Trotter v. Klincar

• Decision Date: 27 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-2168,83-2168
• Citation: 748 F.2d 1177
• Parties: Clarence C. TROTTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul J. KLINCAR, Individually and as Acting Chairman of the Prison Review Board, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1177

748 F.2d 1177

40 Fed.R.Serv.2d 739

Clarence C. TROTTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul J. KLINCAR, Individually and as Acting Chairman of the Prison Review Board, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-2168.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 24, 1984.

Decided Nov. 27, 1984.

Darryl M. Bradford, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Imelda Terrazino, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before PELL and ESCHBACH, Circuit Judges, and WYATT, Senior District Judge. ^*

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Trotter contests the district court's grant of the defendants' summary-judgment motion in this Sec. 1983 action and asserts that the court below erred in its disposition of both his individual and class claims. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I

After serving a sentence in the Illinois prison system for a burglary conviction, Clarence C. Trotter was released on parole ¹ in April 1981 under the authority of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board ("Board"). On May 27, 1982, Trotter was arrested on theft and burglary charges. Bail was set at $12,000 on May 28. On that same day, however, a parole-violation warrant was served on Trotter and a "parole hold" went into effect, which prevented the accused from posting bond and obtaining release from custody.

Trotter, as a parolee charged with violating the conditions of his parole, was entitled to a preliminary parole-revocation hearing ("preliminary hearing") to determine whether there was probable cause "to hold the [parolee] for a revocation hearing." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, p 1003-3-9(c). Trotter received a copy of the parole-violation charges on August 9, 1982 and he was informed that a preliminary hearing was scheduled for August 16, 1982. In order to arrange for his legal counsel to be present, Trotter requested and received a continuance until August 27, 1982. Prior to that date, the hearing officer, defendant Sharon Everett, informed Trotter's counsel that her determination of probable cause would be based on the written report of Deputy Thedos, Officer Alessia, and Officer Lesko. Trotter's counsel then requested that Thedos, Alessia, and Lesko be present at the hearing, so that they could be questioned in Trotter's presence. Because it could not produce these witnesses by August 27, the Board rescheduled the hearing for September 15, 1982. ²

Trotter had retained two attorneys, Ms. Rhodes and Mr. Wedoff, to represent him at the preliminary hearing. However, on the day of the hearing, Ms. Everett informed Trotter's counsel that only Ms. Rhodes could be present at the proceeding. Mr. Wedoff telephoned the Executive Secretary of the Board, defendant Kaufmann, to protest the exclusion; Mr. Kaufmann, however, refused to overturn Ms. Everett's decision.

Trotter's counsel sought to make a tape recording of the proceedings; Ms. Everett, however, would not allow the device to be brought into the hearing room. Mr. Wedoff also protested this action to Mr. Kaufmann prior to the hearing, but the latter again refused to overrule Ms. Everett's decision.

The following individuals were present at the hearing: Mr. Nigro of the state's attorney's office, Ms. Everett, defendant Guthrie (a hearing officer for the Illinois Department of Corrections), Deputy Thedos, Officer Alessia, Officer Lesko, Trotter, and Ms. Rhodes. After calling the meeting to order, Ms. Everett read from the arrest report and asked the three witnesses whether the report was accurate. Each witness stated that the report was true and that Trotter was the person to whom the report referred. Trotter's counsel then endeavored to cross-examine. Mr. Nigro, however, objected to the initial question and Ms. Everett sustained the objection. She then stated that she had found the requisite probable cause and that she was closing the hearing. After a colloquy regarding the right of the parolee to question the witnesses, Ms. Everett allowed Trotter's counsel to ask Thedos, Alessia, and Lesko whether they would be willing to answer any further questions. After they had indicated that they would not, Ms. Everett stated once again that, on the basis of the written report and the testimony of the witnesses, she had found the necessary probable cause. Trotter's counsel again objected to the limitation on cross-examination. At that point the hearing was terminated.

Ms. Everett prepared a summary of the proceedings, which stated that the finding of probable cause was based on the written report and the testimony of Thedos, Alessia, and Lesko. Trotter was given a copy of this summary.

The defendants, after receiving a letter from Trotter's counsel protesting the manner in which the preliminary hearing was conducted, scheduled another hearing for November 9, 1982. It was subsequently rescheduled for November 12, so that Thedos, Alessia, and Lesko could be present. On November 10, however, Trotter's counsel was informed that the hearing had been cancelled; a second preliminary hearing never took place. Defendants Scillia and Thomas, officials of the Department of Corrections, conferred with the defendant members of the Board in making the determination that a second proceeding would not be held.

Trotter initiated this Sec. 1983 action in federal district court on November 18, 1982. The complaint, referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) and the Board's regulations, alleged that (1) Trotter had been improperly denied a prompt preliminary hearing, (2) his counsel had been arbitrarily barred from the hearing, (3) Trotter had been improperly denied the right to record the proceedings, and (4) cross-examination of the government's witnesses had been improperly denied. Trotter sought (1) compensatory and punitive damages for the alleged violation of his own constitutional rights and (2) injunctive and declaratory relief for himself and all other similarly situated parolees.

On January 27, 1983, Trotter was convicted of the burglary charges that had been the basis for the parole-violation warrant. He was given an eight-year sentence, to be served concurrently with the remainder of his sentence from the previous burglary conviction. A final parole-revocation hearing was held on February 15, 1983.

In an order dated May 26, 1983, the district court, ruling on Trotter's motion for partial summary judgment as to his individual claims and on the defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, entered judgment in favor of the defendants and against Trotter. Trotter v. Klincar, 566 F.Supp. 1059 (N.D.Ill. 1983). Relying on City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), the court held that, because Trotter had been convicted and a final parole-revocation hearing had already been provided, Trotter's individual claims for declaratory and injunctive relief arising from the conduct of the preliminary hearing were moot. The court also found that Trotter was no longer a suitable class representative. Because no class had been certified, the court reasoned that the putative class members had not acquired a separate legal status that would sustain their claims after those of the named representative had expired and also rejected Trotter's argument that the class claims were "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The class claims were, therefore, dismissed. 566 F.Supp. at 1062-63.

The court did not find that Trotter's damage claims had expired. However, in reliance on the decision of this court in United States ex rel. Powell v. Irving, 684 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1982), the court held that defendants Klincar, Kaufmann, Ewers, Everett, and the Board were absolutely immune from damage claims under Sec. 1983. As for the remaining defendants, the court concluded that the Illinois Department of Corrections was immune from damage claims under the Eleventh Amendment. It found, however, that the Amendment would not necessarily shield defendants Scillia and Thomas from personal liability under Sec. 1983, but that these officials were nonetheless entitled to qualified good-faith immunity. It was not necessary to consider whether such immunity was appropriate, however, as the court determined that no violation of Trotter's constitutional rights had occurred at the preliminary hearing. In view of the disposition of the federal claims, the court, citing the Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), declined to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claims. This appeal followed.

II

A. Damage Claims

As noted above, the district court, relying on Powell, supra, held that the defendant officials who had been directly involved with the preliminary hearing were entitled to absolute, "quasi-judicial," immunity. Thus, defendants Klincar, Kaufmann, Ewers, Everett, and Guthrie could not be held liable for damages under Sec. 1983. On appeal, Trotter argues that the court erred in relying on Powell, supra, and that these defendants can at best claim only qualified good-faith immunity for their actions. ³ We disagree.

Trotter first argues that the absolute immunity accorded in Powell, supra, extended only to activities associated with the Board's review of parole applications and that there is a substantial difference between that process and the one associated with the revocation of parole. We, however, agree with the district court's conclusion that "parole officials who decide parole applications are indistinguishable from parole officials who conduct preliminary and final parole revocation hearings." 566 F.Supp. at 1063. Indeed, this finding is fully supported by Powell, supra. Although that decision dealt with the Board's review of parole applications, the court adopted the analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.), cert....