Trowell v. Providence Hosp. & Med. Ctrs., Inc.

• Citation: 502 Mich. 509,918 N.W.2d 645
• Decision Date: 06 December 2017
• Docket Number: No. 154476,154476
• Parties: Audrey TROWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTERS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

502 Mich. 509

918 N.W.2d 645

Audrey TROWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTERS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 154476

Supreme Court of Michigan.

December 6, 2017

July 23, 2018

Carla D. Aikens, PC, Illinois (by Carla D. Aikens ), Olsman MacKenzie & Wallace (by Jules B. Olsman, Donna M. MacKenzie, and Ben C. Lesnick ), and Mark Granzotto, PC (by Mark Granzotto ), Michigan, for Audrey Trowell.

Grier, Copeland & Williams, PC (by Rhonda Y. Reid Williams) for Providence Hospital and Medical Centers, Inc.

Collins Einhorn Farrell PC (by Michael J. Cook ), for amici curiae, the West Branch Regional Medical Center.

Per Curiam.

At issue in this case is whether plaintiff’s claims sound in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence. If her claims sound in medical malpractice, then they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions and defendant is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). If her claims sound in ordinary negligence, then they are timely. The Court of Appeals held that it could not "conclude solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint ... that plaintiff’s claims sounded in medical malpractice."¹ It then remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether plaintiff’s claims sounded in medical malpractice, ordinary negligence, or both. We disagree with this approach. We hold that under the facts of this case, in which the only material submitted to the trial court was plaintiff’s complaint, the remand was improper and in determining the nature of plaintiff’s claims, the lower courts’ review was limited to the complaint alone. A proper review of the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint leads us to conclude that although the complaint includes some claims of medical malpractice, it also contains one claim of ordinary negligence. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff brought the present lawsuit on February 11, 2014, after sustaining injuries at defendant hospital. Three years earlier, on February 11, 2011, plaintiff was admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) at defendant hospital after an aneurysm

caused her to suffer a stroke and subsequently go into cardiac arrest. While in the ICU, she needed assistance to use the restroom. Her complaint alleges that an aide named Dana, acting alone, tried to move her to the bathroom and dropped plaintiff twice during the process. Specifically, the complaint alleges:

11. Although "Dana" was tasked with assisting Plaintiff with using the bathroom, she dropped Plaintiff, which caused Plaintiff to hit her head on her wheelchair.

12. "Dana" attempted to assist Plaintiff again after dropping her, but instead she dropped Plaintiff a second time.

13. As a result of her falls, Plaintiff suffered a torn rotator cuff which has required multiple surgeries, and treatment continues into the present time.

14. Further, an MRI revealed that Plaintiff had suffered bleeding on the brain

as a result of being dropped by Defendant’s nurse, "Dana."

15. Defendant hospital was negligent in one or more of the following particulars, departing from the standard of care in the community:

a. Failure to ensure the safety of Plaintiff while in Defendant’s hospital;

b. Failure to properly supervise the care of Plaintiff while in Defendant’s hospital;

c. Failure to provide an adequate number of nurses to assist Plaintiff while in Defendant’s hospital;

d. Failure to properly train "Dana" and other nurses in how to properly handle patients such as Plaintiff;e. Failure to exercise proper care to prevent Plaintiff from being injured while in Defendant’s hospital[.]

16. Defendant hospital was negligent through its agents, employees, and staff in failing to ensure the safety of Plaintiff.

17. The negligence of Defendant and its agents, employees and staff was the proximate [cause] of Plaintiff’s damages set forth below.

On January 9, 2015, after the parties had the opportunity to engage in more than 10 months of discovery but before discovery closed, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8), arguing that plaintiff’s claims sound in medical malpractice and thus are barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims.² That period is tolled when a plaintiff serves the defendant with a notice of intent to sue,³ which is required by MCL 600.2912b(1). But in this case, plaintiff never served a notice of intent to sue, and consequently the limitations period was never tolled.⁴ Thus, according to defendant, the complaint was untimely because it was filed more than two years after the claims accrued. In response, plaintiff argued that her complaint does not allege medical malpractice claims, but instead alleges ordinary negligence claims.

The trial court granted summary disposition to defendant on April 8, 2015, holding that plaintiff’s claims sound in medical malpractice, not ordinary negligence, because the claims involve a professional relationship between plaintiff and defendant and concern questions of defendant’s medical judgment.⁵

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.⁶ Its analysis was based on the distinctions between medical malpractice and ordinary negligence claims set forth by this Court in Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr., Inc .⁷ In applying Bryant , the Court of Appeals noted that it was "confined to examining the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint," but the "complaint is fairly vague and lacks elaboration in terms of describing and factually supporting the particular theories of negligence it sets forth, ostensibly because plaintiff was short on information concerning details of the incident...."⁸ The Court observed that, based on the language of plaintiff’s complaint, all of plaintiff’s allegations could involve matters of medical judgment in the course of a professional relationship with defendant and thus constitute medical malpractice claims.⁹ But the Court thought that plaintiff’s allegations could also be consistent with factual scenarios involving ordinary negligence. The Court determined that, without additional evidence, it was impossible to discern the nature of plaintiff’s claims.¹⁰ Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendant and remanded to the trial court for further factual development of the nature of plaintiff’s claims as pleaded in her complaint.¹¹

Citing Bryant , we ordered oral argument on defendant’s application for leave to appeal, directing the parties to address "whether the claims in the plaintiff’s complaint sound in ordinary negligence or medical malpractice[.]"¹²

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a claim sounds in ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.¹³

III. ANALYSIS

A medical malpractice claim is sometimes difficult to distinguish from an ordinary negligence claim.¹⁴ But the distinction is often critical.¹⁵ In this case, defendant contended in its motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8) that while plaintiff framed her claims as a "general negligence action," they "actually sound in medical malpractice" and are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff has argued that her claims are for ordinary negligence.

The Court of Appeals concluded in this case that "the allegations in the complaint did not lend themselves to a definitive determination that the negligence claims in plaintiff’s suit necessarily sounded in medical malpractice," and the panel therefore remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.¹⁶ Defendant disagrees with this approach, arguing that because it moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8), the court’s review of "allegations in [plaintiff’s] Complaint" was restricted "to the four corners of said Complaint." Implicit in this argument is the premise that a remand to the trial court is unnecessary because that court was limited to reviewing the complaint alone when deciding defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

A court is permitted to consider materials outside the pleadings when deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7).¹⁷ In contrast, "[o]nly the pleadings may be considered when the motion [for summary disposition] is based on subrule (C)(8)...."¹⁸ We need not decide in this case whether the trial court was required to look only to the complaint in reviewing defendant’s motion or whether it could have looked to other submitted evidence in ascertaining the nature of plaintiff’s claims. This is because, under MCR 2.116(G)(5), "[t]he affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties , must be considered by the court when the motion is based on subrule (C)(1)-(7) or (10)."¹⁹ In this case, neither party submitted materials beyond the complaint concerning the nature of the claims, and thus review is properly limited to the complaint alone, regardless of whether defendant’s motion is examined under the standards applicable to (C)(7) motions, (C)(8) motions, or some combination of both standards.²⁰

The Court of Appeals therefore erred by ordering further discovery to determine the nature of plaintiff’s claims, which must be ascertained from the complaint itself under the facts of this case. As with any such review of a complaint, "[a]ll well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant."²¹ And we disregard the labels given to the claims and instead read the complaint as a whole, seeking the gravamen of the claims.²²

IV. APPLICATION

The question remains as to what theory (or theories) plaintiff’s complaint actually sounds in. The Court of Appeals identified two claims in plaintiff’s complaint—"(1) the use of one nurse’s aide to...