Trotter v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
| Decision Date | 01 March 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 14,14 |
| Citation | 374 Mich. 682,133 N.W.2d 182 |
| Parties | George W. TROTTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
D. Bruce Wistrand, Flint, Donald T. Butler, Flint, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellant.
Hoffman & Rubenstein, by Gilbert Y. Rubenstein, Flint, for defendant-appellee.
Before the Entire Bench.
Defendant-appellee's counter-statement exhibits with clarity the question brought up by this appeal:
'Where both the application for a policy of life insurance and the 'conditional receipt' expressly provide that no insurance shall take effect unless the full first premium for the policy is paid, does the payment of $16.68 (the first monthly premium being $89.60) give rise to a cause of action for the proceeds (following death of the applicant) on a theory that acceptance of the application is to be implied from alleged unreasonable delay in acting thereon?'
There is no dispute about the facts. Ruth V. Johnson, plaintiff's sister, applied in writing August 3, 1961 to the defendant insurer for insurance of her life in the sum of $12,000. The stipulated premium (to be paid monthly) was $89.60. Mrs. Johnson paid the soliciting agent $16.68 only at the time of application and received from him a 'Conditional Receipt' which, as will presently appear, determined exclusively the rights and obligations of the parties. The receipt, copied in full, appears at end of this opinion as an appendix.
Mrs. Johnson died October 12, 1961, no policy having been prepared and no further dealings or conversations between the parties having taken place. This suit, the nature of which is indicated by the quoted counter-statement, followed defendant's subsequent notice of rejection of the application. It resulted in a judgment for defendant, entered on motion assigning failure of plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff has appealed.
No question of fraud is involved. The facts requisite to determination of the reviewable question appear in the written undertakings of the contracting parties as evidenced by the application for insurance and the receipt. The litigant parties agree that the application and the receipt are materially consistent. The application specifies choice by the applicant of the insurer's monthly premium payment plan; specifies that the amount paid 'in advance' is $16.68, and answers 'No' to the presented question, 'Does this equal or exceed first premium?'
Judge McGregor, in his opinion for grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment, analyzed properly the applicable portion of the conditional receipt. Having referred to controlling paragraph 'B' thereof, and having noted that 'the first month's premium or initial premium was not paid,' the judge found 'no ambiguity in any of the terms of the application or the receipt issued to the deceased as to when the insurance becomes effective.' Upon such findings the reviewed judgment was entered.
We concur with such findings and application of legal principles thereto. It is not claimed on review that the application and receipt are ambiguous, or that they are interpretively difficult of application to the conceded facts; hence the recent decision of Van Koevering v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., D.C., 234 F.Supp. 786 does not apply.* Nor does Wadsworth v. New York Life Insurance Co., 349 Mich. 240, 84 N.W.2d 513 provide any aid for plaintiff. The governing fact in this case, the contrary being so in Wadsworth, is that the applicant failed at any time to pay the stipulated 'first full premium' of $89.60. On that account no duty on the part of the insurer arose, either under the receipt or by fact, there being no or additional pleaded fact, there being no ambiguity or dispute of fact as in Van Koevering and it not being claimed that Mrs. Johnson availed herself of that which appears at the conclusion of the receipt, namely:
NOTE--unless the proposed owner receives a policy or the money is returned within six weeks from the date of this receipt, please notify The Prudential Insurance Company of America, giving the amount paid, date of payment, and name of person to whom paid. (See reverse for mailing address.)'
If, during that few days between expiration of the six week period and the date of her death, Mrs. Johnson had 'notified' the insurer and had paid or tendered payment of the remainder of that agreed 'first full premium,' the case would be here in altogether different posture. Such, however, was not done.
On the face of the pleadings and pretrial summary the result reached below was fully justified. Judgment affirmed. Costs to defendant.
APPENDIX
('Conditional Receipt' considered in opinion)
'CONDITIONAL RECEIPT
'THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
'Aug. 3, 1961
'Received from Mrs. Ruth Johnson the sum of $16.68, being...
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Shannon v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
...cases from other jurisdictions, in the absence of opinions directly on point in this State. In Trotter v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 374 Mich. 682, 133 N.W.2d 182 (1965), the Supreme Court of Michigan held that where the applicant failed to pay the full first premium prior to her ......
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Denney v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., Docket No. 3369
...instruction and a verdict entered for the plaintiff. We cannot see error here. The recent case of Trotter v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, Inc. (1965), 374 Mich. 682, 133 N.W.2d 182, has no application here. In that case there was no pretense that the original premium was paid wi......
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