Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 03 March 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-742-DJH-CHL
• Parties: STEPHANIE TROUTMAN, as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Troutman, Jr., Plaintiff, v. LOUISVILLE METRO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

STEPHANIE TROUTMAN, as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Troutman, Jr., Plaintiff, v. LOUISVILLE METRO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-742-DJH-CHL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION

March 3, 2020

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Stephanie Troutman alleges that her father, Charles Troutman, Jr., died as a result of the gross negligence and deliberate indifference of Defendants Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government, Mark Bolton, and James Cox (Metro Defendants). As administratrix of Charles Troutman's estate, Stephanie Troutman asserts violations of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims of negligence and wrongful death. (Docket No. 7) The Metro Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Stephanie's claims against them. (D.N. 140) For the reasons set out below, the Court will grant the Metro Defendants' motion as to the federal claims and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, which are dismissed without prejudice.

I.

Charles Troutman, Jr., was arrested for drug-related offenses on November 12, 2015, and booked into Louisville Metro Department of Corrections in the early morning hours of the following day. (D.N. 143-12, PageID # 3759) Charles's intake paperwork indicated that he was a daily user of heroin and methamphetamine (id., PageID # 3802), and that while he was not currently contemplating suicide, he had attempted it multiple times in the past. (Id., PageID # 3808) Charles also indicated at intake that he had not suffered any closed head trauma in the past year (id.), although Stephanie called the jail to report that her father had recently suffered a traumatic brain injury. (D.N. 143-16, PageID # 4185) That information was never conveyed to the medical staff. (D.N. 143-15, PageID # 4080)

While in a holding cell on the booking floor that same morning, Charles wrapped gauze around his neck and strangled himself. (D.N. 143-13, PageID # 3809) Medical personnel recorded the incident as an attempted suicide (id.), and placed Charles on "level one" observation for patient safety. (Id., PageID # 3941) Dr. Donna Smith evaluated Charles after the incident but did not consider it "serious" because Charles did not tighten the gauze around his neck, "he didn't hang from anything," and Charles himself reported that he attempted suicide because he "was mad at being ignored and wanted to get out of down there [booking]." (D.N. 143-15, PageID # 4086-87) The medical unit also instituted detox protocols based on Charles's history of substance abuse. (D.N. 143-12, PageID # 3761) A subsequent mental-health evaluation on November 15, 2015, indicated that Charles did not express "current ideation" of suicide, but medical personnel kept Charles on suicide-watch protocols for another day, until November 16, 2015. (D.N. 143-13, PageID # 3781) The mental-health staff observed Charles for three days and "not one person said that he was even suicidal, saw him crying, saw him sad, saw him with a flat affect." (D.N. 143-15, PageID # 4106)

Following three days of observation and the November 15 mental-health evaluation, the medical staff on November 17 cleared Charles for release to the general population and lifted the medical and detox protocols. (Id.) Charles was involved in a verbal altercation with another inmate the next day and then moved to the Community Corrections Center, a different area of thejail. (D.N. 143-12, PageID # 3761) Charles called and spoke to Stephanie several times following his release into the general population. They spoke about his case and attempted to secure money for bond. (D.N. 143-16, PageID # 4181-83) A week later, on November 24, Charles received a disciplinary write-up for fighting. (D.N. 143-12, PageID # 3761) Stephanie spoke to her father once more after the altercation, and Charles expressed his anger that he was moved. (D.N. 143-16, PageID # 4183-84) After this incident Officer James Cox, a member of the classification unit, transferred Charles to a single cell in the Hall of Justice, another area of the jail, pending disciplinary review. (Id.) Cox called the medical unit and informed Nurse Brown of the move as a courtesy and to ascertain whether the medical staff "had any objection to it." (D.N. 143-20, PageID # 4471) He never received a return phone call. (Id., PageID # 4479)

Following Charles's move to the single cell, LMDC officers saw "nothing [that] stood out" about Charles's behavior. (D.N. 143-10, PageID # 3476) LMDC did not receive any reports or warnings from other inmates about Charles that night. (D.N. 143-12, PageID # 3753) The corrections officers on duty the night of November 24, 2015, found Charles hanging unconscious from a sheet tied to the bars covering the window in his cell. The officers began CPR and utilized an automated external defibrillator in an attempt to resuscitate Charles. (D.N. 143-10, PageID # 3474) The charge nurse assisted in the lifesaving efforts and directed staff to call EMS, which transported Charles to University of Louisville Hospital. (D.N. 143-12, PageID # 3751) Sadly, Charles never regained consciousness and was pronounced dead on November 28, 2015. (Id.)

Stephanie filed this lawsuit on November 22, 2016 (D.N. 1), and amended her complaint to add Defendants Cox and Bolton on January 2, 2017. (D.N. 7) The Metro Defendants move for summary judgment (D.N. 140) and to exclude portions of Stephanie's expert testimony. (D.N. 141)

II.

Summary judgment is required when the moving party shows, using evidence in the record, "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see 56(c)(1). For purposes of summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). However, the Court "need consider only the cited materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see Shreve v. Franklin Cty., 743 F.3d 126, 136 (6th Cir. 2014). If the nonmoving party "fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)," the fact may be treated as undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(3). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each element of each of her claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

III.

Stephanie argues that the Metro Defendants' deliberate indifference caused her father's death. (D.N. 143, PageID # 979) Deliberate indifference can amount to a constitutional violation, and thus a successful claim under § 1983, because "[t]he Eighth Amendment 'forbids prison officials from unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on an inmate by acting with deliberate indifference toward [his] serious medical needs.'" Jones v. Muskegon Cty., 625 F.3d 935, 941 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)). This same protection is extended to pretrial detainees by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citation omitted). The deliberate-indifference standard contains both an objective and a subjective component. To satisfy the objective component, "the medical need'must be, objectively, sufficiently serious.'" Cooper v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 222 F. App'x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1970)). The subjective component "actually has three prongs embedded within it." Id. To meet the subjective component the plaintiff must establish "that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded the risk." Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

Taking all facts in the light most favorable to Stephanie, there is at least a material issue of fact as to the objective component. Charles took his own life only ten days after his initial suicide attempt, and "[i]t is well-established in this Circuit that suicidal tendencies are considered 'serious medical needs.'" Cooper, 222 F. App'x at 465 (citing Horn by Parks v. Madison Cty. Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Metro Defendants do not substantively argue the objective prong. (D.N. 140-1, PageID # 894)

This case turns on whether a material issue of fact remains regarding the Metro Defendants' culpability under the subjective component of the deliberate-indifference standard. The Court will consider whether the Metro Defendants have demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Stephanie's § 1983 claims against Cox, Bolton, and Louisville Metro.

A. James Cox

To determine whether Stephanie's claim against Cox survives, the Court asks whether a reasonable jury could find that Cox, "based on facts within his knowledge, drew the inference that there was a 'strong likelihood' that the decedent was suicidal, but then disregarded that risk." Galloway v. Anuszkiewicz, 518 F. App'x 330, 335 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Perez v. Oakland Cty., 466 F.3d 416, 424 (6th Cir. 2006)). Prisoner-suicide cases receive special consideration becauseof the difficulty inherent in predicting and preventing suicide. Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005). To account for this uncertainty, the Sixth Circuit has settled on a test that asks "whether the decedent showed a strong likelihood that he would attempt to take his own life in such a manner that failure to take adequate precautions amounted to deliberate indifference to the decedent's serious medical needs." Id. (quoting Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 239-40 (6th...