Tropi-Cal v. United States
| Decision Date | 24 December 1969 |
| Docket Number | C.D. 3945 |
| Parties | TROPI-CAL <I>v.</I> UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Glad & Tuttle (Edward N. Glad of counsel) for the plaintiff.
William D. Ruckelshaus, Assistant Attorney General (Robert T. Richardson and Frederick L. Ikenson, trial attorneys), for the defendant.
Before WATSON, MALETZ, and RE, Judges
The protest in this case is limited to the merchandise described on the invoice as "#5127-TW victorian bed headboard". It was assessed for duty at 17 per centum ad valorem under paragraph 412 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified, as parts of furniture in chief value of wood. The plaintiff has protested the assessment and maintains that the merchandise is wood furniture under paragraph 412 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified, and is properly dutiable at 10½ per centum ad valorem.
At the trial, counsel for the plaintiff stated that the merchandise in the case at bar is identical to that in the case of Modernaire Furniture, Inc. v. United States, 39 Cust. Ct. 438, Abstract 61224 (1957), and the record of the Modernaire Furniture case was incorporated into the record of this case. Although the defendant did not object to the incorporation of the record of that case, no agreement or stipulation was entered into pertaining to the similarity of the merchandise. The official papers were received into evidence, but no witnesses were called and no exhibits were introduced.
The following are the pertinent competing statutory provisions:
Classified under:
Paragraph 412, Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by T.D. 54108:
"Furniture, wholly or partly finished, and parts
thereof, wholly or in chief value of wood, and
not specially provided for
* * * * * * *
Parts of any of the foregoing __________ 17% ad val."
Claimed under:
Paragraph 412, Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by T.D. 54108:
"Furniture, wholly or partly finished, and parts
thereof, wholly or in chief value of wood, and
not specially provided for
* * * * * * *
Other furniture ___________________ 10½% ad val."
In the Modernaire Furniture case, this court held that the bed headboards therein in issue were "in the category of `casual, auxiliary, or optional' articles and are accessories to the beds with which they may be used, rather than `integral, constituent, or component' parts whether considered in a utilitarian or decorative sense." Id. at 440. The court therefore held that the bed headboards in that case were not embraced by the provision for "parts of furniture" under which they were assessed, but were properly dutiable as claimed, under the provision for "furniture". A careful reading of the opinion of Judge Mollison in the Modernaire Furniture case, however, reveals that it is important to ascertain the nature of the particular headboards before they may be properly classified. Hence Judge Mollison quoted key paragraphs from two appellate court decisions. The first was a definition of the term "part" as found in the case of United States v. Willoughby Camera Stores, Inc., 21 CCPA 322, 324, T.D. 46851 (1933):
The second was a quotation from the case of Peter J. Schweitzer (Inc.) v. United States, 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. 285, 292, T.D. 42872 (1928), wherein the court stated:
In the Modernaire Furniture case the facts were not in dispute. The headboards in that case were of a type used in connection with box springs and mattresses. It was clear that they were not structurally a part of the bed, nor necessary to the functioning and use of the box spring and mattress as a bed. The sole purpose was ornamental. The defendant therein attempted to establish a refinement of the definition of parts, as given in the Willoughby Camera Stores case, and suggested that "the definition should be extended to cover parts which have a decorative or ornamental function only in connection with the articles of which they are parts." Modernaire Furniture, Inc. v. United States, 39 Cust. Ct. 438, 439, Abstract 61224 (1957). On the record in the Modernaire Furniture case the court did not deem it necessary to decide whether the definition of "parts" embraced those which supplied a decorative function only, as well as those which served a utilitarian purpose. Relying on the distinction made in the Peter J. Schweitzer case, the court held that the "headboards of the type of those at bar are accessory, as distinguished from integral parts of the beds with which they are used", and therefore sustained the protest.
A reading of the Modernaire Furniture case and the record therein, upon which plaintiff relies, demonstrates with abundant clarity that there is no rule for customs classification purposes that categorically applies to all bed headboards. As stated by counsel for plaintiff in the Modernaire Furniture case, "it is very important" to know the type of headboard that is the subject of the protest. For this reason the witness in that case compared various types of headboards, and stressed that the headboard therein served "no purpose at all" and that it was only "decorative" or "ornamental".
Although the plaintiff in the Modernaire Furniture case proved that the headboard in that case was an "accessory", as distinguished from an integral part of the bed, no such proof can be found in the case presently before the court. There is no evidence before the court from which the nature or type of the headboard may be discerned. No sample or exhibit was moved into evidence, nor was testimonial evidence given that would indicate that the controverted merchandise was the same as that in the Modernaire Furniture case. The present record merely reveals the...
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