Troy Campus v. City of Troy

• Decision Date: 04 May 1984
• Docket Number: Docket No. 66247
• Citation: 349 N.W.2d 177,132 Mich.App. 441
• Parties: TROY CAMPUS, a Michigan Co-Partnership, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF TROY, a Michigan Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 132 Mich.App. 441, 349 N.W.2d 177
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 177

349 N.W.2d 177

TROY CAMPUS, a Michigan Co-Partnership Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF TROY, a Michigan Municipal Corporation Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 66247.

132 Mich.App. 441, 349 N.W.2d 177

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 14, 1983.

Decided March 5, 1984.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1984.

Released for Publication May 4, 1984.

[132 MICHAPP 446] Keywell & Rosenfeld by Frederic I. Keywell and Dawn L. Phillips, Troy, for plaintiff.

John J. Martin, III, Asst. City Atty., Troy, for defendant.

[132 MICHAPP 447] Before DANHOF, C.J., BRONSON and PETERSON, ^* JJ.

BRONSON, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court's order upholding the validity of defendant's single-family zoning classification of property owned by plaintiff. We find that plaintiff met its burden of proving that the zoning classification of plaintiff's property does not reasonably advance any governmental interest and is therefore invalid. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff is a general co-partnership created for the purpose of developing low-rise medical and professional office buildings on the subject property. The subject property is a 17.6-acre L-shaped parcel of land (the Land) located on Crooks Road, north of Big Beaver Road, in the City of Troy. The Land is comprised of a long, narrow 15-acre rectangle, with frontage of approximately 500 feet on the east side of Crooks Road and a depth of approximately 1,317 feet, at the southwest end of which is appended an approximately 2.5-acre rectangle.

The Crooks-Big Beaver intersection is a major intersection in the City of Troy. Big Beaver Road is a principal east-west road in Troy. At the Crooks intersection it has four through lanes and two deceleration lanes for right turns. It also has a center median with two left-turn lanes.

In the vicinity of the intersection are a number of office buildings, including several high-rise buildings. Along both sides of Big Beaver Road in the one-mile stretch west from the Crooks intersection is a combination of office and commercial uses. Located in the vicinity of the Big Beaver-Coolidge intersection is the Somerset complex, [132 MICHAPP 448] consisting of a high-rise hotel and a regional shopping center, K Mart Corporation's international headquarters, and two major office developments.

For approximately one-quarter mile east along Big Beaver Road from the Crooks intersection is an area of intense office development, including two high-rise and several mid-rise office developments. Approximately one-quarter mile from the intersection are the entrance and exit ramps to I-75. Just east of I-75 on the north side of Big Beaver Road is the municipal office complex of the City of Troy.

Crooks Road, at the Big Beaver Road intersection, has four through lanes plus a right-turn deceleration lane. It is one of Troy's major north-south roads and is the third most heavily traveled road in the city. At present, Crooks Road in front of the Land has three lanes. Troy's master plan calls for a widening of Crooks Road north from the Land to the next mile road. At the northwest and southwest corners of the Crooks-Big Beaver intersection are two service stations. A 13-story highrise office building sits at the northeast corner and another office building is located at the southeast corner.

In the approximately 800-foot stretch of Crooks Road between the Land and the Big Beaver intersection are a mix of non-residential uses, both office and commercial. There is no residentially zoned land in that stretch of road. Directly to the south of the Land on the west side of Crooks Road are a 24-hour Denny's Restaurant, a small strip shopping center, several office developments, and a vacant parcel zoned for office use. ¹ Abutting the [132 MICHAPP 449] north and west boundary of the Land is a small single-family subdivision, consisting of older, low-cost homes.

Directly across Crooks Road from the Land is a vacant parcel, part of which is zoned for single-family use and part of which has recently been rezoned by the city for mid-rise office use. An office development plan has been approved for this parcel and the record indicates that improvements will be made to Crooks Road to accommodate the expected increased traffic generated by development of this parcel and the newly developed office building on the west side of Crooks Road (see fn. 1, supra ).

The Land is, and was at the time it was acquired, ² zoned R-1B. The R-1B zoning classification restricts the use of the Land to single-family detached dwellings, churches, schools, non-profit swimming pools, non-commercial recreational areas, and golf courses.

Plaintiff challenges the R-1B zoning classification on alternative constitutional grounds. Plaintiff contends that the classification does not reasonably further a legitimate governmental interest. Alternatively, plaintiff argues, the zoning classification amounts to a confiscation of plaintiff's property because it precludes use of the Land for any purposes to which the Land is reasonably adapted. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment if it shows either that the R-1B classification does not reasonably advance a governmental interest or that the classification amounts to a confiscation of plaintiff's [132 MICHAPP 450] property; plaintiff is not required to succeed on both arguments. Kropf, supra, 391 Mich. pp. 156-157, 215 N.W.2d 179.

In addressing plaintiff's confiscation claim, the trial court interpreted Michigan case law to require presentation of proofs as to all of the potential uses permitted by the R-1B classification. The court ruled that plaintiff had failed to sustain this burden of proof. The court opined that the Michigan rule was inequitable and expressed its preference for the rule set forth in Grimpel Associates v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 431, 393 N.Y.S.2d 373, 361 N.E.2d 1022 (1977), to the effect that plaintiff need not prove the unfeasibility of the Land's use for public or quasi-public purposes. Inviting appellate review, the trial court stated that it was not for it to follow the "sound public policy and cogent legal reasoning" embodied in Grimpel.

The trial court continued that since plaintiff had failed to make the required showing the court need not address the question of whether or not the Land could feasibly be developed for single-family residential use. In its amended findings of fact, the trial court found that reasonable governmental interests were advanced by the R-1B classification.

This Court, while giving deference to the findings of the trial court, must review the record in a zoning case de novo. Kropf, supra, 391 Mich. p. 163, 215 N.W.2d 179. Although we hold that the R-1B classification of plaintiff's property is invalid because it fails to reasonably advance a legitimate governmental interest, we feel it necessary also to discuss the fundamental issues raised by the trial court's view of the burden imposed on a landowner making a confiscation claim.

A zoning ordinance which substantially destroys the value of a parcel of property is void. Robyns v. [132 MICHAPP 451] Dearborn, 341 Mich. 495, 67 N.W.2d 718 (1954). Even though such an ordinance may advance the public welfare, it is invalid because it amounts to a condemnation of property for a public purpose without compensation. In Michigan, the test for determining whether a zoning ordinance is invalid because it is confiscatory is whether the restrictions the ordinance imposes on the use of the property "preclude its use for any purposes to which it is reasonably adapted". Kropf, supra, 391 Mich. pp. 162-163, 215 N.W.2d 179.

Plaintiff introduced evidence indicating that the Land has a negative value as a site for single-family homes. ³ We agree that, to establish confiscation, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the R-1B classification precludes use of the Land for any use to which it is reasonably adapted. Kropf, supra, pp. 162-163, 215 N.W.2d 179. We do not agree that this rule imposes a burden on plaintiff to positively show that the Land could not be reasonably adapted to each and every permitted use; specifically, we do not believe that plaintiff's failure to introduce evidence on the use of the property for churches, schools, non-profit swimming pools, non-commercial recreational areas, or golf courses precluded a finding of confiscation.

In Zaagman, supra, fn. 3, the Supreme Court found that a zoning ordinance precluded all reasonable uses of the property in question, but did [132 MICHAPP 452] not expressly consider each of the permitted uses. Similarly, in Schwartz v. City of Flint, 92 Mich.App. 495, 285 N.W.2d 344 (1979), lv. den. 408 Mich. 905 (1980), after remand 120 Mich.App. 449, 329 N.W.2d 26 (1982), this Court invalidated a zoning ordinance based on proofs showing that the property was undevelopable for single-family homes, without undertaking a consideration of the feasibility of any other uses permitted by the zoning ordinance.

In ruling that plaintiff had not met the required burden of proof, the trial court relied on White Lake Twp. v. Amos, 371 Mich. 693, 124 N.W.2d 803 (1963), where the Court refused to find a zoning ordinance invalid because the landowners showed only that the land was undevelopable for single-family housing, but did not show that the land was undevelopable pursuant to the other non-public uses permitted by the applicable ordinance. Accord, Davis v. Bridgeport Twp. Planning Comm, 55 Mich.App. 15, 222 N.W.2d 13 (1974).

In White Lake Twp., supra, and Davis, supra, the other uses permitted by the applicable ordinances were animal husbandry and farming, respectively, both of which are commercial activities. These cases do not stand for the proposition that a landowner, in order to prove confiscation, must show that his property is not developable for the public, religious, or non-profit uses permitted by a zoning ordinance; moreover, we do not believe that...