Trombley v. Bellows Falls Union High School Dist. No. 27

• Decision Date: 26 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-392,91-392
• Citation: 624 A.2d 857,160 Vt. 101
• Parties: , 82 Ed. Law Rep. 869 Patricia TROMBLEY and Georgia Lique v. BELLOWS FALLS UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 27, et al.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 857

624 A.2d 857

160 Vt. 101, 82 Ed. Law Rep. 869

Patricia TROMBLEY and Georgia Lique v. BELLOWS FALLS UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 27, et al.

No. 91-392.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Feb. 26, 1993.

Stephen L. Fine, Athens, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Lawrence Miller and John Paul Faignant of Miller & Faignant, Rutland, for defendants-appellees.

Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.

DOOLEY, Justice.

Plaintiffs, residents of the Town of Rockingham, brought this action against their local union high school district, its board of directors, the chair of the board and the superintendent of the district, alleging that the board violated the open meeting law, 1 V.S.A. §§ 311-314, and the access to public records act, 1 V.S.A. §§ 315-320, in denying them information about a teachers' grievance. The Windsor Superior Court found no violation of either law. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the court misapplied the relevant laws. We reverse and remand.

This controversy started when the board reduced the budget for the district, in response to voter rejection of an earlier budget, by cutting some of the allocation for sports activities. Three athletic instructors complained about the action in a letter, sent out on official high school stationery, to voters in the district. The board, believing that the instructors had misused the school letterhead, voted to condemn the actions of the instructors. At a special meeting to reconsider the budget cuts, the board read its condemnation statement to the public.

The three instructors responded by filing a grievance contesting the condemnation. The grievance came before the board on July 19, 1990. Under the contract between the board and the Windham Northeast Education Association, the union representing teachers in the district, the grievants requested that the grievance be heard in executive session. The board agreed and so heard the grievance, which it denied on July 30, 1990.

On August 2, 1990, one of the plaintiffs requested to see the grievance and the response to it by the board, the superintendent and the principal of the high school. The superintendent denied this request. Plaintiff appealed the superintendent's decision to the chair of the board, who put it on the agenda for the next board meeting. On advice of counsel, the board adopted in open session on September 10, 1990, a resolution formally denying the grievance for the reasons stated in the July 30th written decision. The board denied plaintiff's appeal on the grounds that the documents requested were exempt from disclosure under 1 V.S.A. § 317(b)(7). This suit followed.

In a lengthy complaint, plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the board had violated the open meeting law, together with an injunction against further violations, (2) an order requiring disclosure of the documents, (3) a declaration that the board chair did not act timely in response to the appeal of the superintendent's denial of the documents, and (4) costs. The Windham Northeast Education Association was allowed to intervene as a party defendant. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court dismissed the complaint, holding that the grievance could be considered in executive session pursuant to 1 V.S.A. § 313(a)(1), that the decision on the grievance was valid, and that the documents are exempt from disclosure under 1 V.S.A. § 317(b)(7) because they relate to a personnel matter.

Plaintiffs first attack the court's decision that the grievance could be considered in executive session, claiming that the statutory requirements were not met. ¹ Specifically, they argue that the grievance hearing was a meeting of a public body that was required to be open to the public under 1 V.S.A. § 312(a), and that it could not be held in executive session under § 313(a)(1) because the statutory prerequisite that "premature general public knowledge would clearly place the ... public body[ ] or person involved at a substantial disadvantage" was not present. ² Defendants argue and the court held, that the language quoted above is an expression of why the Legislature found that grievances could be conducted in private, and not a prerequisite to an executive session in each case.

The open meeting law implements the command of Chapter I, Article 6 of the Vermont Constitution that officers of government are "trustees and servants" of the people and are "at all times, in a legal way, accountable to them." See 1 V.S.A. § 311; Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Institutional Animal Care & Use Committee, 159 Vt. 133, ----, 616 A.2d 224, 225 (1992). Although this Court has not previously addressed the question, courts in other jurisdictions have held that similar public meeting laws are entitled to a liberal construction in support of the goal of open access to public meetings for members of the public. See, e.g., Hinds County Board of Supervisors v. Common Cause, 551 So.2d 107, 110 (Miss.1989); Grein v. Board of Education, 216 Neb. 158, 343 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Neb.1984). Exemptions to these laws must be strictly construed. See, e.g., Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 183, 470 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Conn.1984); Orford Teachers Association v. Watson, 121 N.H. 118, 427 A.2d 21, 23 (N.H.1981). Further, in construing a statute, we presume that language is inserted in a statute advisedly. Clymer v. Webster, 156 Vt. 614, 625, 596 A.2d 905, 912 (1991). Thus, we do not construe the statute "in a way that renders a significant part of it pure surplusage." State v. Beattie, 157 Vt. 162, 165, 596 A.2d 919, 921 (1991).

Although the open meeting exemption in question covers consideration of grievances, it is subject to a proviso that requires circumstances "where premature general public knowledge would clearly place the ... public body, or person involved at a substantial disadvantage." ³ 1 V.S.A. § 313(a)(1). The board did not make a finding that the proviso applied in this case and defendants do not seriously contend that it could have made such a finding. The condemnation that the teachers grieved was public, as was the reason for the condemnation. There is no reason why "premature general public knowledge" would disadvantage the teachers or the board. Indeed, it is not the timing of disclosure that is in issue; defendants want to prevent disclosure at any time.

We cannot accept the trial court's conclusion that the proviso is merely a statement of policy and not a requirement. That conclusion is inconsistent with our canons of statutory construction and serves to expand, rather than strictly construe, the access exemption. Apparently, the trial court felt that application of the proviso in each individual case would be unworkable. We cannot agree. Open meeting laws exist in every state and at the federal level. See Note, New Jersey's Open Public Meetings Act: Has Five Years Brought "Sunshine" Over the Garden State?, 12 Rutgers L.J. 561, 561-62 nn. 4 & 5 (1981) (itemizing the state statutes and the federal statute). Most jurisdictions have personal privacy exemptions that require a public agency to evaluate the impact of public access in each case before it. See, e.g., Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 674 F.2d 921, 932-33, 938 (D.C.Cir.1982) (evaluating exemptions 9(B) and 6 of the Federal Sunshine Act); Attorney General v. School Committee of Northampton, 375 Mass. 127, 375 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (Mass.1978). It is not unworkable for a public body to make a careful analysis of need before deciding to go into executive session. In fact, in the absence of a case-by-case determination, the legislative policy of openness would be frustrated by the impossibility of describing in categorical terms, without being overinclusive, the permissible subjects of executive sessions. The exercise of judgment is inevitable.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on the open meeting claim. ⁴ We cannot find, however, that plaintiffs made the requisite showing to obtain relief. The open meeting law provides for a private right of action for a "person aggrieved by a violation of the provisions of this subchapter" to apply to superior court "for appropriate injunctive relief or for a declaratory judgment." 1 V.S.A. § 314(b). The complaint was filed long after the meeting in question, and there is no allegation that plaintiffs ever raised the issue at the time of the meeting or that they were even at the meeting. As shown by the summary judgment papers, plaintiffs' presuit actions were directed at obtaining access to the documents. Apparently, the issue first surfaced at a school board meeting some two months after the grievance hearing.

We need not define "aggrieved" in order to hold that plaintiffs must make some showing of injury to obtain relief. In the absence of an aggrieved individual, the attorney general may bring suit to enforce the statute. Id. On remand, the trial court must determine whether plaintiffs have the requisite standing to bring their open meeting claim.

The second claim involves plaintiffs' right of access to the grievance decision and related documents. The trial court ruled that the documents were covered by an exception to the disclosure requirements of the access to public records act (Public Records Act), which covers:

(7) personal documents relating to an individual, including information in any files maintained to hire, evaluate, promote or discipline any employee of a public agency, information in any files relating to personal finances, medical or psychological facts concerning any individual or corporation....

1 V.S.A. § 317(b)(7). Before we analyze the language of the exception, we stress that our overall approach to cases arising under the Public Records Act is similar to that for open meeting law cases. The Act is to be construed liberally. Id. § 315. It implements the policy that "the public interest clearly favors the right of...