Tripp County v. State

• Decision Date: 01 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 12268,12268
• Parties: COUNTY OF TRIPP, South Dakota, a political subdivision of the State of South Dakota, Warren Sealy, Wesley Frantz, and Don Mason, Individually and as Commissioners of Tripp County, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of South Dakota, Richard F. Kneip, Governor, Lorna Herseth, Secretary of State, William J. Janklow, Attorney General, and Shirley Briggs, County Auditor of Tripp County, Defendants and Respondents, and Clayton "Bud" Haley and Anita Remerowski, Defendant-Intervenors and Respondents, and Marlow Newman, Intervenor.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 213

264 N.W.2d 213

COUNTY OF TRIPP, South Dakota, a political subdivision of the State of South Dakota, Warren Sealy, Wesley Frantz, and Don Mason, Individually and as Commissioners of Tripp County, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of South Dakota, Richard F. Kneip, Governor, Lorna Herseth, Secretary of State, William J. Janklow, Attorney General, and Shirley Briggs, County Auditor of Tripp County Defendants and Respondents and Clayton "Bud" Haley and Anita Remerowski Defendant-Intervenors and Respondents and Marlow Newman, Intervenor.

No. 12268.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued June 6, 1977.

Decided March 27, 1978.

Rehearing Denied May 1, 1978.

Tom D. Tobin and Earl R. Mettler, Winner, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Doyle D. Estes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for defendants and respondents; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.

John J. Simpson, Winner, Terry Pechota, Mission, for defendant-intervenors and respondents.

John W. Grieves, Winner, for intervenor Marlow Newman.

PORTER, Justice.

CASE SUMMARY

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court declaring the attachment of the unorganized county of Todd to the organized county of Tripp for administration of governmental and fiscal affairs pursuant to SDCL 7-17-1 constitutional. The appellants (County of Tripp and the Board of Commissioners of Tripp County) contend that SDCL 7-17-1 denies them due process, equal protection, and their right to a free and equal election as guaranteed by the South Dakota Constitution. S.D.Const., Art. VI, § 2, Art. VI, § 26, and Art. VI, § 19. They argue that Tripp and Todd Counties have been consolidated without the consent of their residents in contravention of Article IX, § 1 of the South Dakota Constitution, and that the trial court erred in holding that the issue of whether Tripp and Todd Counties should be severed is a political one, which is properly left within the cognizance of the South Dakota Legislature. We find no merit in appellants' assignment of error, and therefore affirm the portion of the judgment of the trial court declaring SDCL 7-17-1 constitutional.

FACTS

In 1929 the South Dakota Legislature attached the unorganized county of Todd to the organized county of Tripp for administration of governmental and fiscal affairs including all state, county, judicial, taxation, election, recording, canvassing, and foreclosure purposes, pursuant to SDCL 7-17-1. ¹ Although the county officers of Tripp County have all of the jurisdiction, rights, powers, duties, and liabilities for the administration of the affairs of Todd County, under SDCL 12-23-2 ² the residents of Todd County were not allowed to vote for the Tripp County officers. In 1975, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that Todd County electors must be allowed to vote in Tripp County elections. Little Thunder v. Kneip, 518 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1975). Shortly before primary and general elections in Tripp County the federal district court entered This appeal stems from a trial on December 17, 1976, in which the appellants alleged the unconstitutionality of SDCL 7-17-1. Subsequently, the trial court issued a memorandum decision holding SDCL 7-17-1 constitutional and refusing to sever Todd County from Tripp County. The court also ordered that the Tripp County Auditor be directed to certify Clayton Haley as the county commissioner from the third district, notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the process by which the election took place. A judgment was entered accordingly on February 11, 1977, to which appellants assign several errors. We affirm the portion of the judgment of the trial court declaring SDCL 7-17-1 constitutional.

an order implementing that decision. Prior to those elections the appellants in this case sought to enjoin the participation of Todd County residents in the Tripp County elections. The trial court ordered that Todd County residents be allowed to vote in the elections, but that election officials keep separate totals for votes cast from each county. Intervenor Clayton "Bud" Haley was elected county commissioner for the third district by a combination of Tripp and Todd County voters. His opponent Marlow Newman would have been elected to that office, however, if only the Tripp County votes cast were counted.

ISSUES

This appeal presents the following issues:

Issue One Does SDCL 7-17-1 deprive Tripp County residents of their property without due process of law as guaranteed by the South Dakota Constitution, Article VI, Section 2? ³

Issue Two Does SDCL 7-17-1 deny Tripp County residents equal protection as guaranteed by the South Dakota Constitution, Article VI, Section 26? ⁴

Issue Three Does SDCL 7-17-1 deny residents of Tripp County their right to a free and equal election as guaranteed by the South Dakota Constitution, Article VI, Section 19? ⁵

Issue Four Did SDCL 7-17-1 unconstitutionally consolidate Tripp and Todd Counties without the consent of the residents therein as required by the South Dakota Constitution, Article IX, Section 1? ⁶

Issue Five Is the issue of severance of Tripp and Todd Counties a political one, which is properly left within the cognizance of the South Dakota Legislature?

DECISION

Issue One

Appellants allege that SDCL 7-17-1 deprives Tripp County residents of their property without due process of law by requiring them to provide to an adjacent county services for which they do not receive adequate compensation. The basis for this assertion is that SDCL 7-17-9, ⁷ 7-17- The power of the legislature in the control of counties and other political subdivisions is unrestrained by requirements of due process. (Citations omitted.) In Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 46, 52 L.Ed. 151, the Court answered the contention that taxpayers of a municipality could not be taxed for the benefit of a municipality with which it may be consolidated in this way:

11, ⁸ and 7-7-13 ⁹ limit the amount of taxes that can be collected from Todd County by Tripp County for administrative costs and the amount of money that can be paid in salaries to the officials who perform certain administrative tasks. We hold that the due process clause does not limit the power of the legislature in this instance. In Williams v. Book, 75 S.D. 173, 181-82, 61 N.W.2d 290, 294 (1953), this court said:

"The state, * * * may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States."

Similarly, questions of public policy, convenience, and welfare related to any change in county boundaries are of purely legislative cognizance and any action in regard thereto does not come within the due process clauses of either the state or federal constitutions. Syfie v. Tri-County Hospital District, 186 Neb. 478, 184 N.W.2d 398, 403 (1971). Although such legislative actions might sometimes work hardships on certain citizens, the legislature's exercise of its plenary power over counties through attachment is not limited by due process. The attachment of Todd County to Tripp County might cause residents inconvenience, but the statutory scheme is still a valid exercise of legislative authority. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179, 28 S.Ct. 40, 46, 52 L.Ed. 151, 159 (1907). We hold, therefore, that SDCL 7-17-1 does not violate appellants' rights to due process under the South Dakota Constitution.

Issue Two

Appellants base their allegation of a violation of the equal protection clause of the South Dakota Constitution on the inadequate compensation to Tripp County for services provided to Todd County, which additional expense is not borne by residents of any other county or by residents of the state at large. The only possible merit to this argument stems from this allegation by Equal protection demands that there be a rational basis for differing treatment of people by state statute. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 (1961). Appellants argue that there is no rational basis for the attachment of an unorganized county to an organized county, or for the attachment of Todd County to Tripp County rather than to another adjacent county, and that SDCL 7-17-1 unconstitutionally treats Tripp County residents differently from Todd County residents. It is well recognized that state legislatures have the power to attach unorganized counties to organized counties for special purposes subject only to constitutional limitations. Parish of Caddo v. Parish of Bossier, 164 La. 378, 113 So. 882 (1927). The object of the attachment statute under attack here is to provide for the administration of governmental and fiscal affairs of Todd County. The attachment of Todd County to Tripp County is obviously reasonably related to that object and is indeed a rational solution to the problem of administration of Todd County. This solution need not be the only alternative to be constitutional, but rather it must merely be a reasonable alternative. See W. S. Butterfield Theatres v. Department of Revenue, 353 Mich. 345, 91 N.W.2d 269 (1958). The attachment of these counties was a rational way to provide an effective system of county government for an unorganized county. The test is not whether there is a rational basis for the attachment of Todd County to Tripp County rather than to another adjacent county, but instead whether there is a rational basis for the attachment of Todd County to Tripp County rather than any other county in the state....