Trost-Steffen v. Steffen, 61A05-0110-CV-441.

• Citation: 772 N.E.2d 500
• Decision Date: 30 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 61A05-0110-CV-441.,61A05-0110-CV-441.
• Parties: Catherine TROST-STEFFEN, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Kenneth L. STEFFEN, Appellee-Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

772 N.E.2d 500

Catherine TROST-STEFFEN, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Kenneth L. STEFFEN, Appellee-Respondent.

No. 61A05-0110-CV-441.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

July 30, 2002.

Rehearing Denied September 17, 2002.

Russell T. Clarke, Jr., Emswiller, Williams, Noland & Clarke, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Samuel A. Swaim, Hanner Hanner & Hanner, Rockville, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Catherine Trost-Steffen (Mother) appeals the trial court's order that dissolved her marriage to Kenneth L. Steffen (Father). She raises the following four restated issues:

I. Whether the trial court's property distribution, which awarded 85% of the net estate to Mother and 15% to Father, was erroneous because such distribution awarded only 24% of the jointly held property to Mother.

II. Whether the trial court properly valued stock in a closely-held corporation primarily owned and operated by Mother's family.

III. Whether the trial court properly awarded custody of the parties' minor children to Father.

IV. Whether the trial court erred when it imposed sanctions against Mother for noncompliance with discovery.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother and Father married in 1979 and separated in July 1999, when Mother filed her petition for dissolution of marriage. They are the parents of three children, B.S., A.S., and F.S. Both parties are well educated: Mother has a Masters' degree in speech and language pathology, and Father has a Ph.D. in horticulture.

The parties moved a number of times in pursuit of Father's education and career. After Father received his Bachelor's degree in 1979 from the University of Illinois, Mother and Father moved to Maryland where Father obtained his Master's degree. During this time, Mother worked at the Maryland School for the Deaf. After B.S. was born in 1982, they moved to Madison, Wisconsin, where Father entered the Ph.D. program at the University of Wisconsin. While there, A.S. and F.S. were born, and, for three years, Mother worked part-time as a research assistant for a speech pathology professor. In 1987, the parties relocated to the University of Kentucky, where Father engaged in post-doctorate work, and Mother began homeschooling the oldest child, B.S. In 1989, the family moved to Pennsylvania, where Father was an assistant professor at Penn State University. They remained in Pennsylvania for approximately seven years. During that time, Mother did not work outside the home, but homeschooled the children. Father was denied tenure in 1995, and, in 1996, the family moved to Parke County, Indiana, and began an organic farming operation, Quiet Springs Farm. Mother continued homeschooling the children, who "did very well." Appellant's Appendix at 70.

Each party brought to the marriage substantial financial resources. Additionally, during the marriage, Mother inherited or was gifted significant assets from her family. Her father began, and her family continues to own and operate, a business called CJT, Inc./Koolcarb ("CJT"), of which Mother is a director and receives annual director's fees in the amount of $2,400. In 1982 or 1983, Mother was gifted 3,804 shares of CJT; those remained in her name alone and were never commingled with joint assets. As of the date of separation, the parties jointly owned an additional 400 shares of CJT. The CJT stock generates annual dividends of approximately $32,000. In 1996, Mother received a $100,000 distribution from a trust established by her father, who died in 1992. That distribution was applied toward the purchase of the parties' Parke County home. Beginning in 1994, Mother also received annual gifts of $10,000, which were used to purchase marital assets and fund the family's expenses.

Following a physical altercation between the parties in June 1999, and after almost twenty years of marriage, Mother filed her petition for dissolution on July 2, 1999. Among other things, she requested temporary custody of the children, supervised visitation for Father, and possession of the marital residence. She also sought and obtained a temporary restraining order against Father. Shortly thereafter, Father filed a cross-petition for dissolution, in which he asked for emergency custody of the children. Upon Mother's request, the trial court conducted an in-camera interview of the children at the July 29, 1999 preliminary hearing. Following the hearing, the court awarded Father temporary custody of the children and possession of the marital residence and divided certain personal property and debts. Following this custody determination, the children were placed in public schools, and each of the children continued to excel academically. In September 1999, Dr. Richard Lawlor performed a custodial evaluation; he ultimately recommended that Father retain custody of the minor children.

During the pendency of the action, contentious discovery disputes arose concerning matters Father sought to discover regarding CJT, its stock ownership and restrictions on transfer, and the trust from which Mother had received the $100,000 distribution. Upon Father's motion to compel, the court ordered Mother to produce the requested information.

Pursuant to Father's request, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law dissolving the marriage. In its order, the trial court imposed sanctions against Mother for noncompliance with discovery, awarding Father fees. It also divided the marital estate, and in so doing valued the CJT stock, all of which the court awarded to Mother. Its division of property resulted in Mother receiving 85% of the net marital estate and Father receiving 15%. The court awarded custody of the minor children to Father. Mother now appeals, and Father requests appellate fees.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Distribution of the Marital Estate

The division of marital assets lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Wells v. Collins, 679 N.E.2d 915, 916 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Id. As a reviewing court, we may not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition of marital property. Marriage of Stetler, 657 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ind.Ct. App.1995),trans. denied (1996); see also Goodman v. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)

(reviewing division of property for abuse of discretion, we consider only evidence favorable to judgment). In addition, the party challenging the trial court's property division must overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the appropriate statutory guidelines. Wells, 679 N.E.2d at 916.

As stated earlier, the trial court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law at Father's request pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Our standard of review is therefore two-tiered; we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and then whether those findings support the judgment. Goodman, 754 N.E.2d at 599. On review, we do not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. T.R. 52(A). A finding is clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it. Bloodgood v. Bloodgood, 679 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). The judgment will be reversed only when clearly erroneous, i.e., when the judgment is unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions entered on the findings. Id.

Here, Mother's quarrel with the division of the marital estate is that she received only 24% of the jointly acquired property, despite making contributions of 45% to the acquisition of such property through supplying her gifts and inheritances to the family's maintenance and expenses, serving as homemaker, and successfully homeschooling the children. Specifically, Mother asserts that because of her significant financial and non-financial contributions, she should have received "an equal portion of the jointly acquired property[.]" Appellant's Brief at 17.

An equal division of marital property between the parties is presumed to be just and reasonable. IC XX-XX-X-X. However, the presumption that an equal division of marital property would be just and reasonable

may be rebutted by a party who presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and (B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

IC XX-XX-X-X.

In this case, the court deviated from the presumption and made an unequal division of the estate, awarding Mother approximately 85% of the net estate. In making its division, the court awarded to Mother all the CJT stock, namely 4204 shares (3804 in her name and all 400 joint shares), with a total value of $1,017,368.¹ Mother concedes that the stock in her individual name should be awarded to her, Appellant's Brief at 10, but argues that all joint property should be divided...