Troiano v. U.S.
Decision Date | 22 March 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 18-15183,18-15183 |
Citation | 918 F.3d 1082 |
Parties | James TROIANO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Peter C. Wolff, Jr. (argued), Assistant Federal Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Marion Percell (argued) and Jill Otake, Assistant United States Attorneys; Kenji M. Price, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Honolulu, Hawaii; for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Richard C. Tallman, Jay S. Bybee, and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.
Federal prisoner James Troiano appeals the district court’s order correcting his sentence only as to one of his four counts of conviction following his partially successful motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Troiano contends the court was required to conduct a full resentencing proceeding on all counts because removing the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") sentencing enhancement from one count necessarily impacted the court’s consideration of his full sentencing package. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in correcting only one count of Troiano’s sentence. We decline to certify the two additional issues Troiano seeks to appeal, and we do not reach them.
In 2006, Troiano was convicted by a federal jury on four counts—Count 1: Conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 1952 ("Hobbs Act conspiracy"); Count 2: Obstructing commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 1952 ("Hobbs Act robbery"); Count 3: Use of a firearm in obstructing commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ; and Count 4: Felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). These charges stemmed from the robbery of a convenience store in Waialua, Hawaii, carried out by Troiano and others. During the robbery Troiano brandished a Colt .45 semi-automatic pistol, took $ 12,000 from an ATM, and injured the store clerk.
At sentencing, the government introduced certified copies of Troiano’s prior Hawaii state convictions, including, as relevant here, two 1991 and two 1998 convictions for burglary in the first degree. The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") noted that Troiano was subject to the career offender sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1,1 because he was over 18 at the time of the instant offense, the offense was a crime of violence, and he had at least two predicate felony convictions for crimes of violence (the 1991 and 1998 Hawaii first-degree burglaries). The PSR also explained that Troiano faced a mandatory 7-year consecutive sentence on Count 3 under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), for brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. Further, the PSR noted that Troiano faced a mandatory minimum term of 15 years on Count 4 under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because, under the ACCA, Troiano had three previous convictions "for a violent felony ... committed on occasions different from one another[.]"
For the purpose of calculating Troiano’s Sentencing Guidelines range, the PSR explained that Counts 1 and 2 were grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b), because Count 2 charged a substantive offense that was the subject of the conspiracy charged in Count 1. Count 3 was not grouped with any other count because of the mandatory 7-year consecutive sentence it carried. Count 4 also was not grouped because the mandatory consecutive sentence for Count 3 already accounted for the firearm possessed in connection with the robbery counts.2 Ultimately, due to his career offender status, Troiano’s Guidelines range on Counts 1 and 2, as well as on Count 4, was 360 months to life. The PSR referenced U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(e), stating that in cases involving career offenders, "to the extent possible, the total punishment is to be apportioned among the counts of conviction, except that ... the [84-month] sentence to be imposed on the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)... count shall be imposed to run consecutively to any other count."
At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR, including the calculation of Troiano’s Guidelines range. The court then varied below the range and imposed a total sentence of 24 years, stating:
I believe that an appropriate sentence as to counts 1, 2, and 4 is 17 years. As to count 3, I am giving you seven years. And so that is a total of 24 years. And the sentence of 17 years on counts 1, 2, and 4 run concurrently. The sentence as to count 3 runs consecutively, and that is how, when you total it up, it becomes 24 years, which is vastly different than 360 months to life. And it is my hope that you will look at that as an opportunity to pay for your crimes but still have some life left at the end of that.
Troiano’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied. See United States v. Troiano , 258 F. App'x 983 (9th Cir. 2007). In 2016, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), which struck down as unconstitutionally vague the ACCA’s residual clause definition of "crime of violence," Troiano was permitted to file a second section 2255 motion. In that motion, Troiano argued: first, that post- Johnson , he was no longer subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA for Count 4; second, that because of the Guidelines’ identically worded residual clause definition of "crime of violence" he was not properly designated a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 ; and third, that Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Acknowledging Johnson , the district court granted relief on Troiano’s claim that the ACCA enhancement was incorrectly applied to Count 4, but it denied his Guidelines challenge in light of Beckles v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 886, 895, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017) ( ). It also denied relief on Troiano’s section 924(c) claim. The court then ordered the parties to file memoranda "addressing their positions as to the procedure for post-2255 proceedings in this case," including "the need for a revised Presentence Investigation Report, the need for a resentencing hearing, and the need for [Troiano] to be present at a resentencing hearing."
After full briefing, the court issued its order correcting Troiano’s sentence. Noting its "wide discretion in choosing the proper scope of post-2255 proceedings," the court opted not to conduct a full resentencing as to all four counts of conviction, and instead corrected Troiano’s sentence on Count 4 to 10 years—the maximum sentence permitted without the ACCA enhancement. Because Troiano’s 17-year sentences on Counts 1 and 2 and his 7-year consecutive sentence on Count 3 were not altered, his overall sentence of 24 years remained unchanged.
The district court issued Troiano a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") to challenge the procedure by which it corrected his sentence, but denied COAs to challenge his career offender designation and whether Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We also declined to certify the latter two issues, but did so without prejudice to Troiano raising them in his opening brief.
We have not explicitly stated in a published opinion which standard of review applies to a district court’s determination of the appropriate remedy in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. We take the occasion to do so here, and hold that the standard is abuse of discretion.
Citing our cases discussing the standard of review for decisions to grant or deny section 2255 motions, Troiano urges us to apply de novo review. See, e.g. , United States v. Swisher , 811 F.3d 299, 306 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (); United States v. Navarro , 160 F.3d 1254, 1255 (9th Cir. 1998) (). Those cases, however, do not discuss which standard we are to apply when reviewing the district court’s choice of remedial action in response to a successful—or, as here, a partially successful— section 2255 motion.
We have already declared in Loher v. Thomas , 825 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2016), a case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that "review [of] the district court’s determination of the appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation on a habeas petition [is] for abuse of discretion." Section 2255 is "intended to mirror § 2254 in operative effect," United States v. Winkles , 795 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2015), and we see no reason to distinguish between those sections when it comes to reviewing the district court’s choice of remedy after it grants habeas relief.
Moreover, the deferential abuse of discretion standard accords with the "broad and flexible power" conferred upon district courts under section 2255. United States v. Handa , 122 F.3d 690, 691 (9th Cir. 1997). See also United States v. Jones , 114 F.3d 896, 897 (9th Cir. 1997) ( ). Additionally, at least four of our sister circuits have explicitly applied the abuse of discretion standard to remedial decisions under section 2255. See United States v. Brown , 879 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018) ( ). Accordingly, we follow our precedent from the section 2254 context and adopt the approach of our sister circuits in reviewing the...
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