Tripp v. Torrey
| Decision Date | 01 May 1891 |
| Citation | 22 A. 278,17 R.I. 359 |
| Parties | TRIPP, City Treasurer v. TORREY. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from court of common pleas, Providence county.
Action by Benjamin Tripp, city treasurer of the city of Providence, against Ellsworth Torrey, to recover taxes. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings exceptions. Affirmed.
Nicholas Van Slyck and Cyrus M. Van Slyck, for plaintiff.
John T. Blodgett, for defendant.
This is an action of a case for the recovery of a tax amounting to $75, assessed by the city of Providence in the year 1888 against the defendant, on personal property valued at $5,000. It was brought in the court of common pleas, Which rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and is now before this court on the defendant's exceptions. The plaintiff sues under Pub. St. R. I. c. 44, § 26, which provides that "the collector of any tax may recover the amount thereof in an action of the case against the person taxed in the court of common pleas or the supreme court." The defendant contends that the court of common pleas had no jurisdiction of the suit, the amount sued for being less than $100, and so appearing in the declaration. He claims that exclusive jurisdiction, in all cases in which the debt or damages demanded do not exceed $100, is vested in the district court. In support of his claim he relies upon Pub. Laws R. I. c. 597, §§ 23, 56, of May 27, 1886. The former section confers upon "every district court * * * original and exclusive jurisdiction of all civil actions legally brought before it, wherein the debt or damages demanded do not exceed one hundred dollars "The latter section repeals certain statutes enumerated therein, among which Pub. St. R. I. c. 44, § 26, is not included, and also "all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith;" that is, with said chapter 597. The defendant's argument is that, as the amount sued for is less than $100, the suit might legally have been brought in the district court: and as that court, under said chapter 597, has exclusive jurisdiction in such cases, it could only have been brought in that court; and that Pub. St. R. I. c. 44, § 26, being inconsistent with Pub. Laws, c. 597, § 23, of May 27, 1886, was repealed by section 56 of the latter chapter. The argument is plausible, rather than valid. The vice of it is that it really gives no effect, or, at least, not full effect, to the words, "legally brought before it;" but treats chapter 597, § 23, as though it read: "Every district court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the debt or damages demanded do not exceed one hundred dolars." The words, "legally brought before it," were apparently intended to qualify or limit the words of the section preceding them; to take some actions out of the exclusive jurisdiction of district courts which but for them would have been included within that jurisdiction. We are inclined to the opinion that they are broad enough to except from the jurisdiction of district courts cases special jurisdiction over which had been conferred upon other tribunals. Cases relating to the collection of taxes are of this kind. Pub. St. R. I. c. 44, § 26, is a special statute, conferring a special jurisdiction over suits for taxes upon the court of common pleas and supreme court, without reference to the amount sued for. Authority is nowhere else given to collectors of taxes to bring suits for the recovery Of taxes. Doubtless it was the intention of the legislature by this statute, which not only authorizes the suit, but provides what allegations shall make a sufficient declaration, to give to collectors of taxes a more summary remedy than that provided for ordinary suitors for the collection of debts, and to relieve them from the embarrassment and delays that might result from the bringing of suits in the lower courts in cases of appeals from their judgments. It is a well-established rule of construction that special statutes are not repealed by general provisions, unless the legislative in tent to repeal be clear. If both...
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CIC-Newport Associates v. Stein
...Ewing v. Tax Assessors, 93 R.I. at 376, 176 A.2d at 71; Quimby v. Wood, 19 R.I. 571, 578, 35 A. 149, 150-51 (1896); Tripp v. Torrey, 17 R.I. 359, 362, 22 A. 278, 278 (1891); Tripp v. Merchants' Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 12 R.I. 435, 436 The plaintiff acknowledges this general rule but argu......
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Van Alen v. Stein, 75-124-A
...the assessment period is entitled to relief under § 44-5-26 even though no account was filed. The tax assessor cites Tripp v. Torrey, 17 R.I. 359, 22 A. 278 (1891) for the proposition that even if petitioners' challenge is based on lack of taxable situs, so long as petitioners own some rata......
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Bishop v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport
...called illegal taxation. Tripp v. Merchants' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 12 R. I. 435; Quimby v. Wood, 19 R, I. 571, 35 A. 149; Tripp v. Torrey, 17 R. I. 359, 22 A. 278; Hall v. Bain, 18 R. I. 413, 28 A. 371. The authority of these cases is not now intended to be questioned, but in none of them w......
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