaintiff's car and the defendant's truck was immediately behind her. After the train cleared the street crossing the traffic proceeded north. The defendant's truck ran into the plaintiff's car from the rear.
Testimony for the plaintiff tended to show that when she was approaching the 8th street crossing the red traffic light came on. The cars in front of her were slowing down gradually and coming to a stop. She likewise slowed down gradually and came to a stop behind the other three or four automobiles. The defendant's truck was considerably behind her after leaving the railroad crossing. It was about a half minute behind her when she came to a stop. After her car came to a complete standstill and after it had been in that position about a half minute the defendant's truck crashed into her car from the rear. She testified that when the defendant's truck struck her car she was thrown forward against the steering wheel from which she received injuries to her breast and other personal injuries.
Testimony for the defendant tended to show that the truck of the defendant after leaving the railroad crossing was moving in the line of cars at a speed from 15 to 20 miles per hour, the truck being within 15 to 20 feet of plaintiff's car. In this situation the plaintiff's car came to a stop without warning of any kind. The driver of defendant's truck did not see the cars in front of plaintiff stopping and the traffic light was green.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff was fully aware that the defendant's truck was the next vehicle behind her car in the line of traffic. On the morning of January 1, 1948 it was cold, a rather hazy day. All the windows of her car were up with the exception of a small opening in the front window for ventilation. The heater was on in the car. She gave no signal preceding the impact other than holding up her right hand inside the car in the center of the automobile. At no time did she lower the lefthand front window of her automobile or indicate her intention to stop by giving any other signal to stop. At no time did she hold out her hand horizontally beyond the left side of her automobile.
We have concluded that the giving of charge C requested by the defendant constitutes error. Testimony for the plaintiff tended to show that the defendant's truck was considerably behind her after leaving the railroad crossing and that after her car had come to a complete standstill and had been in that position for about one-half minute, it was then that the defendant's truck crashed...
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Prince v. Lowe, 5 Div. 601
...exact time the horn on plaintiff's automobile was sounded, we think a jury question was presented under the rule of Triplett v. Daniel, 255 Ala. 566, 52 So.2d 184, 186, where it was said: '* * * If under the undisputed proof in the case there is a violation of § 17, Title 36, Code of 1940, ......
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Edwards v. United States
...given if it appears that the movement or operation of another's car might reasonably be affected by the stopping," Triplett v. Daniel, 255 Ala. 566, 52 So.2d 184, 185 (1951); and it is evident from subsection 32-5-240(d)(1) that it was intended to require that large vehicles give such signa......
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Hawkins v. Simmons
...consideration the frozen and slippery condition of the highway and all surrounding circumstances."); see also Triplett v. Daniel, 255 Ala. 566, 568, 52 So. 2d 184, 186 (1951) ("If under the undisputed proof in the case there is a violation of § 17, Title 36, Code of 1940, then such violatio......
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Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Pacheco-Rivera, PACHECO-RIVERA
...has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety." Ala.Code 1975, § 32-5A-88(1). (Emphasis added.) In Triplett v. Daniel, 255 Ala. 566, 52 So.2d 184 (1951), the Court considered Ala.Code 1940, Tit. 36, § 17, which (as paraphrased in Triplett ) provided that "the driver of an......