Trotter v. Sacramento Hous. & Redevelopment Agency

• Decision Date: 28 September 2022
• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-1552-KJM-KJN PS
• Parties: CUPID MONIQUE TROTTER, Plaintiff, v. SACRAMENTO HOUSING AND REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

CUPID MONIQUE TROTTER, Plaintiff, v. SACRAMENTO HOUSING AND REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-1552-KJM-KJN PS

United States District Court, E.D. California

September 28, 2022

ORDER GRANTING IFP REQUEST AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 2.)

KENDALL J. NEWMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff who is proceeding without counsel in this action, requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).^[1] (ECF No. 2.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (authorizing the commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees or security” by a person who is unable to pay such fees). Plaintiff's affidavit makes the required financial showing, and so plaintiff's request is granted.

However the determination that a plaintiff may proceed without payment of fees does not complete the inquiry. Under the IFP statute, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss any claims that are “frivolous or malicious,” fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Further, the federal court has an independent duty to ensure it has subject matter jurisdiction in the case. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004).

Legal Standards

i. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Frivolity

The court must dismiss a case if, at any time, it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(h)(3).^[2] A federal district court generally has original jurisdiction over a civil action when: (1) a federal question is presented in an action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) there is complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). A federal district court may hear and decide state-law claims along with federal-law claims where the claims are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Further, a plaintiff must have standing to assert a claim, which requires an injury in fact caused by defendant(s) that may be redressed in court. Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims that are “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974) (court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are “essentially fictitious,” “obviously frivolous” or “obviously without merit”); see also Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 549-50 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that the “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” standard for dismissing claims operates under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of federal question jurisdiction). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327; Rule 12(h)(3). ii. Federal Notice Pleading and a Complaint's Failure to State a Claim

Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading be “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. Rule 8(d)(1); see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (overruled on other grounds) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”).

A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if it either lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to allege a cognizable legal theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). A complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claims and must allege facts that state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint must also “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the well-pled factual allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). However, the court is not required to accept as true “legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). iii. Pleadings from Unrepresented Parties

Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal). Prior to dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and provide an opportunity to cure-if it appears at all possible the defects can be corrected. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, if amendment would be futile, no leave to amend need be given. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

Analysis

Plaintiff's complaint against defendants, the Sacramento Housing and Redevelopment Agency (“SHRA”) and specified board members, appears to allege violations of: (A) the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) via references to 42 U.S.C §§ 1437, 1472, 1485, 1486, 3601, and 12101 and 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.50 et seq.; (B) various civil rights; and (C) other statutes and sources of law (41 U.S.C. § 56503, Wagner-Stegall). (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff seeks $26 million in damages. (Id.)

Although courts construe pro se complaints liberally, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. As best as the court can tell, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to “supply her with livable housing units.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) However, plaintiff's complaint relies on blanket references to federal statutes and lacks sufficient factual allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A. Fair Housing Act Claim(s)

By referencing the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), plaintiff appears to claim defendants discriminated against her in failing to provide her with housing under the Section 8 federal housing program. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff states that defendants “breached their duties to supply [her] with livable housing units” and “caused profound injury to plaintiff's equal opportunity to free and safe living...” (Id.) However, plaintiff's complaint fails to allege sufficient facts from which the court can reasonably infer that actionable discrimination occurred to support a claim under the FHA.

The FHA prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of [for example] race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” or a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) and (f). Under the FHA, it is unlawful to “engage in any conduct relating to the provision of housing which otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings to persons” because of a defined class. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b); see also 24 C.F.R. §100.50(b). Prohibitions by the FHA include a “[refusal] to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise [making] unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person” based on a protected class. (Id.) To establish a prima face case of disparate treatment under the FHA, a plaintiff must show (1) she is a member of a protected class who applied for and was qualified for housing, (2) the housing authority rejected her application based on their protected characteristic, and (3) that housing opportunities remained thereafter. See Community H., Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 F.3d 1041, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007).

With respect of plaintiff's FHA claim, the complaint lacks facts indicating she is a member of a protected class under the FHA, as well as that defendants refused to supply housing because of the protected characteristic. While plaintiff generally alleges defendants failed to supply plaintiff with livable housing, the complaint does not allow the court to infer that the refusal was due to improper discrimination. See Cabrera v. Alvarez, 977 F.Supp.2d 969, 976 (N.D Cal. 2013) (finding a claim of discrimination based...