Trowell v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc.

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Decision Date: 23 July 2018
• Docket Number: No. 154476,154476
• Citation: Trowell v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc., No. 154476 (Mich. Jul 23, 2018)
• Parties: AUDREY TROWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTERS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

AUDREY TROWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTERS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 154476

STATE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

Argued on application for leave to appeal December 6, 2017

July 23, 2018

Syllabus

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

Reporter of Decisions: Kathryn L. Loomis

Audrey Trowell filed an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Providence Hospital and Medical Centers, Inc., after she sustained injuries while she was hospitalized. Venue was later transferred to the Oakland Circuit Court by stipulation. The injuries from which Trowell's complaint arose resulted when an aide, acting alone, attempted to assist Trowell to the bathroom and dropped her twice during the process. Trowell did not serve Providence Hospital with a notice of intent to sue and failed to file the lawsuit within the two-year period of limitations generally applicable to medical malpractice actions. Providence Hospital moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (statute of limitations) and (C)(8) (failure to state a claim). The court, COLLEEN A. O'BRIEN, J., concluded that Trowell's lawsuit sounded in medical malpractice and granted summary disposition in favor of Providence Hospital. Trowell moved for reconsideration and to amend the complaint, and the court denied both motions. Trowell appealed, arguing that the claim was not filed as a medical malpractice action but rather as an ordinary negligence action, that medical expertise was not necessary for a jury to determine whether a hospital aide dropping a patient constituted ordinary negligence, and that summary disposition was premature because discovery had not yet been completed. The Court of Appeals, MURPHY, P.J., and STEPHENS and BOONSTRA, JJ., reversed and remanded the case, concluding that it was impossible to discern the nature of Trowell's claims without additional factual development. 316 Mich App 680 (2016). Providence Hospital applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action. 500 Mich 965 (2017).

In a per curiam opinion signed by Chief Justice MARKMAN and Justices ZAHRA, BERNSTEIN, and WILDER, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:

Neither party submitted materials beyond the complaint concerning the nature of the claims at issue in this case, and thus review was properly limited to the complaint alone, regardless of whether Providence Hospital's motion was examined under the standards applicable to (C)(7) motions, (C)(8) motions, or some combination of both standards. The Court of Appeals erred by ordering further discovery to determine the nature of Trowell's claims; the nature of Trowell's claims had to be ascertained from the complaint itself under the facts of the case. With the exception of Trowell's claim regarding the second time the aide dropped her, the allegations in Trowell's complaint sounded in medical malpractice and thus were time-barred because the allegations involved matters of medical judgment in the course of Providence Hospital's professional relationship with Trowell and a jury was not likely to possess the knowledge and experience necessary to reach an informed decision as to those matters. However, Trowell's claim addressing the second drop sounded in ordinary negligence—a jury's common knowledge and experience was sufficient to inform its decision regarding the hospital employee's failure to take corrective action in the face of a known danger that had resulted in patient injury.

1. MCR 2.116(G)(5) states that when deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a court must consider, together with the pleadings, all documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties but that review of a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is limited to the pleadings. In this case, neither party submitted materials beyond the complaint regarding the nature of Trowell's claims and thus review was properly limited to the complaint alone. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred by ordering further discovery to determine the nature of Trowell's claims.

2. A claim sounds in medical malpractice if the conduct on which the claim is based occurred in the context of a professional relationship and the claim raises questions of medical judgment beyond the common knowledge and experience of a jury. Trowell's complaint contained the following claims: (1) insufficient staff to assist Trowell; (2) improper physical handling of Trowell, which claim could be further divided into a claim related to the first time Trowell was dropped and a claim related to the second time Trowell was dropped; (3) failure to properly supervise; and (4) failure to properly train. With the exception of the claim regarding the second time Trowell was dropped, these claims all sounded in medical malpractice. Staffing decisions and patient monitoring involve questions of professional medical management. Properly assisting Trowell required consideration of her individualized medical needs. Properly supervising Trowell's care while she was in Providence Hospital was beyond the common knowledge and experience of an ordinary layman. For a jury to determine whether Providence Hospital had properly trained its staff would have required expert testimony to explain the proper methods of moving Trowell and to identify Trowell's individualized needs. Accordingly, all but one of Trowell's claims sounded in medical malpractice and were time-barred.

3. The first time the aide dropped Trowell sounded in medical malpractice because the context of moving Trowell under the circumstances required medical judgment involving an individualized assessment of Trowell's needs. The second drop sounded in ordinary negligence because a jury relying on common knowledge and experience could determine whether Providence Hospital was negligent for failing to take corrective action in response to a known danger—that is, for failing to call for assistance or to retrieve additional equipment to aid in Trowell's movement after Trowell was dropped and injured the first time. Instead of taking corrective action, the aide attempted the same action that had already failed and had injured Trowell. Trowell's complaint, as it related to the second drop, set forth a claim that a jury relying only on common knowledge and experience could decide, and therefore, the claim sounded in ordinary negligence.

Reversed and remanded.

Justice VIVIANO, joined by Justices MCCORMACK and CLEMENT, concurring, agreed with the majority that the nature of the claims in Trowell's complaint should have been determined on the basis of the complaint alone and that Trowell's complaint contained only one allegation of ordinary negligence. However, Justice VIVIANO disagreed with the majority's reasoning. The majority based its conclusion on the fact that none of the parties submitted any material to the court in the matter. The problem with this rationale was that it implied that determining the nature of a claim can be converted into a factual issue when a party submits evidence on the matter. Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, 471 Mich 411 (2004), charted a wayward course that permits consideration of facts outside the pleadings to decide what claims a plaintiff has asserted. However, under basic pleading principles, the nature of claims must be determined by the sufficiency of the pleadings, not by the sufficiency of the evidence. A trial court, when faced with a motion alleging untimely claims that also requires the court to determine the nature of the claims, must, under MCR 2.116(C)(8), make the latter determination solely by reference to the complaint. Once the nature of a claim has been established, the court must then determine whether the claim was timely under MCR 2.116(C)(7). When a motion for summary disposition is based on MCR 2.116(C)(7), MCR 2.116(G)(5) directs courts to consider then-filed documentary evidence outside the pleadings—affidavits, depositions, admissions, etc. The majority reads a prohibition into the rule—according to the majority, a court is prohibited from ordering further factual development to decide the motion. But MCR 2.116(G)(5) is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion. Nothing in the rule establishes that a court is prohibited from considering any other evidence. The majority's approach allows the factual record in a case to crystallize even when discovery has not yet been completed. In fact, the Supreme Court has taken the opposite tack in past cases dealing with motions subject to MCR 2.116(G)(5). In addition, summary disposition is often premature without sufficient factual development, and dismissal without further factual development when a question of fact related to recovery exists may be inappropriate. In addition, MCR 2.116(I)(3) authorizes an immediate trial on disputed issues of fact when a motion for summary disposition is based on MCR 2.116(C)(7), suggesting that MCR 2.116(G)(5) is not a prohibition on evidentiary development. In this case, discovery was incomplete—Trowell had not yet even deposed the aide who dropped her, and the aide would have likely been the central witness. The majority's outcome would prevent a court from considering the aide's testimony simply because Providence Hospital successfully filed its motion for summary disposition before the conclusion of discovery. When determining the nature of a complaint, review is properly limited to the complaint alone.

OPINION

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

PER CURIAM.

At issue in this case is whether plaintiff's claims sound in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence. If her claims sound in medical malpractice, then they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions and defendant is entitled to summary...