Trout v. Secretary of Navy

• Decision Date: 31 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-5325.,01-5325.
• Citation: 317 F.3d 286
• Parties: Yvonne G. TROUT, et al., Appellees, v. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY and Commanding Officer, Naval Command Systems Support Activity, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

317 F.3d 286

Yvonne G. TROUT, et al., Appellees, v. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY and Commanding Officer, Naval Command Systems Support Activity, Appellants.

No. 01-5325.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued December 6, 2002.

Decided January 31, 2003.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 73cv00055).

Daniel F. VanHorn, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Bradley G. McDonald argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were John F. Karl, Jr. and Nancy J. Malir.

Bruce A. Fredrickson, Susan L. Brackshaw, and Jonathan C. Puth were on the brief for amicus curiae Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association in support of appellees.

Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge:

In the most recent chapter of this extremely protracted litigation, the district court, invoking § 114(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Act"), Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified as an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d)), ordered the U.S. Navy to pay prejudgment interest on backpay and attorneys' fees for periods before November 21, 1991, to a class of women who successfully established that the Navy discriminated against them in employment on the basis of sex. Trout v. England, No. 73-55 (D.D.C. July 17, 2001); see also Trout v. Dalton, No. 73-55 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 1998); Trout v. Dalton, No. 73-55 (D.D.C. July 22, 1998). The Navy appeals on the ground that § 114(2) cannot be applied retroactively to periods predating November 21, 1991, when § 114(2) became effective, citing Brown v. Sec'y of the Army, 78 F.3d 645 (D.C.Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1040, 117 S.Ct. 607, 136 L.Ed.2d 533 (1997), as dispositive. Appellees would distinguish Brown on the ground that the Navy's liability was not finally determined until after § 114(2) became effective. Because the holding in Brown rested on considerations of sovereign immunity as enhanced by the rule of no-interest against the sovereign, it is dispositive, and accordingly we reverse the award of prejudgment interest to the Trout class for periods before November 21, 1991.

I.

In 1991, when Congress enacted § 114(2), the Trout class action was almost twenty years old. The litigation began in 1973 when Navy computer analyst Yvonne Trout and other female employees of the Navy's computer operations center sued the Navy for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The district court consolidated the complaints and certified a class of civilian women employees who worked for the Navy's computer operations center at any time between June 6, 1972 and June 4, 1979. In 1981, after a lengthy trial involving forty-two witnesses, more than 7,000 pages of exhibits, and extensive regression analyses demonstrating sex discrimination in the Navy's hiring, promotion, evaluation, and assignment of women, the district court found the Navy liable for violating Title VII, Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F.Supp. 873 (D.D.C.1981), and granted relief to the Trout class in the form of backpay. Trout v. Hidalgo, 1981 WL 416 (D.D.C.1981). Following appeals by the Navy, Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C.Cir.1983); vacated and remanded, Lehman v. Trout, 465 U.S. 1056, 104 S.Ct. 1404, 79 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), the district court reinstated its finding of discrimination in 1986 on remand. Trout v. Lehman, 652 F.Supp. 144 (D.D.C.1986).

On August 5, 1988, the district court made an interim award of attorneys' fees and costs to the Trout class, in the amounts of $276,044.00 and $15,434.01, respectively. Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.Supp. 3, 4 (D.D.C.1988). The Navy appealed the order to pay the interim attorneys' fees on grounds of sovereign immunity. Trout v. Garrett, 891 F.2d 332, 334 (D.C.Cir.1989). This court, on December 15, 1989, denied the Navy's petition for mandamus and dismissed the appeal because the Navy conceded, and the court agreed, that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) "waives the United States' immunity from claims, whether final or interim, for attorneys' fees as an element of costs." Id., 336.

While the award of interim attorneys' fees was pending appeal, the district court, on October 12, 1988, ordered backpay relief for the Trout class dating back to 1970, with individual hearings to be held before a special master to determine each claimant's entitlement. Trout v. Webb, 708 F.Supp. 358, 358-59 (D.D.C. 1988). After denying the Navy's motion for reconsideration, Trout v. Ball, 705 F.Supp. 705 (D.D.C.1989), the district court referred the claims to a special master with instructions to determine which statistical methodology was most appropriate for determining backpay. Id. at 358. By memoranda and orders of March 30, 1990 and December 27, 1990, the special master accepted the statistical analysis for calculating backpay provided by the Trout class, and identified the members of the class entitled to relief. Trout v. Garrett, 1990 WL 96640 (D.D.C.1990); Trout v. Garrett, 1990 WL 301806 (D.D.C.1990).

Six days after § 114(2) became effective, the district court, on November 27, 1991, issued an order that (1) identified the class members entitled to backpay, (2) accepted the special master's findings that the Trout class' regression analysis should be used to determine the amount of backpay, and (3) awarded an interim backpay award of $670,402.75 for the period from June 1970 through April 30, 1979. Trout v. Garrett, 780 F.Supp. 1396 (D.D.C.1991). Following this court's dismissal of the Navy's appeal of interim backpay for lack of jurisdiction, Trout v. Sec'y of the Navy, 971 F.2d 766 (D.C.Cir.1992) (per curiam), the district court ruled, on November 12, 1992, that the Trout class was entitled to additional backpay because of the Navy's "indefatigable" and "inappropriate" delay tactics spanning twenty years of litigation, and expanded the backpay award to cover "1979 to the present," then November 12, 1992. Trout v. O'Keefe, 144 F.R.D. 587, 588 (D.D.C.1992).

By stipulation of January 22, 1993, the parties agreed that the Trout class was entitled to additional backpay in the amount of $368,277.18 for the period from June 1, 1979 through December 31, 1991. In a settlement agreement of September 20, 1993, the parties agreed the eligible Trout class members were entitled to backpay through December 31, 1991, and attorneys fees through May 17, 1993; the Trout class reserved the right to seek interest on backpay and attorneys fees under § 114(2). The district court approved the settlement agreement on November 22, 1993. Regarding the reservation in the settlement agreement for interest, the Navy advised the district court that the government's position was that § 114(2) was not retroactive, and consequently, interest did not begin to run on backpay and attorneys' fees until November 21, 1991. By stipulation of May 10, 1995, the Navy agreed to pay interest on backpay and attorneys' fees awards beginning on November 21, 1991, again preserving the Trout class's right to seek interest for periods prior to November 21, 1991.

After this court issued its decision in Brown, 78 F.3d 645, holding that § 114(2) did not apply to a period before its effective date, the district court awarded the Trout class prejudgment interest back to 1970. Trout v. Dalton, No. 73-55 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 1998); Trout v. Dalton, No. 73-55 (D.D.C. July 22, 1998). The district court, adopting the Trout class' argument, interpreted Brown to bar § 114(2) interest only where the merits of the litigation had been completed before § 114(2) became effective, and concluded that "[b]ecause the instant case was very much alive and being actively litigated on [November 21, 1991], Brown is not dispositive and the [Trout class members] are entitled to prejudgment interest." While acknowledging that the "liability phase" had ended on April 25, 1990, the district court focused on the fact that the "award phase" was ongoing when § 114(2) became effective. The court entered a final judgment for the Trout class on July 17, 2001, ordering the Navy to pay prejudgment interest, based on the prime rate, on backpay in the amount of $8,627,276.40, and interest on attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,477,020.90. Trout v. England, No. 73-55 (D.D.C. July 17, 2001).

II.

Section 114(2) provides Title VII plaintiffs in suits against the federal government with "the same interest to compensate for delay in payment [as is available] in cases against nonpublic parties." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d). Whether § 114(2) permits prejudgment interest for periods prior November 21, 1991, when it became effective, is a question of law that the court reviews de novo. Herbert v. Nat'l Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992); Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C.Cir.1985). However, this appeal turns on the proper interpretation of Brown, which, absent en banc review, binds the court on the question of law. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C.Cir.1996). We turn, then, to an examination of the analysis in Brown.

A.

Statutes waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States are subject to the rule of strict construction. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 2963, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983). As such, waivers of sovereign immunity are to be read "no more broadly than [their] terms require." Brown, 78 F.3d at 649. Further, as the court had previously observed, "any doubts about the scope of a waiver [are to] be resolved in favor of the narrower governmental liability." Nichols v. Pierce, 740 F.2d 1249, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1984); see also Shaw, 478 U.S. at 318, 106 S.Ct. at 2963; Ruckelshaus, ...