Trottie v. Thaler
| Decision Date | 30 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:09-0435 |
| Parties | WILLIE TYRONE TROTTIE, Petitioner, v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Willie Tyrone Trottie is a Texas death row inmate. This case is before the Court on Trottie's Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 33), Respondent Rick Thaler's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 44), and Trottie's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 49). Having carefully considered the Petition, the Summary Judgment Motions, all the arguments and authorities submitted by counsel, and the entire record, the Court is of the opinion that Thaler's Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted, and Trottie's Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
Trottie and Barbara Canada met and began dating in 1989 or 1990, and soon began living together. In September 1992, Barbara left Trottie and moved in with her parents. Trottie threatened to kill Barbara if she did not return to him, and repeated the threat several times over the following months.
In April 1993, Trottie phoned Barbara and told her that he would kill her if she did not return to him by May 1. On May 3, Trottie called Barbara again and told her that her time was up and he intended to kill her and her brother Titus (because, he claimed, Titus kept Barbara from seeing him). At approximately 11:00 that night, Trottie forced his way into the Canada residence and began firing a semiautomatic 9mm pistol. He immediately shot Barbara's mother, sister, and Titus. Titus was wounded, but returned fire, hitting Trottie three times. Though wounded, Trottie cornered Barbara in a bedroom and shot her 11 times, stating: "Bitch, I told you I was going to kill you." Barbara died instantly. Trottie then returned to the living room where Titus was lying wounded. In the view of at least two small children, Trottie fired two shots into the back of Titus's head, killing him. Trottie left, and was arrested a short time later in the emergency room of a nearby hospital. The jury found Trottie guilty of capital murder for murdering Barbara and Titus Canada during the same criminal transaction.
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence that in 1988, Trottie pled guilty in Louisiana to theft of property valued at less than $100. In July 1990, he was arrested in Texas for unlawfully carrying a weapon. He pled guilty to that crime, as well. In September 1990, Trottie was convicted of theft in Texas and placed on probation. He violated a condition of the probation in February 1993. In October 1992, Trottie shot out the tires on Barbara Canada's car. The TCCA also noted that the evidence from the guilt/innocence phase established that Trottie unlawfully carried a handgun, and that the capital murder of Barbara and Titus Canada "was both premeditated and extreme." Trottie Appeal Op. at 1-5.
Van Curry testified that he worked with Trottie for six years through the Young Professionals of Houston program. Trottie got work as a security guard through the organization and, in exchange, did volunteer work for the organization. Curry testified that Trottie worked with children through the program and they had a good experience. Trottie had a positive attitude and Curry was impressed with Trottie's leadership. 22Tr. at 124-26.2
Trottie's mother and sister testified about Trottie's childhood. They testified that Trottie's parents stopped living together when Trottie was five years old. At first, the children lived with their mother. Shortly after the parents separated, Trottie's mother took the four youngest children to a motel where their father lived and told the children to wait for their father on a motel room doorstep. The oldest of the four children was nine years old. Trottie, the second oldest, was eight. After waiting for about 10 minutes, the children went to a grocery store because they were hungry. Store employees caught them stealing food,but then gave the food to them. The police eventually picked the children up and they were placed in foster care. Trottie ran away from his foster homes several times to try to find his mother or grandmother. Id. at 132-46. The defense also established that Trottie had no disciplinary problems in jail. Id. at 152-56.
Lynn Clark, Trottie's probation officer, testified that Trottie brought his nephew to see Clark because Trottie was concerned that the nephew was becoming involved with drugs. Trottie wanted Clark to tell his nephew about the criminal justice system, and help him get help for his drug use. Id. at 166.
Dr. Priscilla Ray testified that Trottie needed therapy and medication for depression and issues with abandonment. She also observed that Trottie might have strong reactions to rejection or abandonment by women because of his experiences in childhood. She opined that Trottie's abandonment by his mother may have played a part in his violent reaction to Barbara's rejection. During interviews, Trottie was remorseful. Dr. Ray also testified that she did not feel threatened by Trottie, and opined that he could become a productive member of society with treatment for depression. Id. at 172-77.
Based on this evidence, the jury found that there was a probability that Trottie would commit future acts of criminal violence constituting a continuing threat to society, and that the mitigating evidence was insufficient to warrant a life sentence. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to death.
The TCCA affirmed Trottie's conviction and sentence. Trottie v. State, No. 71,793 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 1995). Trottie filed his state application for a writ of habeascorpus on August 18, 1997. On July 10, 2008, the trial court submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that relief be denied. SH at 324-49.3 The TCCA adopted the findings and conclusions and denied relief on February 11, 2009. Ex Parte Trottie, No. 70,302-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2009) ("State Habeas Op.").
Trottie filed his initial federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus on February 13, 2009. He amended the petition on September 14, 2009, and March 4, 2010. Respondent answered the second amended petition and moved for summary judgment on December 20, 2010. Trottie responded and cross-moved for summary judgment on August 17, 2011.
This federal petition for habeas corpus relief is governed by the applicable provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 205-08 (2003); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 335-36 (1997). Under the AEDPA, federal habeas relief based upon claims that were adjudicated on the merits by the state courts cannot be granted unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002); Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1999).
For questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact adjudicated on the merits in state court, this Court may grant habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) only if the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [Supreme Court precedent]." See Kittelson v. Dretke, 426 F.3d 306, 318 (5th Cir. 2005). Under the "contrary to" clause, this Court may afford habeas relief only if "'the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by . . . [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than . . . [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000)), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 915 (2001)).
The "unreasonable application" standard permits federal habeas corpus relief only if a state court decision "identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case" or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. "In applying this standard, we must decide (1) what was the decision of the state courts with regard to the questions before us and (2) whether there is any established federal law, as explicated by the Supreme Court, with which the state court decision conflicts." Hoover v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1999). A federal court's "focus on the 'unreasonable application' test under Section 2254(d) should be on the ultimate legal conclusion that the state court reached and not onwhether the state court considered and discussed every angle of the evidence." Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 696 (5th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 286 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1104 (2003); see also Pape v. Thaler, 645 F.3d 281, 292-93 (5th Cir. 2011). The focus for a federal court under the "unreasonable application" prong is "whether the state court's determination is 'at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.'" Id. (); see also Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2001) (...
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