Tripp v. Swoap

• Citation: 552 P.2d 749,17 Cal.3d 671,131 Cal.Rptr. 789
• Decision Date: 03 August 1976
• Docket Number: S.F. 23423
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 552 P.2d 749 Kathleen TRIPP, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David B. SWOAP, as Director, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 789

131 Cal.Rptr. 789

17 Cal.3d 671, 552 P.2d 749

Kathleen TRIPP, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David B. SWOAP, as Director, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

S.F. 23423.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Aug. 3, 1976.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jerome M. Behrens and John J. Klee, Jr., San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Carl L. McConnell, Redwood City, Peter Reid, Daly City, and Byron Mellberg, Redwood City, for plaintiff and respondent.

Craig H. Scott, Daly City, and Richard M. Pearl, Deland, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment awarding plaintiff Kathleen Tripp retroactive payment of welfare benefits with attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest.

On July 25, 1972, plaintiff presented an application for benefits under the aid to the needy disabled program (ATD) ¹ based on a disabling injury to her back sustained in 1970. The ATD review team initially denied plaintiff benefits on the ground that she had not established the requisite permanent disability on which such benefits were conditioned. After a hearing to review the denial the hearing officer found that plaintiff was eligible for Group II benefits. These benefits were available to an applicant whose impairments were reasonably expected to continue throughout the applicant's lifetime, but might improve at some future, undetermined date and therefore were subject to periodic review. Despite the hearing officer's finding, on August 28, 1973, defendant Director of the State Department of Social Welfare (hereafter Director and DSW) ² denied plaintiff's claim on the ground that her impairments were not permanent in that they would improve with time or medical treatment and therefore did not appear reasonably certain to continue for the duration of her life.

Plaintiff commenced the instant proceedings in administrative mandamus to challenge the Director's determination of her ineligibility. The trial court determined that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that plaintiff's disability was permanent, and that there was no substantial evidence that her condition would improve. ³ The court entered judgment accordingly ordering the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing defendant to set aside his decision of August 28, 1973, in the underlying administrative proceeding and to pay plaintiff benefits retroactively from July 25, 1972, with attorney's fees and interest at the legal rate. The writ issued forthwith. This appeal by the Director followed.

We agree at the outset with the trial court's conclusion that the Director's decision denying benefits to plaintiff must be set aside as not supported by substantial evidence. Under the substantial evidence test it was the duty of the trial court to review defendant's decision in light of the entire administrative record. Our task is defined by the same standard of review. (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 149, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 915--916, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33.)

Defendant denied plaintiff's claim for benefits on the ground that her impairments would improve. However, the only evidence adduced by defendant to support his finding was a report by plaintiff's physician made one month after she underwent surgery. In his report the doctor noted that prognosis was 'fair' but that a final prognosis could not be rendered for another year, and further noted that plaintiff's functional limitations were 'temporary.' On the other hand, the remaining evidence disclosed that five months after her surgery plaintiff was required to wear a back brace to stand; that in her doctor's opinion she would never return to her prior work and would probably require additional surgery; that she still suffered from dizziness and had difficulty speaking; that her doctor had diagnosed deterioration of the spine; that after a short period of improvement following her operation, she began hemorrhaging in her back; and that her condition was becoming progressively worse.

On the basis of the above facts, the trial court properly concluded that there was substantial evidence that plaintiff's impairments were sufficiently permanent to entitle her to ATD benefits subject to periodic review. Considered in the light of the entire record, the report made by plaintiff's doctor one month after her surgery did not constitute substantial evidence to support defendant's decision denying plaintiff benefits. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error in ordering the decision to be set aside.

We reject as devoid of merit the Director's related contention that the trial court did not in fact apply the 'substantial evidence test' in reversing the Director's decision. Defendant argues that the trial court reweighed the evidence and exercised its independent judgment in reviewing the administrative record. It is urged that this is manifest in the trial court's memorandum decision where after summarizing the evidence, the court stated that 'it is apparent that a preponderance of evidence pointed to the conclusions of the referee that the disability was indeed permanent.' Defendant complains that at least the court alternatively used the 'independent judgment' test and the 'substantial evidence' test to overturn his decision. We do not agree. At the very beginning of the memorandum decision and immediately preceding the above summary of evidence, it is clearly and explicitly stated that 'The trial court's review of this decision is confined to the issue of whether or not there was substantial evidence to support the (Director's) decision.' Again at the end of the decision the court concluded: 'Thus, it is apparent from the evidence there were substantial facts to support a finding of permanence, and no substantial evidence to find that petitioner 'will improve. " We are satisfied that the trial judge applied the proper scope of review.

We also uphold the trial court's award of retroactive benefits. Defendant contends that the power to grant aid was vested in the DSW subject to review by the trial court and that consequently although the court could order defendant to pay benefits to plaintiff, it was without power to order such payments to be made retroactively or to fix the date on which payments were to commence. Contrary to the Director's claim, however, it has been held on a number of occasions over the last 30 years that where the circumstances so warrant, it is within the power of a trial court to order that the payment of benefits be made retroactive. (See e.g., Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L.A. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 81, 86--89, 162 P.2d 630; Smock v. Carleson (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 960, 964, 121 Cal.Rptr. 432; Leach v. Swoap (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 685, 689--690, 110 Cal.Rptr. 62; Mooney v. Pickett (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 431, 435, 102 Cal.Rptr. 708.

When in its review of an administrative decision the court enters judgment commanding the respondent to set aside the decision, it 'may order respondent to take such further action as is specially enjoined upon it by law but the judgment shall not limit or control in any way the discretion legally vested in the respondent.' (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (e).) In the instant case, having determined that plaintiff had been wrongfully denied ATD benefits as a matter of law, the trial court merely rendered a judgment ordering defendant to discharge his legal obligation. Inasmuch as an ATD applicant is entitled by statute to benefits as of a particular date once eligibility is established (§ 11056), there was no issue remaining on which the trial court could invade the Director's discretion.

Under these circumstances, it is manifest that the trial court acted properly within the scope of its power. We observe, however, that the court erroneously applied July 25, 1972, the date of plaintiff's application for benefits, as the effective date of her entitlement to benefits. Under section 11056, plaintiff's entitlement to benefits commenced on August 1, 1972, as the first day of the month following the date of application. Accordingly the judgment must be modified to reflect August 1, 1972, as the proper date of commencement of plaintiff's benefits.

We turn to the issue whether the recipient of wrongfully withheld welfare benefits is entitled to prejudgment interest. Defendant contends that plaintiff is not entitled to interest because it is not specifically authorized under section 10962 ⁴ which provides for judicial review of benefit determinations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that section 3287, subdivision (a), of the Civil Code, ⁵ which provides generally for the award of interest on damages, authorizes the interest awarded her by the trial court. ⁶ The resolution of this issue thus calls for the statutory construction of section 10962 and Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a). We begin with the fundamental rule that a court 'should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672, 675.) In interpreting particular words, phrases, or clauses in a statute, 'the entire substance of the statute or that portion relating to the subject under review should be examined in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision containing such words, phrases or clauses.' (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Finance Loans (1970) 2 Cal.3d 594, 608, 86 Cal.Rptr. 793, 803, 469 P.2d 665, 675.) The words in question 'must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.' (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 149, 514 P.2d 1224, 1229, quoting from Johnstone v. Richardson (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 41, 46, 229 P.2d 9.)

Where as here two codes...