Tritz v. U.S. Postal Serv.

• Citation: 721 F.3d 1133
• Decision Date: 09 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10–56967.,10–56967.
• Parties: Irene TRITZ, an individual, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; The California Franchise Tax Board; Internal Revenue Service, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

721 F.3d 1133

Irene TRITZ, an individual, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; The California Franchise Tax Board; Internal Revenue Service, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 10–56967.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 17, 2013.
Filed July 9, 2013.

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Willie Jordan–Curtis, Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Andrew B. Compton, Matthew J. Palmer, David C. Potts (argued), Michael R. Shumway, Law Students, University of Arizona Pro Bono Appellate Project, Tucson, AR, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

André Birotte, Jr., United States Attorney, Leon W. Weidman, Chief, Civil Division, Russell W. Chittenden (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants–Appellees United States Postal Service and Internal Revenue Service.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, W. Dean Freeman, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Marla K. Markman (argued), Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant–Appellee California Franchise Tax Board.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 8:10–cv–00182–DOC–RNB.
Before MARY M. SCHROEDER, SIDNEY R. THOMAS, and BARRY G. SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION
THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we consider whether the Tucker Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims to hear contract claims against the United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”) seeking more than $10,000 in damages. We conclude that the Tucker Act's grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims to hear such claims is concurrent with the independent grant of jurisdiction to the United States district courts under the Postal Reorganization Act (“PRA”), 39 U.S.C. §§ 401 and 409. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the action on alternative grounds.

I

According to her complaint,¹ Irene Tritz was an employee of the Postal Service for

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over thirty-three years. During that time, she filed several complaints for gender discrimination, age discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. Following a bench trial in 1991, a district court judge held that the Postal Service had discriminated against Tritz on account of her sex. Before the court ruled on damages, Tritz and the Postal Service entered into a settlement agreement (“1991 Settlement Agreement”).

In 2005, Tritz brought a pro se complaint against the Postal Service alleging a hostile work environment. Although a jury found in her favor and awarded her $275,000, Tritz again entered into a settlement agreement with the Postal Service (“2006 Settlement Agreement”). Under the terms of the settlement, the Postal Service agreed to provide Tritz with a letter of recommendation and to pay her $225,000 as compensation for her claimed emotional injury. In exchange, Tritz agreed to release all of her claims—known and unknown, pending or otherwise—against the Postal Service and its employees. In February 2006, the parties signed the settlement agreement and the district court judge accordingly dismissed Tritz's action.

In 2010, Tritz brought her present complaint pro se. She claims that the Postal Service breached the 1991 and 2006 Settlement Agreements, and that the 2006 Settlement Agreement is voidable because her assent was the result of undue influence and fraudulent misrepresentation. She also brings claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. For relief, Tritz requests, among other things, that the 2006 Settlement Agreement be voided; that she be awarded trial costs of $14,723.25; that taxes and penalties be waived; and that she receive her original jury award of $275,000 (i.e., that she be paid $50,000 in addition to her settlement award).

The district court granted the federal defendants' motion to dismiss Tritz's complaint. It dismissed Tritz's breach of contract claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), grants the Court of Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction to hear breach of contract claims against the Postal Service that put more than $10,000 in controversy. It dismissed seven of Tritz's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it held that Tritz had not complied with the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Finally, the district court held that Tritz's remaining three claims were barred by res judicata.

We review de novo the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir.2005). We also review de novo the district court's dismissal regarding res judicata. W. Radio Servs. Co., Inc. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir.1997). We may affirm the district court's dismissal on any grounds supported by the record. Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1100 n. 2 (9th Cir.2000).

II

The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit in state or federal court except to the extent that Congress has expressly waived such sovereign immunity. United States v. Mitchell ( Mitchell I ), 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980). “[T]he terms of [Congress's] consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Id. The Tucker Act provides that “[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded ... upon any express or implied

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contract with the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). ² The Supreme Court has long recognized that this provision of the Tucker Act effects a waiver of sovereign immunity and grants jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims with regard to contract claims against the United States. United States v. Mitchell ( Mitchell II ), 463 U.S. 206, 215, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983).

Contrary to the Postal Service's argument, nothing in the language of the Tucker Act makes its grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims exclusive for all contract claims over $10,000. It is true that we have read the Tucker Act and the “Littler Tucker Act” ³ together to “provide for jurisdiction solely in the Court of Federal Claims for Tucker Act claims seeking more than $10,000 in damages, and concurrent district court jurisdiction over claims seeking $10,000 or less.” McGuire v. United States, 550 F.3d 903, 910–11 (9th Cir.2008) (emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court has explained that this reading is not correct in all instances:

It is often assumed that the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction of Tucker Act claims for more than $10,000. (Title 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) expressly authorizes concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts and the Claims Court for claims under $10,000.) That assumption is not based on any language in the Tucker Act granting such exclusive jurisdiction to the Claims Court. Rather, that court's jurisdiction is “exclusive” only to the extent that Congress has not granted any other court authority to hear the claims that may be decided by the Claims Court.
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n. 48, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988) (emphasis added).

In other words, the Tucker Act and Little Tucker Act create a presumption of exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims, but that presumption can be overcome by an independent statutory grant of jurisdiction to another court.

In another context, we interpreted the Tucker Act consistently with Bowen and found that the presumption of exclusive jurisdiction was overcome. In In re Liberty Construction, we explained that “claims against the United States may be entertained by the district courts, regardless of the amount sought, so long as there exists a basis for jurisdiction independent of the Tucker Act.” Concrete Tie, Inc. v. Liberty Constr., Inc. ( In re Liberty Constr., Inc.), 9 F.3d 800, 801–02 (9th Cir.1993) (footnote omitted). Then, after noting that the Small Business Act's “sue and be sued”

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provision, 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(1), independently vested jurisdiction in the district courts over claims against the Small Business Administration, we upheld the district court's jurisdiction to hear an action against the Small Business Administration despite the Tucker Act's grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims. Id. at 802.

The PRA provides that “the United States district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought by or against the Postal Service.” 39 U.S.C. § 409(a). The plain language of this provision grants district courts jurisdiction over contract actions against the Postal Service. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 302 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir.2002), reversed on other grounds,540 U.S. 736, 124 S.Ct. 1321, 158 L.Ed.2d 19 (2004), on remand,366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir.2004);Wright v. U.S. Postal Serv., 29 F.3d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir.1994). We have previously concluded that “[t]here is ... no basis for differentiating between the [Small Business Act and the PRA]” with regard to their respective sovereign immunity waivers and jurisdictional grants. Wright, 29 F.3d at 1430. Therefore, we now hold that, like the Small Business Act in Liberty Construction, the PRA independently grants district courts jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Federal Claims, to hear claims against the Postal Service for more than $10,000. See Liberty Constr., 9 F.3d at 802;see also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 910 n. 48, 108 S.Ct. 2722.

The Federal Circuit has also interpreted the PRA and the Tucker Act to authorize district courts to hear contract claims against the Postal Service...