Trout v. WCAB (TRANS CONTINENTAL)

• Decision Date: 19 November 2003
• Citation: Trout v. WCAB (TRANS CONTINENTAL), 836 A.2d 178 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)
• Parties: Patricia TROUT, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (TRANS CONTINENTAL REFRIGERATED), Respondent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

836 A.2d 178

Patricia TROUT, Petitioner, v.WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (TRANS CONTINENTAL REFRIGERATED), Respondent.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs August 22, 2003.

Decided November 19, 2003.

Michael G. Dryden, Philadelphia, for petitioner.

William E. Wyatt, Jr., Scranton, for respondent.

BEFORE: FRIEDMAN, Judge, and COHN, Judge, and McCLOSKEY, Senior Judge.

OPINION BY Judge FRIEDMAN.

Patricia Trout(Claimant)petitions for review of the May 13, 2003, order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board(WCAB) reversing the decision of a workers' compensation judge (WCJ) to grant Claimant's reinstatement petition.We reverse.

Claimant sustained a knee injury in the course and scope of her employment as a truck driver with Trans Continental Refrigerated (Employer)¹ on December 19, 1996, and received workers' compensation benefits pursuant to a Notice of Compensation Payable.These benefits continued until Claimant returned to a light-duty job with Employer checking refrigerated loads at a site near Claimant's home in Somerdale, New Jersey.(WCJ's Findings of Fact, No. 3.)When this job expired, Claimant was reinstated on workers' compensation until benefits again were suspended in February of 2001, when Claimant returned to light-duty work with Employer as a traveling field recruiter with no loss of earnings.In the field recruiter position, Claimant was provided with a company vehicle and was required to visit truck stops within a 100 to 150-mile radius of her home to recruit truck drivers for Employer.(WCJ's Findings of Fact, No. 4.)Claimant worked in this position until June 21, 2001, when she was told she would be transferred to Employer's Pittston, Pennsylvania location, which is 150 miles from Claimant's home.Claimant found she could not continue in the recruiter position once she was transferred because working in Pittston involved a daily commute of three-hours each way and meant that she could not get back home following her work day.(WCJ's Findings of Fact, No. 5.)She notified Employer of her dilemma and declined to accept the transfer.On July 3, 2001, Claimant filed a petition for reinstatement of her workers' compensation benefits, alleging that she was once again disabled from her December 19, 1996, work-related injury.(WCJ's Findings of Fact, Nos. 1 and 5.)

At a hearing on the matter,²Claimant testified on her own behalf and explained the circumstances that necessitated her departure from her employment with Employer.Claimant testified that, when she took the field recruiter job initially, she understood that she would be traveling from truck stop to truck stop within a hundred mile radius of her home to try and recruit drivers for Employer.However, within a week, she was told that there was not enough work for her within that distance, and she would have to go outside the area initially prescribed.³Claimant accepted that change, as well as two pay cuts, without complaint.(R.R.at 9a-11a.)Claimant testified that she had never been told that there was a problem with her work, and she was never disciplined; however, on June 21, 2001, about four months after she began, Claimant was informed that she would no longer be a field recruiter.Instead, she was told that she would work permanently out of Employer's Pittston office and had to recruit from that location six days a week.⁴(R.R.at 12a, 20a.)

Claimant admitted that no one at Employer fired her.(R.R.at 27a.)Claimant stated that she called her supervisor, Fred Magnotta, and left a voice mail message indicating her decision not to accept the permanent position in Pittston.Claimant explained that Pittston was 150 miles from her home, and the 300-mile, six-hour daily commute, combined with the required minimum fifty-hour work week, (R.R.at 73a, 79a), would create a hardship for her.(R.R.at 13a, 28a, 30a.)As Claimant stated, "[e]ven with traveling outside the one hundred mile radius, there was still a substantial amount of time that I could be near the house with the outside recruiting job.Being stationed up here six days a week, I would have no time at all at home."(R.R.at 30a.)Claimant testified that she never quit or left the original field recruiter job and would return to that position.⁵(R.R.at 13a.)

Employer defended against Claimant's reinstatement petition by contending that Claimant voluntarily quit her employment, thereby creating her own temporary total disability status.In furtherance of this position, Employer presented the testimony of Fred Magnotta, Claimant's immediate supervisor.⁶(WCJ's Findings of Fact, No. 6.)Magnotta testified that Claimant initially performed well as a recruiter, but when her numbers started to fall off in April or May, he made the decision to move Claimant to Pittston, Employer's best recruiting spot, where she would be required to report eleven out of every fourteen days.(R.R.at 37a-39a, 43a-45a.)

Magnotta acknowledged that, in Claimant's original position as a field recruiter, she did not have to stay in any place for a specific period of time.He stated "there [are] times you're away from home a lot," but "you're pretty much on your own ... you're your own boss."(R.R.at 35a, 54a-55a.)Magnotta also admitted that, in offering the original field recruiter position to Claimant, Employer specified a range within which Claimant would be expected to recruit drivers, and Magnotta conceded that, at 150 miles from Claimant's home, Pittston was further than any of these locations.(R.R.at 54a.)However, according to Magnotta, Claimant's transfer to the Pittston location was not permanent; rather, she was placed there temporarily, until her volume of driver applications increased dramatically.⁷Magnotta felt that this transfer actually was a way of helping Claimant, whose applications were falling off in her New Jersey location, to see if she could improve.(WCJ's Findings of Fact, No. 7;R.R.at 40a, 44a-45a.)

After considering this testimony, the WCJ made the following relevant findings:

8.Under the circumstances, we do not find that either party acted unreasonably.We understand that it was difficult for the Claimant living in Somerdale, New Jersey to work in Pittston every day but we can also understand the Employer's position that the Claimant was required to travel whether she was based in Somerdale or Pittston.Nevertheless, if she had to travel 150 miles to and from work every day it would be a hardship for her.

9.Keeping in mind that the Workers' Compensation Act[(Act)⁸] is a remedial piece of legislation and also looking at the Claimant's past work history wherein she worked steadily as a truck driver and then as a reefer checker, we do not find the Claimant's motives in terminating her employment with [Employer] when she was transferred to Pittston were in bad faith but rather were done out of practicality.

10.We do not find any fault with [Employer], after all they are a business and had a legitimate reason to try to increase the Claimant's productivity.Unfortunately, their efforts should have been concentrated closer to the Claimant's home or it should have been made clear to the Claimant that her relocation, away from home was only a temporary transfer.

11.We find under the circumstances that the Claimant is out of work through no fault of her own and is still suffering from the residuals of her work injury thus her benefits should be reinstated.We understand that the Employer also feels that the Claimant has recovered from her work injury and can return to work anywhere but that litigation is for another day.

(WCJ's Findings of Fact, Nos. 8-11.)Based on these findings, the WCJ concluded that suitable work no longer was available to Claimant in her locale, and, therefore, Claimant's workers' compensation benefits should be reinstated.(WCJ's Conclusions of Law, No. 2.)

Employer appealed to the WCAB, again asserting that Claimant had voluntarily left her employment and, therefore, reinstatement of benefits was not appropriate.The WCAB agreed with Employer and reversed the WCJ, concluding that Claimant created her own loss of earnings when she voluntarily quit her light-duty job for reasons unrelated to the work-related injury.

Claimant now petitions this court for review,⁹ arguing that the WCAB erred by reversing the WCJ's reinstatement of Claimant's benefits.Claimant asserts that the WCAB applied the wrong standard in evaluating whether reinstatement was appropriate because the evidence establishes that Claimant did not voluntarily quit an ongoing available light-duty job, but, instead, declined to accept a newly offered light-duty position that was unavailable to her.We agree with Claimant.

A claimant seeking reinstatement following a suspension of benefits must demonstrate that: (1) through no fault of his or her own, the claimant's earning power is once again adversely affected by his or her disability; and (2) the disability which gave rise to the original claim continues.Latta v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Latrobe Die Casting Co.),537 Pa. 223, 642 A.2d 1083(1994);Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Division,526 Pa. 25, 584 A.2d 301(1990).

In concluding that Claimant did not satisfy this burden of proof, the WCAB likened Claimant's situation to that of the claimants in Campbell v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board(Foamex),707 A.2d 1188(Pa.Cmwlth.1998), and Beattie v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board(Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.),713 A.2d 187(Pa.Cmwlth.1998).¹⁰In each of those cases, the claimant sustained a work-related injury and had benefits suspended after returning to modified work without a loss of wages.Subsequently, each claimant left the modified position which served as the basis for the suspension of benefits and sought reinstatement of total disability benefits.In each case, this court held that, because the claimant voluntarily quit his job for personal reasons,...